People v. Wafer

• Decision Date: 16 February 2022
• Docket Number: 153828
• Citation: People v. Wafer, 509 Mich. 31, 983 N.W.2d 315 (Mich. 2022)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore Paul WAFER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

509 Mich. 31

983 N.W.2d 315

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Theodore Paul WAFER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 153828

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal October 7, 2021

Decided February 16, 2022

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jon P. Wojtala, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, Timothy A. Baughman, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and Amanda Morris Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Jacqueline J. McCann, Michael L. Mittlestat, and Maya Menlo) for defendant.

Aaron Cyers in propria persona for Amicus Curiae

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

Viviano, J. Defendant Theodore Wafer was found guilty of both second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and statutory involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.329, and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms for those convictions. The convictions and sentences arose from defendant's shooting and killing of Renisha McBride. The issue presented in this case is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits these multiple punishments for the same homicide. We find the answer to this question in the statutory text establishing these crimes. To be guilty of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, an individual must have acted with malice. By contrast, the Legislature crafted the involuntary manslaughter statute to encompass certain conduct that occurred "without malice." MCL 750.329(1). By including this language, the Legislature provided a clear indication that it sought to prevent an individual from receiving punishments for both of these offenses in relation to a single homicide. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reached the opposite conclusion, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Renisha McBride. On the evening of November 1, 2013, McBride left her friend's home and crashed her vehicle into a parked car around 1:00 a.m. The owner of the parked car, seeing McBride walk away from the scene in an apparently injured state, called for an ambulance. McBride left before the ambulance arrived.

It is unclear what occurred from this point until McBride arrived at defendant's home half a mile away from the crash site some three hours later. But after 4:00 a.m., defendant awoke to the sound of banging on his door. Defendant testified that he was frightened and thought someone was trying to break into his home because his neighborhood had recently experienced an increase in crime and his vehicle had recently been vandalized. Defendant retrieved his shotgun from the closet, opened the home's front door a few inches (but kept the screen door shut), saw a person come toward the door, and raised his gun and shot. Defendant shot McBride in the face, killing her. Defendant called 911 at 4:42 a.m. and said that he "shot somebody on [his] front porch with a shotgun banging on [his] door."

At trial, defendant admitted to shooting McBride but asserted that it was in self-defense because he thought that McBride was trying to break into his home. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, statutory involuntary manslaughter, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years for the second-degree murder conviction and 7 to 15 years for the manslaughter conviction, to be served consecutively to a 2-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.

Defendant appealed as of right, alleging a host of errors, including that convicting him of and sentencing him for both second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because statutory manslaughter must be committed without malice whereas malice is an element of second-degree murder. U.S. Const., Am. V ; Const. 1963 art. 1, § 15. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed. Following the test set out in People v. Miller , 498 Mich. 13, 869 N.W.2d 204 (2015), the Court of Appeals majority first determined that the Legislature gave no clear indication of whether it wished to permit or prohibit multiple punishments. People v. Wafer , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 5, 2016 (Docket No. 324018), p. 9, 2016 WL 1358544. Therefore, the Court of Appeals majority proceeded to the second part of the Miller framework, comparing the abstract legal elements of each offense. Id. The Court of Appeals determined that defendant's two convictions did not constitute a double-jeopardy violation because each offense contained different elements. Id. In dissent, Judge SERVITTO would have concluded that the Legislature clearly indicated its intent to prohibit multiple punishments. Id. at 1-2 ( SERVITTO , J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). She wrote, "There would have been no need to add the limitation ‘but without malice ’ in the manslaughter statute had the Legislature intended to authorize dual punishments for both second degree murder and manslaughter under these circumstances." Id. at 3.

Defendant then sought leave to appeal in this Court. We heard argument on his claim that the jury instructions were improper but not on the double-jeopardy issue. We then denied leave to appeal. People v. Wafer , 501 Mich. 986, 907 N.W.2d 584 (2018). On defendant's motion for reconsideration, however, we granted argument on defendant's application, limited to his double-jeopardy claim. People v. Wafer , 505 Mich. 1112, 943 N.W.2d 379 (2020). The parties were directed to "address[ ] whether the defendant's convictions for second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and statutory manslaughter, MCL 750.329(1), violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy." Id. at 1113, 943 N.W.2d 379.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo questions of law regarding statutory interpretation and the application of the state and federal Constitutions. Miller , 498 Mich. at 16-17, 869 N.W.2d 204.

III. ANALYSIS

The issue in this case is whether defendant's dual convictions for second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter violate constitutional double-jeopardy protections. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" U.S. Const., Am. V. The Michigan Constitution similarly provides that "[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15. We have interpreted our double-jeopardy provision consistently with the federal provision. Miller , 498 Mich. at 17 n 9, 869 N.W.2d 204.

The prohibition against double jeopardy protects individuals in three ways: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. People v. Torres , 452 Mich. 43, 64, 549 N.W.2d 540 (1996), citing United States v. Wilson , 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975). The first two of these three protections concern the "successive prosecutions" strand of the Double Jeopardy Clause, while the third concerns the "multiple punishments" strand, which is before us in this case. Miller , 498 Mich. at 17, 869 N.W.2d 204.¹

As we explained in Miller , the multiple-punishments strand of double jeopardy "is designed to ensure that courts confine their sentences to the limits established by the Legislature and therefore acts as a restraint on the prosecutor and the Courts." Id. at 17-18, 869 N.W.2d 204 (cleaned up). It therefore does not prevent the Legislature from "specifically authoriz[ing] cumulative punishment under two statutes." Id. at 18, 869 N.W.2d 204 (cleaned up). "Conversely, where the Legislature expresses a clear intention in the plain language of a statute to prohibit multiple punishments, it will be a violation of the multiple punishments strand for a trial court to cumulatively punish a defendant for both offenses in a single trial." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the question of when multiple punishments are constitutionally permissible is a matter of determining what the Legislature intended. Id.

In Miller , we set forth a two-part test to determine when multiple punishments are, or are not, permitted.

The first step is to look to the ordinary meaning of the statute. If the Legislature has "clearly indicate[d] its intent with regard to the permissibility of multiple punishments," the inquiry ends here. Id. at 19, 869 N.W.2d 204. " ‘The touchstone of legislative intent is the statute's language,’ " and we accord clear and unambiguous language its ordinary meaning. People v. Hardy , 494 Mich. 430, 439, 835 N.W.2d 340 (2013) (citation omitted). However, if the intent is not apparent from the text, Michigan courts apply the abstract-legal-elements test under People v. Ream , 481 Mich. 223, 750 N.W.2d 536 (2008), and Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).² Using this tool of statutory interpretation, if each of the offenses for which defendant was convicted has an element that the other does not, then there is no double-jeopardy violation. Ream , 481 Mich. at 225-226, 750 N.W.2d 536.

To determine whether the Legislature authorized defendant's two convictions, we must first examine the two statutes at issue in this case. First, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder under MCL 750.317, which provides:

All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years, in the discretion of the court trying the same.

The elements of second-degree murder are "(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3)...