People v. Walker
| Decision Date | 17 April 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 51989,51989 |
| Citation | 50 Ill.Dec. 718,84 Ill.2d 512,419 N.E.2d 1167 |
| Parties | , 50 Ill.Dec. 718 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Eugene A. WALKER, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John H. Reid, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Robert E. Davison, First Asst. Appellate Defender, and Randy E. Blue, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Mount Vernon, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago , for the People.
This capital case presents questions involving the permissible reach of prosecutorial discretion under the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the appropriateness of the penalty of death for this defendant under the eighth amendment of the Constitution and Illinois law. For the reasons which follow, we consider only the former issue. The defendant initially pleaded guilty in the circuit court of St. Clair County to indictment counts of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and armed violence, pursuant to a plea bargain under which, inter alia, the defendant would receive a sentence of 60 years in the penitentiary. A subsequent motion to vacate this plea was granted, but when the case proceeded to trial, defendant entered an unnegotiated plea of guilty. A sentencing hearing was held before the court, and defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal followed. See 73 Ill.2d R. 603.
Defendant Walker and Paul Bainter were jointly indicted on June 18, 1978, for murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1)), armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)), armed violence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 33A-2), conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 8-2(a)), and four counts of attempted murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 8-4(a)). The defendant originally entered a not guilty plea, and the St. Clair public defender was appointed to represent him.
The public defender's unopposed motion for a psychiatric examination of defendant to determine his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense based upon his "long history of mental and psychiatric problems" was granted on June 27, 1978. The report and an addendum to the report filed by the court-appointed psychiatrist on July 18, 1978, and September 7, 1978, respectively, contained conclusions that defendant was competent to stand trial and was sane at the time of the crimes, but noted defendant's past history of drug and alcohol abuse and defendant's "dull normal intelligence." Defendant obtained a new attorney on August 8, and the case was set for trial on October 2, 1978.
Defendant's counsel and the State's Attorney concluded a plea bargain in which the defendant pleaded guilty to each charge except the one charging conspiracy, which the State agreed to drop. The State also agreed to recommended a 60-year prison term for murder and other sentences for concurrent terms which are not relevant here.
On October 2, the court explained the terms of the indictment but inaccurately advised defendant of the maximum penalties which could be imposed for his crimes. The court twice told defendant that "(t)he range of sentencing could be 40 to 80 years," whereas the indictment's terms alleging murder and armed robbery, justified a death sentence hearing. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6); People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 524-25, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181.) The State's Attorney took a leading role in these proceedings, advising the court of the sanction possibilities for several indictment counts, and did not challenge the court admonitions on the murder count. Thus these proceedings did not comply with our Rule 402. (73 Ill.2d R. 402 (a)(2).) The court proceeded to inform defendant of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and attempted to ascertain whether his plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
Defendant's counsel set forth the factual basis for the plea. Near the end of the proceeding defendant interjected his concept of what the plea represented:
"THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to say that even though the facts of all this points against me, it's more or less finding me guilty that I have no knowledge that I actually committed these crimes, and even though I have pleaded guilty I cannot say that I am guilty."
The defendant's attorney then, with the court's permission, questioned the defendant:
"Q. Eugene, I think what you are trying to say is that you don't recall after you went up into the cafe, isn't that right? You don't recall anything that took place after that?
A. Yes.
Q. Correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. You're not saying you weren't there?
A. No.
Q. You remember being there don't you?
A. I remember being there.
Q. And you remember having the gun and having the green Army fatigue jacket on, don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. What you are saying to the Court is what I had stated earlier, are you not, that you simply don't recall firing the gun or killing, specifically, at Mrs. Wallace or any of the other people?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
Q. Your Honor, I think it's a problem in that this young man, I believe him, honestly does not recall firing the gun. And I think that's the point he was trying to make to the Court.
The plea was then entered. The court agreed to accept the plea as negotiated but apparently did not formally enter the sentence, for the case was ordered continued pending the receipt of a presentence report. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-3-1.) Therefore, the admonitions in Rule 605(b) (73 Ill.2d R. 605(b)) were never given.
Ten days after these proceedings were concluded (see 73 Ill.2d R. 604(d)), defendant, in a handwritten, notarized letter, asked the trial judge to withdraw his plea of guilty, alleging that he was mentally incompetent, did not understand the full consequences of his original guilty plea and intended to plead not guilty on the basis of mental incompetency. On November 20, defendant appeared in court with his counsel. Counsel, without giving reasons, stated that defendant's motion to vacate the plea was against his advice. Defendant stated that he nevertheless desired to present the motion and dismiss his attorney. The court appointed the public defender to assist defendant in petitioning for a plea withdrawal.
The motion filed alleged various errors in advising the defendant which tended to show that he did not plead guilty knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. This motion was argued on December 7. Defendant testified that both of his attorneys only consulted him briefly and that he was not fully advised prior to the plea that he would have to serve 30 years in jail under the bargain's terms. In addition, defendant said he was "very depressed" and "very nervous" and "very confused" during the negotiation process and at the time of the entry of the plea. The State's Attorney cross-examined the defendant about his reasons for changing his mind, his original decisional process and about the bargain itself:
"Q. And you knew at the outset what the State was going to recommend in exchange for you withdrawing your not guilty plea and entering a guilty plea, didn't you, the term of years, the time that you would have to spend in jail?
A. Yes.
Q. As part of that, we you knew also that the death penalty was not going to be sought, didn't you, you would be going to jail rather than looking at a potential death penalty; didn't you?
A. Yes."
Defense counsel, however, argued in pertinent part to the court that Although counsel did not explain which answers, out of those which were asked, he deemed a product of defendant's confusion, this argument was unrebutted. The court granted defendant's motion.
The trial court was also informed that defendant had arranged for private counsel, who represented defendant for approximately one month before withdrawing, on January 8, 1979, "for professional reasons." The court, being advised that defendant was impecunious, appointed a new attorney to represent him.
This attorney filed a petition for a psychiatric examination on January 31, 1979. This petition alleged that defendant's mental capacity to assist in preparing a defense was suspect, that he was not cooperating in preparing a defense and "that the defendant failed to understand and comprehend that the nature of the charges against him may ultimately lead to a death sentence and refuses to discuss same with counsel." This petition was unopposed and the motion was granted.
The psychiatric report was prepared by a new psychiatrist. It paralleled the earlier report.
On the date this case was set for trial, February 6, 1979, the defendant, before a new judge, entered an unnegotiated plea of guilty to each indictment count. The trial court admonished the defendant in full compliance with Rule 402, the factual basis for the plea was set forth by the State's Attorney, the plea was entered, and in the sentencing hearing which followed, defendant was sentenced to...
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