People v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 27 February 2020
• Docket Number: 109299,109313
• Citation: 180 A.D.3d 1222,120 N.Y.S.3d 500
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rasaun WATKINS, Also Known as Five, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

180 A.D.3d 1222

120 N.Y.S.3d 500

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Rasaun WATKINS, Also Known as Five, Appellant.

109313

109299

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: January 10, 2020

Decided and Entered: February 27, 2020

Bruce Evans Knoll, Albany, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Mulvey, Devine, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Sira, J.), rendered February 9, 2017, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of rape in the third degree, criminal sexual act in the third degree, endangering the welfare of a child, unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree and resisting arrest.

Defendant was charged in the first of two indictments with rape in the third degree, criminal sexual act in the third degree and endangering the welfare of a child. These charges stemmed from an incident in November 2015 when defendant, then 32 years old, engaged in sexual acts with the victim, a 16–year–old female. In the second indictment, defendant was charged with unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree and resisting arrest in connection with a traffic stop during which defendant fled at an excessive speed, later stopped his car, ran on foot and then hid from police and failed to comply with orders to facilitate his arrest. At the People's request, County Court (Sypniewski, J.) ordered defendant to submit to a buccal swab and granted the People's unopposed motion to consolidate the two indictments. Following a seven-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty of all counts. Defendant was thereafter sentenced, as a second felony offender, to concurrent prison terms of four years, to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision, on each conviction of rape in the third degree and criminal sexual act in the third degree, and to lesser concurrent terms of incarceration on the remaining counts. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Defendant contends that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and are against the weight of the evidence. In reviewing legal sufficiency, this Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged" ( People v. Henry, 173 A.D.3d 1470, 1473, 103 N.Y.S.3d 656 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 932, 109 N.Y.S.3d 699, 133 N.E.3d 399 [2019] ). In contrast, weight of the evidence review "involves a two-step approach wherein [the][C]ourt must (1) determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, an acquittal would not have been unreasonable; and (2) weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" ( People v. Sanchez, 32 N.Y.3d 1021, 1023, 87 N.Y.S.3d 135, 112 N.E.3d 312 [2018] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted] ).

Pertinent here, "[a] person is guilty of rape in the third degree when[,] ... [b]eing [21] years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than [17] years old" ( Penal Law § 130.25[2] ), and "[a] person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the third degree when[,] ... [b]eing [21] years old or more, he or she engages in oral sexual conduct ... with a person less than [17] years old" ( Penal Law § 130.40[2] ). "A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when ... [h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than [17] years old" ( Penal Law § 260.10[1] ). "A person is guilty of unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree when, knowing that he or she has been directed to stop his or her motor vehicle by a uniformed police officer or a marked police vehicle by the activation of either the lights or the lights and siren of such vehicle, he or she thereafter attempts to flee such officer or such vehicle by driving at speeds which equal or exceed [25] miles per hour above the speed limit" ( Penal Law § 270.25 ). Finally, "[a] person is guilty of resisting arrest when he [or she] intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer or peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself[, herself] or another person" ( Penal Law § 205.30 ).

At trial, the victim testified that on the date of the incident she was 16 years old. Defendant's birth certificate, which was admitted into evidence, reveals that he was 32 years old at the time of the incident. The victim explained that, during the day, she was with Roshan "Jungle" Lalchan and Africa Klu at an electronics store, which was run by Elvin Singh, and that she, Klu and Lalchan were drinking alcohol. Around 8:30 p.m., after consuming about four drinks, the victim left with Lachlan and went to Elvin Singh's house. She testified that, when she first arrived in the house, multiple people were present, including Lalchan, Klu and Andrick Singh (hereinafter Singh), Elvin Singh's brother, but that defendant was not present at that time. According to the victim, Elvin Singh was home only briefly. The victim testified that she consumed another four or five alcoholic drinks with Klu, and the two began to kiss in the living room and then moved to an upstairs bedroom where Lalchan was also present. According to the victim, Klu then had vaginal intercourse with her. Then, at Klu's insistence, Lalchan began vaginal intercourse with the victim, and Klu had the victim perform oral sex on him. Singh then entered the bedroom and began having vaginal intercourse with the victim. Thereafter, defendant entered the bedroom and the victim performed oral sex on him. According to the victim, after Singh "got off of [her]," defendant began vaginal intercourse with her, "after [she] tried to push him off of [her]." The victim testified that the bedroom was dark, but that the door was cracked so that she could still see "a little bit" from a hallway light. The victim identified defendant in the courtroom by the name Five and testified that he was not present in the living room earlier in the evening and that she did not personally know him, but that she recognized him because he came into the electronics store earlier that day. The victim testified that, after the incident, she got dressed and vomited in the living room and then Singh drove her home. Her mother and father were home when she arrived and, after police and paramedics arrived, she was taken to a hospital and underwent a physical examination. She testified that she was wearing a pair of ripped blue jeans with white leggings, a pink shirt, a bra and underwear on the night of the incident. During direct examination, the victim acknowledged that she initially told police that she had been held down and forcibly raped, but she testified at trial that that was not the truth and that she lied because she did not want to be judged and did not want her family to know the truth.

On cross-examination, the victim acknowledged that she first reported to police that the room was dark and that she could not see who was having intercourse with her and that she did not initially mention defendant. She did not know, or could not recall, whether Lalchan or Klu remained in the bedroom while defendant and Singh had intercourse with her, but acknowledged that she had previously testified before the grand jury that Klu and Lalchan were present and holding her arms down. Defense counsel then questioned the victim as to where her underwear was during the incident and whether she had put it back on when she got dressed, to which the victim responded, "I don't know" and "I don't want to be here. I want to go home." After this, the jury was excused to permit the witness time to "compose herself," and she "walk[ed] off the stand before [County Court] had excused her." After the People's investigator and the prosecutor located the victim and returned her to the courtroom, the jury reconvened and she resumed her testimony. The victim then testified, in contrast to her answer prior to leaving the stand, that she located her underwear next to her shoes in the bedroom and that she was wearing underwear when she went downstairs.

Singh testified that he knew defendant by the name Five and identified him in the courtroom. He testified that on the night of the incident, Elvin Singh, Klu, Lalchan and the victim were at Elvin Singh's house, but that Elvin Singh left the house prior to any sexual contact occurring with the victim. Singh's description of the victim's clothing that evening matched the victim's testimony. According to Singh, Klu and the victim were drinking in the living room; later, Singh went upstairs with the victim to have sex in a bedroom and no one else was present at that time. Klu later entered the bedroom, and he and Singh continued to engage in sexual acts with the victim. According to Singh, after he returned to the living room, he saw defendant enter the house. Thereafter, Singh returned to the bedroom with defendant, at which time he saw Lalchan engaged in intercourse with the victim. Singh testified that he had vaginal intercourse with the victim again while she performed oral sex on defendant and that he and defendant later "switched." According to Singh, although there were no lights on in the room, there was enough light that "things [were] still distinguishable." Singh testified that sexual contact with the victim stopped after "she call[ed] out for [Klu]," and...