People v. Walker

• Decision Date: 24 October 1977
• Docket Number: M,No. 2,2
• Citation: 259 N.W.2d 1,401 Mich. 572
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ulysses WALKER, Defendant-Appellee. ay Term. 401 Mich. 572, 259 N.W.2d 1
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 1

259 N.W.2d 1

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ulysses WALKER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2, May Term.

401 Mich. 572, 259 N.W.2d 1

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 24, 1977.

John A. Smietanka, Pros. Atty., St. Joseph by John Jeffrey Long, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

State Appellate Defender Office by Michael E. Turner, Asst. Defender, Detroit, Kenneth Griffith, Elgin Wheeler, Research Assistants, for defendant-appellee.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

Ulysses Walker was convicted by a jury on May 31, 1973, of possession and control of a controlled substance, heroin, in violation of M.C.L.A. § 335.153; M.S.A. § 18.1123, ¹ and was subsequently sentenced to a term of 21/2 to 4 years imprisonment. Prior to trial, defendant made a timely motion to quash the information and suppress evidence based on the claim that the police had no probable cause to arrest defendant. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for interlocutory appeal of this denial. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals as of right. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the seizure of heroin was unlawful because the police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant. 64 Mich.App. 138, 235 N.W.2d 85 (1975). We granted leave to appeal limited to the issue of whether the stop and arrest of defendant was unlawful, thereby rendering the evidence found at the scene of the arrest inadmissible. 396 Mich. 812 (1976). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated herein.

FACTS

Defendant was arrested for possession of narcotics at about 1 a.m. on February 28, 1971, by the Benton Township police, who were acting on an anonymous telephone tip. According to police testimony, the informant phoned the Benton Township Police Department at about 8:20 p.m. on February 27, 1971, and requested to speak with Captain Paul Farris. The caller was given a phone number at which Captain Farris could be reached. The informant called Captain Farris, insisted on remaining anonymous, and, according to Farris, told him that:

"Ulysses Walker left town a short time ago going to Detroit to pick up a load of dope, and that he would be driving either a bronze-colored Cadillac four-door with Indiana license plates or a black-over-yellow Oldsmobile four-door with Michigan plates, and that there would be two women in the car with him, and that they would be returning to Benton Harbor in approximately five hours and going to 668 Superior Street in the City of Benton Harbor."

After receiving the anonymous call, Captain Farris learned from the Benton Harbor Police Department that a Lucille Gayten lived at 668 Superior Street, and a LEIN report indicated that a 1969 Oldsmobile with 1970 Michigan plate GKV 275 was registered under the name of Ms. Gayten. Officers drove to 668 Superior Street and saw a bronze-colored Cadillac in the garage but not the Oldsmobile.

Captain Farris testified that after he received the anonymous tip he called Sergeant Lester at the police station, told him of the information he had received concerning defendant, and ordered him to determine which of the two cars were at the Superior Street address and then set up a surveillance to locate the other vehicle coming into Benton Harbor and to stop and make an arrest. At about 1 a.m., Sergeant Spencer and two other officers, who were waiting on the Main Street penetrator in an unmarked police car, spotted a black-over-yellow 1969 Oldsmobile with a 1970 Michigan license plate GKV 275 going west on the I-94 business loop into Benton Harbor. As the police car approached the Oldsmobile, the Oldsmobile switched lanes and then made a left turn about 100 yards down the road. Sergeant Lester testified that at this point, the police thought that they had been spotted by the people in the Oldsmobile so they then turned on the siren and the red flashing lights. The driver of the Oldsmobile testified that the unmarked car did not sound a siren or flash its lights. The police stopped the Oldsmobile by forcing it over to the side of the road. When the three police officers got out of their car the Oldsmobile "lurched" forward another three feet before again stopping.

Sergeant Spencer testified that he drew his gun, told the occupants of the Oldsmobile that they were under arrest, and ordered them all to get out of the car. Officers Spencer and Peters testified that as defendant hurriedly exited from the right rear door, he bent over low and made a quick underhanded "throwing motion". Peters saw a "white powdery substance flying through the wind" and after approaching defendant, saw a strip of white powder on the ground near the right rear tire and patches of white powder on the right rear door of the Oldsmobile. The powder was removed from the road and the car and identified as heroin at trial.

ISSUE

The decisive issue in this case is whether the police had probable cause to make a valid arrest, thereby rendering the heroin found at the scene of the arrest admissible into evidence against defendant. We hold that an anonymous tip may be the basis for probable cause to make an arrest if the information in the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent sources. Since we find that the police had probable cause to make a valid arrest of defendant, we need not address plaintiff's alternative theory that despite the fact that the police, with guns drawn, told the occupants of the stopped vehicle that they were all under arrest, the transaction constituted an investigatory stop, in accordance with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

The test for determining when probable cause may be established solely upon the basis of information from an informant or upon such information and corroborating facts has been developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). In Aguilar, the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause for a warrantless arrest is established if the informant's tip meets two requirements: (1) "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were" must be disclosed, and (2) "some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was 'credible' or his information 'reliable' " must be shown. 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723. This two-prong test was further developed in Spinelli, where the affiant swore that his informant was reliable, but gave the magistrate no grounds to support his conclusion.

In regard to the first prong of the test, the Spinelli Court said that "(i)n the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail so that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation". 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. The Court in Spinelli found the detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), a "suitable benchmark". 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. In Draper, the informant reported that the accused was selling narcotics and that he would return from Chicago by train on one of two days with narcotics. The informant also described Draper and his clothing and said that he would be carrying a tan zipper bag and that he habitually walked "real fast". As the Court explained in Spinelli, "(a) magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way". 393 U.S. 410, 417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637.

In the instant case, the anonymous informant indicated to Captain Farris that defendant had just driven to Detroit to pick up a "load of dope" and would return to Benton Harbor in approximately five hours. Further, the informant revealed that defendant would be riding in one of two automobiles, which he described in detail, and would be riding with two women. Finally, the caller said that defendant would be going to 668 Superior Street upon his return to Benton Harbor.

We believe that the tip received by Captain Farris described defendant's criminal venture in sufficient detail so that the police could reasonably infer that they were relying on "something more substantial than a casual rumor" or information based on "an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar". Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Indeed, the informant revealed where defendant was going, the illegal purpose of the trip, a description of the two automobiles to which he had access, the approximate time of his return, the number of people with whom he would be traveling, and the address of his eventual destination. To be sure, the facts supplied by the anonymous informant in the instant case were substantially more numerous and detailed than those contained in the tip received in Spinelli. ² Accordingly, we hold that, as in Draper, the informant's tip in the instant case contained sufficient self-verifying detail to warrant an inference that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner.

Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that the fact that the informant in Draper had supplied reliable information in the past precludes the drawing of an inference in the instant case that the detailed nature of the tip given to Captain Farris indicated that the information was gained in a reliable way. We find, however, that reliance on this distinguishing fact is misplaced, for...