People v. Wallace, No. 81-202

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: KASSERMAN
• Citation: 62 Ill.Dec. 162,435 N.E.2d 960,106 Ill.App.3d 567
• Decision Date: 17 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-202
• Parties: , 62 Ill.Dec. 162 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lester WALLACE, Defendant-Appellee.

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435 N.E.2d 960 106 Ill.App.3d 567, 62 Ill.Dec. 162 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lester WALLACE, Defendant-Appellee. No. 81-202. Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District. May 17, 1982.

Donald Weber, State's Atty., Edwardsville, Martin N. Ashley, Deputy Director,

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[62 Ill.Dec. 163] Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Mount Vernon, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dunham, Boman & Leskera, East St. Louis, for defendant-appellee; John W. Leskera & Russell K. Scott, East St. Louis, of counsel.

KASSERMAN, Justice:

On July 17, 1980, the defendant, Lester Wallace, was indicted for the offense of arson. The State alleged that on June 18, 1978, the defendant burned a residence located at 3128 West Point, Collinsville, Illinois, with intent to defraud an insurer.

[106 Ill.App.3d 568] On October 29, 1980, the defendant filed a motion to suppress a tape recorded conversation between himself and his son-in-law, Wayne L. Colter. Mr. Colter, while serving a sentence for armed robbery at the Vienna Correctional Center, had told agents of the Illinois Division of Criminal Investigation that the defendant had paid him to set fire to the residence on West Point Street. In order to obtain evidence, the investigating agents equipped Mr. Colter with broadcasting and recording devices and on May 15, 1980, recorded a conversation between Mr. Colter and the defendant. After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding that (1) there was no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights and (2) the State had complied with the statutes regulating the use of eavesdropping devices (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 108A-1 et seq.).

On May 4, 1981, the defendant filed a motion in limine which sought to exclude evidence of other fires and insurance claims mentioned in the taped conversation. Defendant stipulated at the hearing on the motion that a 26-page transcript presented by the State accurately reflected the conversation. The defendant argued that the taped conversation was irrelevant and prejudicial and, therefore, should be excluded. The State urged that (1) the taped conversation was admissible because the defendant's silence constituted an admission regarding the charged offense and (2) the discussion concerning arson for profit demonstrated the relationship of the parties, the defendant's knowledge of the fires, and the existence of a continuing scheme. The trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine and excluded the conversation in its entirety stating:

"The Court finds that the matters are not relevant. The prejudicial effect of that tape would deprive the Defendant of a fair trial, and from a careful review of the tape it is in the Court's opinion a discussion of hypothetical situations or matters, and not admissions."

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (73 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)), the State appeals this ruling.

The defendant contends that the order excluding the taped conversation is an evidentiary ruling which the State may not appeal under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). (People v. Van DeRostyne (1976), 63 Ill.2d 364, 349 N.E.2d 16.) However, our supreme court has held that "Rule 604(a)(1) allows an interlocutory appeal by the State of a pretrial suppression order whenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial court that the suppression substantially impairs the State's ability to prosecute the case." (People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill.2d 234, 247, 45 Ill.Dec. 150, 156, 412 N.E.2d 501, 507.) We find Young to be dispositive of this contention; therefore, we hold that the State may appeal the exclusion order entered in the instant case.

While recognizing that Young extended the State's right to appeal [106 Ill.App.3d 569] from a pretrial order excluding evidence, the defendant argues that its holding is limited to orders involving constitutional or statutory considerations and that the State may not appeal from pretrial orders which, as here, are based solely upon evidentiary considerations. We disagree. In deciding that it is not necessary to restrict interlocutory appeals to search and seizure questions, the court in Young observed that refusing to allow an interlocutory appeal from an order suppressing admissible evidence may seriously impair the State's ability to present

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[62 Ill.Dec. 164] its case and further expressed...