People v. Wager
| Citation | 173 A.D.3d 1352,103 N.Y.S.3d 627 |
| Decision Date | 13 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | 109549 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court Appellate Division |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward J. WAGER, Appellant. |
173 A.D.3d 1352
103 N.Y.S.3d 627
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Edward J. WAGER, Appellant.
109549
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Calendar Date: May 3, 2019
Decided and Entered: June 13, 2019
Brian M. Quinn, Albany, for appellant.
Karen A. Heggen, District Attorney, Ballston Spa (Gordon W. Eddy of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Rumsey, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Rumsey, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (Murphy III, J.), rendered November 9, 2016, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree (two counts), vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (two counts), aggravated driving while intoxicated and driving while intoxicated (two counts).
On June 20, 2015, Roxanne Opalka (hereinafter the victim) was killed when she was thrown from an all-terrain vehicle (hereinafter ATV) that defendant was allegedly operating while he was intoxicated. Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, one count of aggravated driving while intoxicated and two counts of driving while intoxicated.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to, among other things, suppress inculpatory statements that he had made to law enforcement officials after the accident. After a Huntley hearing, County Court denied defendant's motion, concluding that defendant was not in custody when he made the statements. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 5 to 15 years on each conviction of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree and to lesser concurrent prison terms on the other convictions. Defendant appeals.
Defendant first contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. He specifically argues that there is no evidence satisfying one of the elements of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.13(1) – operation of a motor
vehicle – because an ATV is not a motor vehicle. He further argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he was operating the ATV at the time of the accident. Defendant's legal sufficiency challenges are not preserved for our review because defense counsel's motion for a trial order of dismissal was not specifically directed at these alleged errors (see People v. Vega, 170 A.D.3d 1266, 1267, 95 N.Y.S.3d 620 [2019] ). Nevertheless, under our weight of evidence review, we must determine whether each element of the crimes for which defendant was convicted was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see id. ; People v. Junior, 119 A.D.3d 1228, 1229, 990 N.Y.S.2d 689 [2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 1044, 998 N.Y.S.2d 314, 23 N.E.3d 157 [2014] ).
"When undertaking a weight of the evidence review, we must first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and then weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence. When conducting this review, we consider the evidence in a neutral light and defer to the jury's credibility assessments" ( People v. Vega, 170 A.D.3d at 1268, 95 N.Y.S.3d 620 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). Defendant was charged with two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree under subdivisions (1) and (3) of Penal Law § 125.13 (counts 1 and 2). A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.13(1) "when he or she commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree ... while operating a motor vehicle" with a blood alcohol content (hereinafter BAC) of .18% or more by weight. We must therefore consider defendant's argument that an ATV is not a motor vehicle.
"Our task — as it is in every case involving statutory interpretation — is to ascertain the legislative intent and construe the pertinent statutes to effectuate that intent. As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof. If the words chosen have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, then there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning" ( People v. Roberts, 31 N.Y.3d 406, 418, 79 N.Y.S.3d 597, 104 N.E.3d 701 [2018] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted] ). "This is particularly important where the definition of a crime is at issue, because courts must be scrupulous in insuring that penal responsibility is not extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory
mandate" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ).
ATVs are specifically excluded by the plain language of the relevant definition of motor vehicle. As relevant herein, the Penal Law defines "vehicle" to include a "motor vehicle," which is further defined in the Vehicle and Traffic Law as "[e]very vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power, except ... [ATVs] as defined in [Vehicle and Traffic Law] article [48–B]" ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 [emphasis added]; see Penal Law § 10.00[14] ). This specific exclusion of ATVs from the definition of motor vehicle is further evident from two statutes that contain provisions that would be unnecessary if ATVs were included in the definition of motor vehicle. First, the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree contains separate provisions for incidents that arise from the operation of motor vehicles (see Penal Law § 125.12[1] ) and ATVs (see Penal Law § 125.12[3] ) and, second, the Vehicle and Traffic Law contains a provision specifically providing that ATVs are motor vehicles for the purpose of Vehicle and Traffic Law article 31, which prohibits the intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2404[5] ). Thus, we are constrained to conclude that ATVs are not motor vehicles for purposes of the Penal Law. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence does not support defendant's conviction for vehicular manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.13(1) (count 1).1
Defendant further argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was operating the ATV at the time of the accident. Monica Snedeker, the victim's friend, testified that she and the victim made plans to meet at Snedeker's home on the evening of the accident. When Snedeker arrived at her home at approximately 9:00 p.m., she noticed that John Hodgson, her then-boyfriend with whom she lived, and defendant had been drinking beer. After the victim arrived, all four – namely, the victim, Snedeker, Hodgson and defendant – sat by a fire and, after each of them had a beer, they drove two ATVs to a nearby restaurant. Snedeker explained that she drove an
ATV that belonged to Hodgson with Hodgson as a passenger and that defendant drove the second ATV, which he owned, with the victim as a passenger. The four of them spent approximately one hour at the restaurant, where they drank, talked and danced, before returning to Snedeker's home on the ATVs, again driven by Snedeker and defendant. When they arrived at Snedeker's house before midnight, Snedeker sat by the fire while the victim remained on defendant's ATV talking with defendant about a friend who could do "wheelies" on an ATV and requesting a ride. As Snedeker advised the victim to wait until morning, defendant got on the driver's seat of his ATV without wearing a helmet. The victim told Snedeker not to worry and "threw her helmet off," and defendant drove the ATV up the road with the victim riding as a passenger.
Snedeker testified that she heard the ATV traveling at a high speed for two or three minutes until it went silent. Snedeker said that she "had a bad feeling," so she drove her car up the road to look for the victim and defendant. She drove past a sharp curve in the road, located near the residence of David Winney and Teresa Winney, and proceeded approximately another mile before turning around to return home. She testified that it was raining and dark and that, as she approached the Winney residence, she saw the ATV on its side in the front yard. She then noticed defendant leaning against a pickup truck parked on that property. Snedeker testified that defendant did not answer when she asked him where the victim was and she could not...
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