People v. Wakat, 32829

Citation114 N.E.2d 706,415 Ill. 610
Decision Date24 September 1953
Docket NumberNo. 32829,32829
PartiesPEOPLE v. WAKAT.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and John Gutknecht, State's Attorney, of Chicago (John T. Gallagher, Robert McDonnell, and William J. McGah, Jr., all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Charles Shanner, and Calvin Sawyier, both of Chicago, for defendant in Error.

SCHAEFER, Chief Justice.

After a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the criminal court of Cook County set aside a judgment convicting Leslie George Wakat of burglary and sentencing him to the penitentiary, and granted him a new trial. By this writ of error, the People seek to review the judgment entered in the post-conviction proceeding.

Wakat was convicted after a jury trial and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a minimum term of ten and a maximum term of twenty years. In his original trial he was represented by the Public Defender. It is not disputed that he was without funds to finance a review of his conviction.

His petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 38, pars. 826-832, alleges that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction petitioner's constitutional rights were violated in numerous respects. Of the many claims made, only two are now pertinent: (1) that a written confession, admitted in evidence against him, had been dictated by the police and his signature thereto coerced, and (2) that perjured testimony was knowingly used against him by the prosecutin officers.

A motion by the People to dismiss the petition was sustained. Upon a writ of error, we reversed the order dismissing the petition, and remanded the cause with directions that the People file an answer and that a hearing be had upon the merits. The answer which was filed denied petitioner's allegations and with respect to the confession stated that in any event its voluntary character was res judicata because that issue was submitted and decided at the original trial. Evidence was heard, and at the conclusion of the hearing judgment was entered granting petitioner a new trial.

To reverse that judgment the People contend (1) that upon a post-conviction hearing an issue of fact which was previously decided adversely to the petitioner at his original trial cannot be questioned, but the hearing is to be limited to the existence of constitutional defects in the original proceedings which prevented a fair adjudication of the issue, and (2) that the post-conviction hearing judge erred in considering evidence which was not before the trial judge and in re-evaluating the credibility of witnesses who had testified at the original trial.

Wakat was first arrested on September 21, 1946, by police officers investigating an arson and a burglary. He was released on a writ of habeas corpus on September 24, but was re-arrested late in the afternoon of the same day. There is neither doubt nor denial that he sustained serious injuries while in police custody after his rearrest. A report of the county jail physician, who examined him on September 27, described the prisoner as suffering multiple bruises and large areas of hemorrhage under the skin, a fracture of a bone in the right arm and injuries to the left leg and knee. He was hospitalized for eleven days and medically treated for several weeks as a result of these injuries.

The substance of petitioner's testimony, both at the trial and at the post-conviction hearing is as follows: Soon after his rearrest on September 24, he was taken to the scene of the crimes of which he was suspected. While there, an officer named Harlib twisted his handcuffed arm behind his back and struck him in the face three or four times. Later he was taken to the police station gymnasium where he was beaten for half an hour with a stick, a sandbag, and two blackjacks wielded by four officers in the presence of the city fire attorney. After this occurrence, he was taken to various offices, then returned to the gymnasium where the beating was resumed and continued until he lost consciousness. When he revived in a cell the following morning, Officer Suckow showed him statements he had allegedly signed the previous evening and threatened him with further mistreatment if he did not 'go through' with his confession. When he asked Suckow for medical treatment he was told that a doctor would be called if he repeated the text of the written confession he had signed. Thereafter, he was questioned by an assistant State's Attorney, a police captain and other officials. While he answered the questions which they put to him, he said nothing of the beatings.

Of those charged with being present in the gymnasium when the alleged beatings occurred, two officers and the fire attorney testified that they had not struck petitioner and that no other person had struck him in their presence. A third officer, Suckow, was deceased at the time of the post-conviction hearing. At the trial Suckow had testified that the petitioner's injuries were received when he fell down a flight of stairs at the police station. Dr. Lipsey, Cook County jail physician, who examined petitioner, testified that his injuries could not have been caused by such a fall. At the post-conviction hearing there was testimony that Suckow had stated, at the petitioner's preliminary hearing, that petitioner was suffering from the injuries in question at the time of his arrest.

Harlib, the fourth officer, testified both at the original trial and at the post-conviction hearing, and it appears that certain discrepancies and incongruities in his testimony largely moved the hearing judge to set aside the conviction. Upon both occasions of his testimony, Harlib stated that he was taking petitioner to a washroom on the second floor of the police station shortly after the rearrest and that they became engaged in a tussle which caused both men to fall down a flight of stairs consisting of about thirty steps. Just what precipitated the scuffle was not clearly shown at the orignal trial, but at the second hearing Harlib said petitioner had lunged for the officer's revolver. Harlib testified that both he and the prisoner had been injured in the fall, and that for thirty days following September 27, 1946, he was confined in a sanitarium in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to receive treatment for his injuries.

At the post-conviction hearing, it was brought out for the first time that Harlib had stated to the sanitarium authorities who were making up his admission records that he had sustained his injuries when he fell while getting out of his automobile. The hospital records also showed that he was not admitted as a patient until October 6, 1946. On cross-examination, Harlib stated that he had not told the sanitarium authorities the true cause of his injuries because he was of a different religious faith than the hospital attendants and did not want to embarrass them or arouse their sympathy for him by...

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16 cases
  • Brooks v. Gladden
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • January 25, 1961
    ...recommend light sentence); People v. Morris, 1954, 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (incompetency of appointed counsel); People v. Wakat, 1953, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (coerced confession and perjured testimony); People v. Evans, 1952, 412 Ill. 616, 107 N.E.2d 839 (confession allegedly obt......
  • Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera v. State of New York Westover v. United States State of California v. Stewart 8212 761, 584
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1966
    ...948 (1954). See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, 95 L.Ed. 774 (1951). 7. In addition, see People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (C.A.7th Cir.1958) (defendant suffering from broken bones, multiple bruises and injuries suf......
  • Miranda v. State
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • October 10, 1966
    ...948 (1954). See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, 95 L.Ed. 774 (1951).7. In addition, see People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (C.A.7th Cir.1958) (defendant suffering from broken bones, multiple bruises and injuries suff......
  • People v. Miller
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 27, 2019
    ...in determining the defendant's claims. Ruiz II , 177 Ill. 2d at 383, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574 (quoting People v. Wakat , 415 Ill. 610, 616-17, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953) ). The trial court was vested with this latitude, even though the law in the case had remained exactly the same—unlike......
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