People v. Walton
Decision Date | 24 June 1969 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 6015,No. 1,1 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie WALTON and Charlie White, Defendants-Appellants |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Carl Levin, Detroit, for defendants-appellants.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Patricia J. Pernick, Asst. Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and McGREGOR and BRONSON, JJ.
Defendants, Willis Walton and Charlie White were convicted before the recorder's court for the city of Detroit sitting without a jury of the crime of breaking and entering a business place with intent to commit a larceny therein. M.C.L.A. § 750.110 (Stat.Ann.1968 Cum.Supp. § 28.305).
The record discloses that a building had been broken into and that defendants were apprehended while fleeing that building. An eyewitness testified that defendants were the men he saw handing materials from out of the building. Defendants were found guilty by the court and were sentenced January 3, 1968, to prison terms of from 7 to 15 years. On January 16, the trial judge realized that the correct maximum term for the crime was 10 years instead of 15 years as he stated when sentencing the defendants the same day. He amended the sentences and commitments Nunc pro tunc to provide maximum terms of 10 years. Defendants made a motion for a new trial. This motion was denied and defendants appealed. Three issues are presented which we restate and discuss in order.
1. Did the trial court's correction by order nunc pro tunc of that portion of the sentences which were in excess of the statutory maximum in the absence of the defendants and their counsel constitute reversible error?
This issue is governed by the indeterminate sentence statute, C.L.1948, § 769.8 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.1080):
The statute governing an excessive sentence is C.L.1948, § 769.24 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.1094), which reads as follows:
'Whenever, in any criminal case, the defendant shall be adjudged guilty and a punishment by fine or imprisonment shall be imposed in excess of that allowed by law, the judgment shall not for that reason alone be judged altogether void, nor be wholly reversed and annulled by any court of review, but the same shall be valid and effectual to the extent of the lawful penalty, and shall only be reversed or annulled on writ of error or otherwise, in respect to the unlawful excess.'
The indeterminate sentence statute requires the court to Set a minimum term and then to State the maximum as set by statute. In the present case the minimum was properly Set by the court. The only defect present in the sentences and commitments was the failure of the court to properly State the maximum term of 10 years set by statute. The statement of the maximum term in the sentences and the commitments was a ministerial act and was legally corrected by the order Nunc pro tunc.* Under the facts in this case, we cannot understand how any of defendants' unconstitutional rights are violated. The case of People v. Theodorou (1968), 10 Mich.App. 409, 159 N.W.2d 765, cited by defendants is not applicable because there the original sentence was Invalid under C.L.S.1961, § 769.9 (Stat.Ann.1968 Cum.Supp. § 28.1081). In the present case the sentences were valid sentences under the indeterminate sentence statute even though the trial court erroneously Stated the maximum term because the correct maximum is read into every sentence by force of law.
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by not offering defendants or their counsel access to the presentence reports or in the alternative to summarize at the time of sentence the contents of the reports?
This issue was withdrawn by counsel for defendants with the permission of the appellee and the Court at the hearing on oral argument.
3. Was the prosecuting attorney's introduction of testimony regarding threats against the State's witness when there existed no evidence to connect defendants to such threats so prejudicial to defendants that it constitutes reversible error?
The following is the testimony referred to above:
The admission of this testimony was error. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 633, pp. 486, 487.
The trial judge stated in his...
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