People v. Washington
| Decision Date | 29 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | SC 160707 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY CARL WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
In 2004, Gregory C. Washington was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of second-degree murder, MCL 750.37; two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b; and being a felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f. The court, Patricia P Fresard, J., sentenced defendant as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 40 to 60 years in prison for second-degree murder; the 40-year minimum sentence was a 12-month upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range. The trial court also sentenced defendant to life in prison for AWIM, 2 to 71/2 years in prison for felon-in-possession, and 2 years in prison for felony-firearm. Washington appealed his convictions and sentences in the Court of Appeals. In an unpublished opinion issued June 13, 2006 (Docket No. 260155), the Court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court had failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons for its departure from the second-degree murder sentencing guidelines. Before defendant was resentenced, he filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court was considering defendant's application, the trial court resentenced defendant, and he applied in the Court of Appeals for leave to appeal his new sentence. The Supreme Court ultimately denied defendant's application for leave to appeal his original convictions. 477 Mich. 973 (2006). After the Court of Appeals also denied defendant's application for leave to appeal, he filed his second application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which was also denied. 480 Mich 891 (2007). Defendant then filed a motion in the trial court for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied. Defendant applied for leave to appeal that decision in the Court of Appeals, which denied his application; the Supreme Court denied his application to appeal the Court of Appeals' denial. 486 Mich. 1042 (2010). In June 2016 after exhausting all available postconviction relief defendant filed a second motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, arguing that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to resentence him in 2006 because his application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court was pending at the time. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, vacated defendant's sentence, and ordered resentencing. The prosecution appealed. The Court of Appeals O'Brien, P.J., and Jansen and Stephens, JJ., upheld the trial court's ruling in a published per curiam opinion, holding that although defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment was barred by MCR 6.502(G), the trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the second judgment of sentence, and it had correctly exercised its inherent power to recognize its lack of jurisdiction when it vacated that judgment and ordered another resentencing hearing. 321 Mich.App. 276 (2017). The prosecution sought leave to appeal that decision in the Supreme Court. In lieu of granting the application, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Luscombe v Shedd's Food Prod Corp, 212 Mich.App. 537 (1995). 503 Mich. 1030 (2019). On remand, the Court of Appeals, O'Brien, P.J., and Jansen and Stephens, JJ., reversed the trial court's 2016 order vacating the 2006 resentencing. The Court noted the differences between a lack of jurisdiction and an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, discussed the two accepted categories of jurisdiction (subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction), and cited a Florida law review article that advocated for a third category of jurisdiction to be recognized in Florida—procedural jurisdiction—to refer to the exercise of jurisdiction. The Court analyzed Luscombe before concluding that the trial court's resentencing before the remand order took effect was not a structural error caused by a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but was, instead, error that was procedural in nature and was rendered harmless by the lack of any objection. 329 Mich.App. 604 (2019). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court directed oral argument on the application. 505 Mich. 1046 (2020).
In an opinion by Justice Clement, joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justices Bernstein and Cavanagh, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
When a judgment of sentence is appealed, the trial court loses subject-matter jurisdiction over those aspects of the case that are involved in the appeal. The restrictions on a trial court's authority in MCR 6.500 et seq. only limit a court's ability to review a judgment of conviction and sentence; although MCR 6.502(G)(2) does not contain an exception allowing successive motions for relief from judgment on the basis of jurisdictional errors, a trial court may vacate a judgment of sentence on such a motion when the court recognizes that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when the judgment was entered.
1. Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's authority to hear and determine a case; the authority is not dependent on the particular facts of the case but, instead, is dependent on the character or class of the case pending. Michigan's 1963 Constitution and statutes set the authority of circuit courts and appellate courts to hear cases. Article VI, § 13 of the state Constitution provides that circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law. In tandem with the constitutional grant of authority, MCL 600.601(1) provides that circuit courts have the power and jurisdiction over (1) that which was possessed by courts of record at common law, as altered by Michigan's Constitution, statutes, and rules of the Supreme Court; (2) that which was possessed by courts and judges in chancery in England on March 1, 1847, as altered by Michigan's Constitution, statutes, and rules of the Supreme Court; and (3) that which is prescribed by the rules of the Supreme Court. Under these provisions, a circuit court has jurisdiction over all felonies from the bindover from the district court. Article VI, § 10 of Michigan's Constitution provides that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals shall be provided by law. In turn, MCL 600.308(1) provides that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on appeals from all final judgments and final orders from the circuit court, court of claims, and probate court. Thus, circuit courts have original jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction. MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a) provides that a Court of Appeals judgment is effective after the expiration of the time for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, or, if such an application is filed, after the disposition of the case by the Supreme Court.
2. People v George, 399 Mich. 638 (1977), controlled the outcome of the case. Analyzing former court rule GCR 1963, 802.1, the George Court concluded that the circuit court had lost jurisdiction over a case once an appeal had been filed in the Court of Appeals and that jurisdiction would not revest in the circuit court until the Supreme Court resolved the prosecution's pending application for leave to appeal that decision; accordingly until the pending application was addressed, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to retry the defendant. Under our present rule, MCR 7.203(A), which is materially similar to the court rule analyzed in George, the Court in People v Swafford, 483 Mich. 1 (2009), likewise concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try or convict the defendant when the defendant's application was still pending in the Supreme Court. A trial court's original jurisdiction is fundamentally incompatible with an appellate court's appellate jurisdiction. To that end, a trial court is divested of subject-matter jurisdiction over those aspects of the case involved in an appeal; this rule preserves the integrity of the appellate process and prevents confusion related to having the same matter before two courts at the same time. Although both state and federal courts often use the term "jurisdiction" imprecisely—referring to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and a court's general authority to take action—the George Court's consistent use of the term "jurisdiction" and the facts of the case support the conclusion that the Court was referring to subject-matter jurisdiction, not to its exercise of jurisdiction. Although there is a presumption against divesting a court of its jurisdiction once it has attached, that presumption applies to the acquisition and retaining of original jurisdiction among trial courts, not to the transfer of jurisdiction during the appellate process. In this case, defendant's appeal of the trial court's judgment of sentence divested the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction of those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Jurisdiction remained with the appellate courts after the Court of Appeals' 2006 judgment, which included a remand for resentencing, until the Supreme Court disposed of defendant's application for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals' judgment. The Court of Appeals' decision in Luscombe did not undermine George because it was factually distinguishable: Luscombe involved ...
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