People v. Walker

• Decision Date: 10 July 1964
• Citation: 200 N.E.2d 779,252 N.Y.S.2d 96,14 N.Y.2d 901
• Parties: , 200 N.E.2d 779 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cora T. WALKER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 96

252 N.Y.S.2d 96

14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cora T. WALKER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Argued May 7, 1964.

Decided July 10, 1964.

Whitney North Seymour, Jr., New York City, for appellant.

Leo A. Larkin, Corp. Counsel (Edward J. McLaughlin and Seymour B. Quel, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Samuel D. Smoleff, New York City, for the Citizens Union of the City of New York, amicus curiae.

MEMORANDUM.

The judgment of conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered. The prosecution of defendant for violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law, Consol.Laws, c. 61-A, came closely in sequence upon the exposure by her of corrupt practices in the Department of Buildings. She contends that the prosecution was the result of an intentional discrimination which deprived her of the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. She was unduly restricted on the trial in her attempts to prove this contention. Latitude should be allowed in this complexarea of proof. We do not hold that defendant has demonstrated intentional discrimination in her prosecution. We rule, merely, that she should have a fair opportunity to establish it on her trial.

DESMOND, Chief Judge (dissenting).

I protest what appears to be the introduction into our criminal law of a novel and mischievous defense. Is a person guilty of crimes to go free because local officials were actuated by corrupt or vengeful motives in prosecuting? There is no precedent for such a holding. It will certainly worsen the current crisis in criminal law enforcement if we let the culprit go free because the police officer or inspector has not proceeded against every other guilty person. The gambler and the narcotics peddler (even the speeder) will have a new kind of license to violate the law. None of the earlier decisions go so far. From Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, to People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 A.D.2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, the cited cases all refer to a 'pattern of discrimination' (see People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 81, 96 N.E.2d 184, 186) meaning a situation where the statute itself contemplates or leads to discrimination or where a generally unenforced law is dug up to harass a particular defendant or group. What has all this to do with the State Multiple Dwelling Law and the New York City Administrative Code sections which, as our own records show, are enforced against building owners in thousands of cases?

I would affirm.

BURKE, Judge (dissenting).

If the constitutional defense of unequal protection of the laws were maintainable solely upon a showing of bad motive on the part of those responsible for the placing of the violations of which appellant is admittedly guilty, then I would concur for reversal. This, however, is not the law; nor does the court say it is. Since the legislation under which appellant has been convicted is itself valid, and since appellant is admittedly guilty of the violations, the defense of unequal protection is established only upon a showing of both bad motive in the subject case and non-enforcement as to others similarly situated (People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184; People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 A.D.2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128). The element of uneven enforcement is of the very essence and substance of the constitutional claim. The violations are not hypertechnical nor have they fallen into a sort of desuetude. The violations, among which are the creation of an additional room by a partition, an additional class B room out of a vestibule, and the maintenance of a defective sprinkler valve, are, in my experience, commonly enforced in New York City. In any event they should not be assumed to be dead letters in the total absence of evidence to that effect.

The fact that the trial court was apparently prepared to exclude any evidence other than that bearing directly on guilt or innocence does not excuse appellant from offering to prove all of the elements of her defense. Concededly, all her offers of proof went solely to the point of bad motive in her individual case. Sympathetic as we may be toward appellant's unfortunate position as the result of what she alleges were numerous bribe solicitations by Building Department officials, we have no license to play fast and loose with the elements of so volatile a doctrine as equal protection of the laws. If the statutory requirements to which appellant was held were generally enforced,...