People v. Walker

• Decision Date: 12 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–08–3655.,1–08–3655.
• Citation: 973 N.E.2d 939,362 Ill.Dec. 543,2012 IL App (1st) 083655
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Frederick WALKER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 083,655

973 N.E.2d 939

362 Ill.Dec. 543

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Frederick WALKER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–08–3655.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

June 12, 2012.

Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Cook County, Chicago (Robert C. Drizin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for Appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Hareena Meghani–Wakely, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[362 Ill.Dec. 548]¶ 1 Defendant, Frederick Walker, appeals his conviction after a jury trial on three counts of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and one count of home invasion, and his sentence of imprisonment for natural life. On appeal, Walker contends he was denied a fair trial and sentencing hearing because (1) the trial court mistakenly believed it had to sentence Walker to either death or natural life imprisonment, and it considered improper factors in his sentencing; (2) his statement should have been suppressed where he had established that his ability to waive his Miranda rights was compromised by his impaired mental abilities, and he testified that a detective had threatened him with a gun into making the statement; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present other crimes evidence; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence where the police had no probable cause to arrest him; (5) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of forensic expert Debora Depcynski and in barring the impeachment of State witness Amy Rehnstrom related to her involvement in a theft; and (6) cumulative error requires reversal. Walker also argues that his mittimus should be corrected to reflect only one conviction for first degree murder and one conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Walker's conviction on one count of first degree murder, one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and home invasion. The mittimus should be corrected accordingly.

¶ 2 JURISDICTION

¶ 3 The trial court sentenced Walker on December 15, 2008, and he filed a timely notice of appeal on December 16, 2008. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 and 606, governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case entered below. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill. S.Ct. R. 603 (eff. Oct. 1, 2010); R. 606 (eff. Mar. 20, 2009).

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On June 22, 2000, the police discovered the body of Dorothy Shorty in her home at 7144 South Oakley in Chicago, Illinois. After speaking with a neighbor and with Shorty's daughter, Brenda, the police issued an investigative alert for Walker. On June 24, 2000, Walker entered the 11th District police station on an unrelated matter hereinafter described and was subsequently arrested. Walker gave an oral statement, which was recorded on videotape. The State filed an intent to seek the death penalty.

¶ 6 The State filed a motion in limine to allow evidence of other crimes. First, the State sought to introduce evidence that Walker burglarized Shorty's home on June 12, 2000, approximately eight days before her murder. Walker admitted in his statement that he had burglarized Shorty's home before her murder, but he later alleged that his confession was coerced. The State argued that the evidence was relevant to establish motive for murder, intent, hostility toward the victim, and the voluntariness of Walker's confession. Walker argued that the burglary was remote and could confuse the jury. Second, the State sought to introduce evidence of events leading up to Walker's arrest at the police station. Specifically, Walker came to the station, allegedly hit a woman, and got into an altercation with police after which he was arrested. The State argued that the evidence rebutted Walker's claim of mistreatment by the police at the station and showed a guilty conscience because he resisted arrest. Walker had asserted in his statement that the police came toward him, kneed him, and sprayed him with mace. Judge Simmons granted the motion, finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact.

¶ 7 On October 24, 2008, Judge Obbish, who had taken over the case after the retirement of Judge Simmons, presided over a motion in limine filed by the defense to bar the State from introducing the other crimes evidence previously ruled admissible by Judge Simmons. Judge Obbish determined that the prior ruling was the law of the case, and in reviewing the evidence, he agreed with the ruling and allowed admission of the evidence.

¶ 8 Walker also filed motions to suppress his statement and to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, specifically clothing and DNA evidence. Walker argued that he was not advised of his rights, his right to remain silent was violated, and his statement was coerced. He testified at the hearing that a gun was held to his head prior to his giving the statement and he did not understand his rights because he read only at a fourth-grade level and no one read the forms to him. Detective Turner testified at the hearing that he was present when Walker gave his statement and to his knowledge no one threatened Walker. Detective Turner stated that when he was in the room with Walker, he did not have a gun in his holster because in most cases he does not go into an interview room armed with a weapon. He also explained the consent forms for taking DNA to Walker and gave him a chance to read the forms. Walker never conveyed that he did not understand he was consenting to give samples of his DNA. The trial court denied the motions.

¶ 9 Walker subsequently obtained new counsel, and they sought to reopen the motion to suppress his statement arguing that Walker was not mentally competent to understand his Miranda rights. They also sought an Atkins hearing ( Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)) to determine whether Walker could be considered mentally retarded. His counsel called Dr. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, to testify. Dr. Gelbort determined that Walker's overall score on an IQ test was 80, which is between “mentally defective range” and “low-average range” of functioning. His verbal score was a 78, which he opined was the most indicative of a person's ability to function in society. His reading was at a fifth-grade level. None of the scores, however, fell into the mental retardation range.

¶ 10 Dr. Gelbort further testified that Walker “in a very, very gross or superficial fashion” could understand words and have a very general understanding of sentences, but his ability to understand the overall concepts of Miranda warnings was “defective.” However, Dr. Gelbort acknowledged that he never asked Walker how many times he had heard Miranda warnings. He also stated that although he was familiar with the Atkins standard for determining mental retardation, he did not evaluate Walker to see if he met the criteria because he did not have enough information to do so.¹ The trial court granted the State's motion for a directed finding that Walker did not meet his burden in establishing that he was mentally retarded under Atkins. After the directed finding, the State decided not to present its expert on the subject, Dr. Coleman.

¶ 11 Regarding the Miranda issue, Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Allan Murphy testified at the hearing that he met with Walker on June 24, 2000, at the police station and spoke to him first in the presence of Detective Turner and then alone. When he first spoke to Walker, he had been in custody about 15 hours. He introduced himself as a prosecutor and read Walker his Miranda rights. He said he understood his rights and was coherent and responsive. Walker stated that the police had treated him well and the only problem was with how they treated him when he was first arrested. He told ASA Murphy that the officers hit him, kneed him, ‘jumped on him” and put mace in his eyes. ASA Murphy stated that he did not see any physical injuries on Walker.

¶ 12 ASA Murphy testified that Walker agreed to have his statement videotaped. He read the form to Walker, and Walker signed the consent form. In the videotape, Walker was again advised of his Miranda rights and stated that he was treated well while in custody. When asked if Detective Turner or ASA Murphy had mistreated him, Walker said no. He never stated that anyone threatened him with a gun. The trial court denied Walker's motion to suppress his statement, finding after viewing the videotape twice that the statement was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.

¶ 13 In March 2008, Walker was found unfit to stand trial and he was remanded to the Department of Health and Human Services. He returned to Cook County jail on May 29, 2008. The trial court conducted another fitness hearing in October 2008. Dr. Chapman testified that he interviewed Walker six to eight times and opined that he was unfit to stand trial. However, his fitness could be restored with proper medication.

¶ 14 At the October 2008 fitness hearing, Dr. Nadkarni testified that he also interviewed Walker and that he understood the legal proceedings and gave articulate responses. Dr. Nadkarni “wanted to make sure that [Walker] was able to assist counsel in his defense.” Walker, in fact, “indicated his desire to do so” and Dr. Nadkarni believed he could effectively assist in his defense. Dr. Nadkarni also reviewed summaries of examinations conducted by forensic clinical services staff, Walker's medical records, police reports, criminal history reports, outside evaluations done by...