People v. Walker (In re Commitment of Walker)

Decision Date26 September 2014
Docket NumberNo. 2–13–0372.,2–13–0372.
Citation19 N.E.3d 205
PartiesIn re COMMITMENT OF Frankie N. WALKER, Sr. (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Frankie N. Walker, Sr., Respondent–Appellant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Eric F. Rinehart, of Malia & Rinehart, of Waukegan, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine M. Doersch, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Respondent, Frankie N. Walker, Sr., was adjudicated a sexually violent person (SVP) and committed to confinement in a secure facility. He now appeals, raising a number of issues regarding the authority of the trial court and the conduct of the proceedings below. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In February 2007, the State filed a petition seeking respondent's commitment in accordance with the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act or SVPA) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2006)). The petition alleged that defendant had pleaded guilty to the offense of attempted predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. It also alleged that respondent had been diagnosed by Dr. Ray Quackenbush with paraphilia, not otherwise specified (NOS), nonconsent, which it described as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting [respondent's] emotional or volitional capacity, which predisposes [respondent] to commit acts of sexual violence.” It continued, Respondent is dangerous because this mental disorder makes it substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence.” Quackenbush's report was attached to the petition. Following a hearing, the trial court found that there was probable cause to believe that respondent is a sexually violent person within the meaning of section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2006) (“ ‘Sexually violent person’ means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.”)). In April 2007, pursuant to respondent's request, the trial court appointed Dr. Ronald Baron as respondent's expert. Respondent was also examined by Dr. Raymond Wood on behalf of the State.

¶ 4 On July 8, 2008, the parties entered into a stipulation. Before accepting the stipulation, the trial court addressed respondent:

“THE COURT: Before we go forward with [the stipulation], Mr. Walker, have you gone over all of this with [your attorney]?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any other questions or issues you need to go over with him?
[RESPONDENT]: No.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you do have the right to a jury trial. Your trial could be either in front of a Judge or in front of a jury. You understand that?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any other questions about that that you need to go over with [your attorney]?
[RESPONDENT]: About the trial? No, ma'am.
THE COURT: You understand that at the trial the State would bring in their witnesses who would testify. You understand that?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: [Your attorney] would have the ability to cross-examine or question them. You understand that?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: You could bring in witnesses.
[RESPONDENT]: Okay.
THE COURT: You could testify if you wanted to. Do you understand that?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: After going over this with [your attorney] again this is what you choose to do?
[RESPONDENT]: I do.
THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or threatened you to get you to do this?
[RESPONDENT]: No, ma'am.
THE COURT: Have you been promised anything?
[RESPONDENT]: No.”

The State then went over what Quackenbush and Wood would testify to. The trial court again addressed respondent:

“THE COURT: Mr. Walker, you have gone over that stipulation with [your attorney]?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand what was presented this morning?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes, I do.

After the stipulation was presented, the trial court stated, [B]ased on the stipulation the Court will find that you are a sexually violent person.”

¶ 5 The stipulation provided:

(1) “that [t]his Stipulation and Agreement is entered into by the Respondent freely and voluntarily and after consulting with his attorney,”
(2) “that the Respondent has read and understands the allegations and request for relief contained in the Petition for Sexually Violent Person Commitment filed herein,”
(3) “that Respondent understands that he has the right to deny the Petition or to admit to the Petition,”
(4) “that Respondent waives the right to have a mental health professional present evidence at trial,”
(5) “that Respondent waives his right to a trial by a jury or by a judge,”
(6) “that Respondent waives his right to present evidence at trial,”
(7) “that the Respondent waives his right to have the People prove that he is a sexually violent person beyond a reasonable doubt,”
(8) “that Respondent has been adjudicated delinquent of the sexually violent offense of Attempt Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault of a Child in Lake County, Illinois, in 2002, in case number 02 CF 448,” (9) “that if this case was to proceed to trial, the People would call Dr. Ray Quackenbush and Dr. Ray Wood to testify,”
(10) “that Dr. Quackenbush and Dr. Wood are experts in clinical psychology in the evaluation and treatment of sex offenders,”
(11) “that if Drs. Quackenbush and Wood were called to testify at trial, they would testify to facts and information as contained in their evaluation reports dated January 31, 2007 (Dr. Quackenbush) and May 25, 2007 (Dr. Wood), and previously filed in this cause, attached as Exhibits A and B,”
(12) “that if Drs. Quackenbush and Wood were called to testify at trial, they would testify that based on their experience, education, training, review of Respondent's records and their interviews of the Respondent, it is their opinion, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that the Respondent suffers from the mental disorders of Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified, Nonconsent (Dr. Quackenbush) and Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified, Sexually Attracted to Non–Consenting Females, Nonexclusive type and Pedophilia, Sexually Attracted to Females, Nonexclusive Type (Dr. Wood). Drs. Quackenbush and Wood would also testify that these mental disorders are congenital or acquired conditions that seriously affect the Respondent's emotional or volitional capacity and predispose him to engage in acts of sexual violence. Drs. Quackenbush and Wood would also testify that these mental disorders cause Respondent serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Drs. Quackenbush and Wood would also testify that Respondent is dangerous because his mental disorders make it substantially probable that Respondent will engage in future acts of sexual violence,”
(13) “that the Respondent is a sexually violent person,”
(14) “that Respondent has the right to a predispositional report and the right to a dispositional hearing,” and
(15) “that the Respondent is committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services for control, care and treatment in a secure setting until his dispositional hearing.”

Both respondent and his attorney personally signed the stipulation. The trial court also entered an agreed order on that date. The order found that respondent's attorney read to respondent—and that respondent understood—the allegations against him; that he understood that he could be committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) until he is no longer a sexually violent person; that respondent's attorney read to respondent—and that respondent understood—the stipulation; and that respondent is a sexually violent person. The court committed respondent to the custody of DHS. In September 2008, the court appointed Dr. Kirk Witherspoon to serve as respondent's expert. Respondent received Witherspoon's report on March 31, 2009.

¶ 6 On that same day, respondent moved to withdraw the stipulation. Respondent alleged that his decision to enter into the stipulation was based on the reports by Quackenbush and Wood. However, respondent alleged, there were several problems with the bases for their opinions. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court ruled, inter alia, that the mere fact that respondent found Witherspoon's report more favorable did not amount to a showing of good cause to withdraw the stipulation.

¶ 7 On July 16, 2009, respondent moved to proceed pro se. The trial court granted the motion. Respondent then moved the court to reconsider its denial of his motion to withdraw the stipulation. Respondent also sought the appointment of standby counsel. Both motions were denied. Respondent filed additional motions attacking the stipulation, all of which were denied. Respondent also unsuccessfully raised the issue of the effectiveness of the representation he had received.

¶ 8 A dispositional hearing was held over two dates in March 2013. At the beginning of the hearing, respondent informed the trial court that he was not prepared to proceed. The trial court noted that respondent had “filed the exact same motions since 2007 on the road towards the dispositional hearing.” It then ruled that the hearing would proceed.

¶ 9 The State called Wood, a clinical psychologist. Wood testified to his credentials, and the trial court recognized him as an expert in the field of “clinical and forensic psychology, specifically in the area of sexually violent persons' evaluations, diagnosis and risk assessment and treatment.” Respondent answered negatively when the trial court asked him if he had any objection. Wood examined respondent “relative to potential commitment as a sexually violent person.” Wood...

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8 cases
  • People v. Brown (In re Brown)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 3, 2021
    ...community. See In re Commitment of Adams , 2021 IL App (1st) 182049, ¶ 56, 455 Ill.Dec. 148, 191 N.E.3d 107 ; In re Commitment of Walker , 2014 IL App (2d) 130372, ¶ 74, 385 Ill.Dec. 647, 19 N.E.3d 205 ; In re Detention of Melcher , 2013 IL App (1st) 123085, ¶ 62, 377 Ill.Dec. 900, 2 N.E.3d......
  • People. v. T.R. (In re T.R.)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 28, 2019
    ...Krankel to other quasi-criminal proceedings, such as those under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (see In re Commitment of Walker , 2014 IL App (2d) 130372, ¶ 56, 385 Ill.Dec. 647, 19 N.E.3d 205 ), and suggests we do the same here. However, we conclude Walker is inapposite becaus......
  • People v. Chester (In re Chester)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 20, 2017
    ...under the Act, however, was considered by the appellate court in our neighboring Second District. In In re Commitment of Walker, 2014 IL App (2d) 130372, 385 Ill.Dec. 647, 19 N.E.3d 205, the parties entered a stipulation that provided, inter alia, that the respondent was a sexually violent ......
  • Noble v. Iowa Dist. Court for Muscatine Cnty., 17-0422
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • March 21, 2018
    ...stipulation and (iii) a court is not required to accept a stipulation regarding a question of law."); In re Commitment of Walker , 385 Ill.Dec. 647, 19 N.E.3d 205, 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) ("From the foregoing, we discern that a party may be relieved from a stipulation where it is clearly s......
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