People v. Walter
| Decision Date | 15 May 1959 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 47613 |
| Citation | 161 N.E.2d 707,23 Ill.App.2d 129 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alexander O. WALTER and Edward M. Koza, Defendant-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Benjamin S. Adamowski, States Atty., Chicago, Francis X. Riley, Edward J. Hladis, Asst. States Attys., Chicago, of counsel, for appellant.
George F. Callaghan, Chicago, Samuel Nineberg, Chicago, of counsel, for appellees.
This is an appeal from an order entered in the Criminal Court of Cook County, sustaining the motion of defendant Walter to quash the indictment and ordering the dismissal of the indictment and that each defendant be discharged.
The indictment here sounded in conspiracy and in short alleged that defendant Walter, who was an assistant United States district attorney in charge of the grand jury, conspired with defendant Koza for the payment of money by one Irving Stenn, Sr., to prevent the issuance of a subpoena before that grand jury to Stenn.
The grounds urged in the motion to quash the indictment are (1) there is no charging clause int he indictment as to the crime of conspiracy: (2) the indictment does not state an offense under the laws of Illinois; (3) the acts charged in the indictment are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and defendants therefore are not indictable under the laws of the State of Illinois; (4) the indictment is void for duplicity.
Here the indictment is phrased in the language of the statute of the State of Illinois relating to conspiracy, and, in addition to that language, specific acts are alleged which would constitute the offense. In People v. Peters, 10 Ill.2d 577, at page 580, 141 N.E.id 9, at page 10, the court pointed out that the necessity for definiteness in an indictment is to definitely advise the accused of the specific offense charged against him, so that he will be able to prepare fully for his defense and later to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, if necessary. Then the court said:
'The Illinois Criminal Code provides that every indictment shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offense in the terms and language of the statute creating the offense, or so plainly that the nature of the offense may be easily understood by the jury. * * *
The indictment here complies with both of those requirements.
It has been repeatedly held that the gist of the crime of conspiracy is the making of the unlawful agreement to do the unlawful act, or acting unlawfully, People v. Nathanson, 389 Ill. 311, at page 316, 59 N.E.2d 677; People v. Kahn, 256 Ill.App. 415, at page 418; People v. Drury, 250 Ill.App. 547, at page 567; 11 I.L.P. Conspiracy § 52. In People v. Buckminster, 282 Ill. 177, 118 N.E. 497, it was urged that the state did not have jurisdiction, because the wrongful acts to be done were to be done outside of the State of Illinois. On page 181 of 282 Ill., on page 499 of 118 N.E. the court said:
The acts themselves to be accomplished need not necessarily be unlawful, if the means to accomplish the ends are unlawful. People v. Braun, 375 Ill. 284, at pages 286-287, 31 N.E.2d 287; Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 Ill. 355, at page 376, 77 N.E. 176, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 1001. It is entirely unnecessary to the crime of conspiracy to prove that any overt act toward the accomplishment of the lawful purpose was ever done. People v. Glassberg, 326 Ill. 379, at page 388, 158 N.E. 103. The indictment does charge the codefendants as participants in the crime of conspiracy, and it does state an offense under the laws of the State of Illinois.
Defendant asserts that the State of Illinois does not have jurisdiction in this matter, because the courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction. The bases of the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction are that (1) because defendant Alexander O. Walter was employed at the time of the alleged conspiracy as an Assistant United States District Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, he is triable only on the United States courts; and (2) because the unlawful act toward which the alleged conspiracy was directed was the obstruction of justice of the United States courts, it was within their jurisdiction exclusively.
It has been held repeatedly that an officer or agent of the United States engaged in the performance of a duty arising under the laws and authority of the United States is not liable to a criminal prosecution in the courts of a state for acts done by him in his official capacity. In re Waite, D.C., 81 F. 359. The same general principle was enunciated in State of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648, where a deputy collector of internal revenue, whose duty it was to seize illicit distilleries, was assaulted and fired upon by a number of armed men while he was attempting to perform his duties. In defense of his life he returned the fire, killing one of his attackers. He was indicted for the crime of murder in the court of Tennessee. It was held that the United States courts had exclusive jurisdiction, and the removal of the proceeding from the state court to the federal court could be compelled. In re Leaken, 137 F. 680, is a case in the Circuit Court of the Southern District of Georgia, Eastern Division, which involved a United States district attorney who had subpoenaed records from a county court for a grand jury's use and turned those records over to the grand jury. After the grand jury had finished with their use, it returned the records to the district attorney. The district attorney failed to return the records to the county court, and the county court held him in contempt for that failure. The United States court issued a writ of habeas corpus. In language which appears to us to be decisive in all these cases the court at page 682 said:
It is clear that, by that test, the crime charged here being conspiracy was not done in the course of business and pursuant to the authority of defendant Walter as assistant United States district attorney. For that reason certainly jurisdiction of the United States court in this matter is not exclusive.
A conspiracy to obstruct federal justice is no doubt a matter of federal jurisdiction. In Sneed v. United States, 5 Cir., 298 F. 911, defendants had conspired to give liquor to a juror and to give the same juror money for the purpose of hanging the jury in a federal case. The court laid down the rule that a conspiracy to commit such a crime is an offense against the United States. The fact that it was a civil matter against which the conspiracy was directed is not important. The court said on page 912:
'The justice being administered was the justice of the United States, and its purity and freedom is to be protected by federal law.'
In the case of Davey v. United States, 7 Cir., 208 F. 237, the court held that a grand jury is an integral part of the court, and an attempt to...
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People v. Edwards
...of the offense is the unlawful combination or agreement. People v. Nathanson, 389 Ill. 311, 59 N.E.2d 677 (1945). People v. Walter, 23 Ill.App.2d 129, 161 N.E.2d 707 (1959). The acts subsequent to the alleged conspiracy may inferentially establish the agreement. People v. Brinn, 32 Ill.2d 2......