People v. Warren

• Decision Date: 30 December 1899
• Citation: 81 N.W. 360,122 Mich. 504
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WARREN.

81 N.W. 360

122 Mich. 504

PEOPLE v. WARREN.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 30, 1899

Exceptions from superior court of Grand Rapids; Richard L. Newnham Judge.

Frank D. Warren was convicted of appropriating to his own use public funds, and brings exceptions. Reversed.

Horace M. Oren, Atty. Gen., and Frank A. Rodgers Pros. Atty., for the people.

M. L Dunham, H. M. Dunham, Joseph Kirwin, and Henry J. Felker, for defendant.

MOORE J.

The respondent was city clerk of Grand Rapids. He was charged with appropriating to his own use money belonging to the city. The case was tried before a jury. The trial judge charged the jury at length. Near the close of the charge he instructed the jury that it was their duty to return a verdict of guilty. The jury retired with an officer, and after being out for three hours the following occurred: 'The Court: Mr. Clerk, you may ask the jury if they have arrived at a verdict. The Clerk: Gentlemen of the jury, have you arrived at your verdict? If so, let your foreman arise and answer. The Foreman (Mr. Goodell): We have not. You ask if we had come to a verdict? The Clerk: Yes; have you arrived at a verdict? The Foreman: We have not; no, sir. The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury: You have been out now somewhere about the space of three hours. The court very plainly gave you his instructions, and told you what it was your duty to do. The court instructed you that it was your duty to render a verdict of guilty in this case. There was nothing else for you to do; there is nothing else for you to do; and any individual juror or jurors who sets himself up against the plain instruction of the court is violating the oath which he took when he was sworn upon the case. The responsibility, gentlemen, of finding this verdict, is not yours. You simply have to do as the court directs you to do; and, as I said, no individual juror or jurors must set up his own opinion against the instructions given you by the court, that under the law and the undisputed facts in this case it is your duty to render a verdict of guilty in this case.' The jury again retired, and after being out 20 minutes returned into court, when the following took place: 'The Court: Mr. Clerk, you may take the verdict. The Clerk: Gentlemen of the jury, have you agreed upon your verdict? If so, let your foreman arise and answer. The Foreman: We have. The Clerk: What say you, Mr. Foreman? Do you find the respondent guilty or not guilty? The Foreman: We find the respondent guilty, according to his honor's instructions. Mr. Dunham: I would like to have the jury polled.

The jury was polled. Five of the jurors replied in substance that because of the instruction of the judge they voted guilty. Afterwards a motion was made for a new trial, and an affidavit signed by 11 of the jurors was filed, stating in substance that each of them would have voted 'Not guilty,' had they not believed that in so doing they would have been guilty of contempt of court, and possibly subject to fine and imprisonment.

Leaving out the question of whether this affidavit can be considered or not, it is very clear that up to the last moment the jury did not acquiesce in the direction of the court to find a verdict, and that five of them, at least, were unwilling to acquiesce in said verdict. The practical effect of what was done was that not only did the trial judge direct the jury as to their duty, but when the jury failed to follow his direction he did for them what he claimed it was their duty to do. Many questions are involved in the case, but the important question is, can a trial court compel a verdict of guilty in a felony case, when some of the jurors are not willing to render such a verdict? The claim of counsel for the people is stated as follows: 'The trial judge has power to direct a verdict of guilty in criminal cases where the facts are admitted or undisputed, and the intent is a legal inference from the undisputed facts, or in cases where the statute does not make intent an element of the offense, but commands an act to be done or omitted without any culpability, and where consequently the bare commission or omission of the act in question in itself constituted the offense, irrespective of any felonious intent on the part of the defendant. We contend that directing a verdict in a civil case or a criminal case comes to the court by virtue of its being the sole judge of the law; that where the facts are undisputed there is nothing for the jury to pass upon, and it logically follows that if the court is the judge of the law, and the facts are undisputed, it is then a question for the court to answer which party should recover in a civil case, and what the verdict should be in a criminal case,' citing Montee v. Com., 3 J. J. Marsh. 132; Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y. 588; Sparf v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343; State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 25 A. 964; Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173; People v. Mortimer, 48 Mich. 38, 11 N.W. 776; People v. Richmond, 59 Mich. 570, 26 N.W. 770; People v. Kirsch, 67 Mich. 539, 35 N.W. 157; People v. Neumann, 85 Mich. 98, 48 N.W. 290; People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 N.W. 861; People v. Hawkins, 106 Mich. 479, 64 N.W. 736; and other cases.

It, of course, is well settled that in civil cases where the facts are undisputed and the case turns upon a question of law, the court can direct a verdict, and he can have the clerk take the verdict without having the jury retire for consultation. It is not true, however, that this has ever been allowed in a criminal case in this state. Our attention has been called to a good many cases where the court has directed a verdict in a criminal case, but it has not been called to any case where the jury failed to follow the instructions of the judge, and the judge himself pronounced the verdict. In a civil case the court may set aside a verdict, whether it be for the plaintiff or defendant. It may do the same thing in a criminal case in case of a conviction, but it cannot do so in case of an acquittal. It would be a useless form to take the verdict of a jury in a civil case involving only questions of law, where the verdict, whether for the plaintiff or defendant, might be set aside by the judge because contrary to the law; but the judge could not set aside a verdict of acquittal of rendered by a jury in a criminal case. Can he, by compelling a verdict of guilty, do indirectly what he could not do directly?

The right of trial by jury was denied to persons accused of crime in the early history of the race. It was not until after a long and persistent struggle that the right was secured. This right was deemed so essential that in the constitution of the United States 'the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed' is guarantied. It has been held that this is a right which cannot be waived, and that a trial by the judge, even by the consent of the prisoner, is erroneous. State v. Maine, 27 Conn. 281. Article 6, � 28, of the constitution of this state also guaranties to the accused the right to a speedy and public trial by jury. This is a right which cannot be waived except by a plea of guilty. Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; People v. Luby, 56 Mich. 551, 23 N.W. 218; People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 284, 50 N.W. 995. To view preceding link please click here In People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31, it is said: 'It is one of the most essential features of the right of trial by jury at common law that no jury should be compelled to find any but a general verdict in criminal cases, and the removal of this safeguard would violate its design and destroy its spirit.' This case is cited with approval in People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 56, 481, 18 N.W. 555, and 19 N.W. 155. I think it clear that a general verdict involves, not only a decision of the facts in the case, but an application of the law to the facts. In Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 188, this language is used: 'The circuit court was asked, but refused, to give the following instruction: 'This is a criminal trial on an information for felony, and all the questions of law and fact in the case are exclusively for the jury, and the jury are paramount judges, both of the law and the facts.' The court held they were judges of law and fact under some restrictions and conditions, but not in the absolute way indicated.

The precise definition of the rights of a jury in criminal cases is easier understood than expressed. Their decision upon the guilt or innocence of a prisoner can never be directly reviewed, and upon an acquittal there can be no new trial. But, if they have the legal authority claimed in the request their verdict of guilty would be of the same force as their acquittal. In this country, for a long time past, exceptions have been usually allowed to the rulings of the court on the trial, and, if those rulings are erroneous, the conviction will be set aside. But this can only be upon the idea that the jury are expected to follow the charges given; and it is as contrary to the law, as usually administered, to refuse to give a proper charge, as to give an improper one. And if a judge were to decline to give any charge,--as he might, if it is of no importance,--it has been assumed that he would violate his duty. The law does not favor unnecessary intrusions by one functionary upon ground of others. But the charge of a judge in criminal cases is one of the ancient and traditional incidents of a trial, which must have been introduced for some purpose, and must have some value. It is certain that there is a great body of authority holding it to be meant for the guidance and instruction of the jury, and entitled to their respect. It is true that juries in criminal cases cannot...