People v. Walker, No. 44

CourtSupreme Court of Michigan
Writing for the CourtO'HARA; KAVANAGH
Citation132 N.W.2d 87,374 Mich. 331
Decision Date05 January 1965
Docket NumberNo. 44
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lee Dell WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 87

132 N.W.2d 87
374 Mich. 331
The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Lee Dell WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 44.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Jan. 5, 1965.

[374 Mich. 332]

Page 88

Samuel J. Torina, Grosse Pointe Park, for plaintiff.

Albert Best, Detroit, for defendant.

Before the Entire Bench.

O'HARA, Justice.

By an equally divided Court, defendant's conviction of first degree murder was upheld in People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 124 N.W.2d 761. Rehearing and reargument was granted.

In fairness to the circuit bench, the prosecuting attorneys of the State, the defense bar, and through them all, to the ultimate repository of our judicial responsibility--the citizenry of Michigan--we owe a duty to speak clearly of the effect of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908), handed down since our previous decision herein.

If we read Jackson v. Denno, supra, correctly the action of the trial judge in submitting the question [374 Mich. 333] of the voluntariness of defendant's confession to the same jury which was trying the issue of his guilt or innocence without first, on a separate record, making separate determination thereof is no longer a permissible rule of law. The question before us now is which of the 2 rules therein approved constitutionally by the United States Supreme Court is to be adopted in Michigan.

The question in Jackson v. Denno, supra, as here, was the admissibility of a confession claimed to have been involuntarily made. The New York State court, where Jackson was tried and convicted, admitted the confession under its rule. That rule 1 historically has been the rule of this State. Very simply stated it is: If under no circumstances the confession could be deemed voluntary, the trial judge was obligated to exclude it. If the evidence presented a fair question of fact as to its voluntary nature, the confession was received and the jury under proper instruction determined the question. The trial judge followed that rule. Defendant was convicted. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Federal district court. The writ was there denied and the court of appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court 'to consider fundamental questions about the constitutionality of the New York procedure governing the admissibility of a confession alleged to be involuntary.'

Page 89

The Court then answered:

'Under the New York procedure, the evidence given the jury inevitably injects irrelevant and impermissible consideration of truthfulness of the confession into the assessment of voluntariness. Indeed the jury is told to determine the truthfulness[374 Mich. 334] of the confession in assessing its probative value. As a consequence, it cannot be assumed, as the Stein 2 Court did, that the jury reliably found the facts against the accused. This unsound assumption undermines Stein's authority as a precedent and its view on the constitutionality of the New York procedure. The admixture of reliability and voluntariness in the considerations of the jury would itself entitle a defendant to further proceedings in any case in which the essential facts are disputed, for we cannot determine how the jury resolved these issues and will not assume that they were reliably and property resolved against the accused. And it is only a reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant and which would permit the jury to consider the confession in adjudicating guilt or innocence.

'But we do not rest on this ground alone, for the other alternative hypothesized in Stein--that the jury found the confession involuntary and disregarded it--is equally unacceptable. Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant's confession is solidly implanted in the jury's mind, for it has not only heard the confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its voluntariness and is in position to assess whether it is true or false. If it finds the confession involuntary, does the jury--indeed, can it--then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions? If there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession? Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal when the jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession?

'It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession which a jury has found to be involuntary [374 Mich. 335] has nevertheless influenced the verdict or that its findings of voluntariness, if this is the course it took, was affected by the other evidence showing the confession was true. But the New York...

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479 practice notes
  • People v. Willing, Docket No. 251786.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • June 28, 2005
    ...not address this issue. 4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 5. People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 6. Although this exchange took place in March 2003, the trial court did not enter an order reflecting Neumann's appointment as ......
  • Duncan v. State, 7 Div. 614
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • June 30, 1965
    ...v. Gladden (Ore.), 396 P.2d 779; State v. Ortiz, 97 Ariz. 228, 399 P.2d 171; State v. Owen, 96 Ariz. 274, 394 P.2d 206; People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87; People v. Perez, Cal.App., 42 Cal.Rptr. 161; Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito v. Moroney, 416 Pa. 199, 204 A.2d 758; People ex re......
  • People v. Wise, Docket No. 69725
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • July 12, 1984
    ...assistance of counsel. First, he complains that defense counsel failed to request a hearing pursuant to People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965), to attempt to have his statement to the police declared involuntary. However, not every such failure necessarily cons......
  • People v. Bladel, Docket Nos. 69749
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • April 1, 1984
    ...when he was first arrested. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 4 People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 5 The court acknowledged that the lack of opportunity to consult with counsel before interrogation does affect the voluntarin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
667 cases
  • People v. Howard, Docket No. 172633
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • November 25, 1997
    ...469 (1989). 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 5 People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ...
  • People v. Crusoe, Docket No. 84017
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • December 7, 1989
    ...prior to the interrogation by the FBI agents should result in the suppression of his statement. 7 See People v. Walker (On Rehearing ), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 8 The magistrate questioned the detective who conducted the first interview with the defendant, and the FBI agent who interrog......
  • Hirmuz v. City of Madison Heights, No. 05-60293.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • January 3, 2007
    ...whether his confession was involuntary, which is known in Michigan jurisprudence as a "Walker hearing," after People v. Walker (on reh), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965). See Weiner v. Bock, 387 F.Supp.2d 717, 725 (E.D.Mich. 2005). On March 12, 2004, the trial court held a Walker hearing......
  • People v. Wright, Docket No. 90512
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • May 1, 1992
    ...with this account of events. All agreed, however, that Terry Harrell was the aggressor in the fight. 2 People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 3 See, e.g., Haliburton v. State, 514 So.2d 1088 (Fla., 1987); People v. Houston, 42 Cal.3d 595, 230 Cal.Rptr. 141, 724 P.2d 1......
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