People v. Watson

• Decision Date: 29 November 2012
• Citation: 20 N.Y.3d 182,981 N.E.2d 265,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 08169,957 N.Y.S.2d 669
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Tyrone WATSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

20 N.Y.3d 182

981 N.E.2d 265

957 N.Y.S.2d 669

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 08169

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Tyrone WATSON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 29, 2012.

Steven Banks, Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York City(Natalie Rea of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Sharon Y. Brodt and John M. Castellano of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GRAFFEO, J.

DefendantTyrone Watson took an undercover police officer to meet a drug dealer, handled the cocaine transaction for the officer and then gave him the drugs.For these acts, defendant was charged with selling cocaine, facilitating the sale and possessing narcotics.At trial, defendant claimed that he was not guilty of the sale or facilitation counts because he was acting as the agent of the buyer.The trial court acquitted defendant of the sale under an agency theory, but convicted him of facilitation and possession.We must now determine whether a claim of agency may be interposed as a defense to the crime of facilitating a drug sale.

I

Legislative efforts to combat drug abuse in New York date back to the 1800s ( seeThomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution & Present Status of New York Drug Control Legislation, 22 BuffL. Rev. 705, 709[1972–1973] ).Criminal liability for the sale and possession of cocaine was first imposed in the early twentieth century ( seeid. at 711–712).During the next 50 years, the federal government and state legislatures increasingly relied on penal statutes to stem the tide of narcotics addiction ( seeid. at 713–732).By the early 1970s, a growing consensus recognized that earlier deterrence efforts were not effective and that new approaches were needed ( seeInterim Rep. of Temp. St. Commn. to Evaluate the Drug Laws, 1972 Legis. Doc. No. 10at 7, 58).Proposals for change ran the gamut from legalization to more punitive criminal sanctions ( seeid. at 58).

The latter strategy was embraced by Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who believed that New York had unsuccessfully “tried every possible approach to stop addiction and save the addict through education and treatment”(Annual Message of the Governor, 1973 McKinney's Session Laws ofN.Y. at 2318, quoted inPeople v. Davis,33 N.Y.2d 221, 228, 351 N.Y.S.2d 663, 306 N.E.2d 787[1973],cert. denied416 U.S. 973, 94 S.Ct. 1999, 40 L.Ed.2d 562[1974] ).At the same time, the legislature was grappling with what it “found to be a high recidivism rate in drug-related crimes, an inadequate response to less severe punishment, and an insidiously growing drug abuse problem”( People v. Broadie,37 N.Y.2d 100, 114, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338[1975],cert. denied423 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 372, 46 L.Ed.2d 287[1975] ).It accepted the Governor's plan and a series of bills were passed that came to be known as the “Rockefeller Drug Laws”( seeL. 1973, chs. 276, 277, 278, 676, 1051).

The centerpiece of the new laws was a “radical restructuring of not only drug laws but of sentencing statutes as well”(Albert M. Rosenblatt, New York's New Drug Laws & Sentencing Statutes at v.[Law Journal Press 1973] ).In adopting harsher consequences for the sale and possession of illegal drugs, New York's statutory penalties became the most stringent in the nation and narcotics crimes were punished “more severely and inflexibly than almost any other offense in the State”—elevating many of them to the status shared by second-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping and first-degree arson ( People v. Broadie,37 N.Y.2d at 115, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338).Specifically, mandatory indeterminate life sentences were imposed “in all narcotic drug sales or transfers, however small, and for possession of over one eighth of an ounce”(Albert M. Rosenblatt, New York's New Drug Laws & Sentencing Statutes at v).Although the statutory minimums ranged from one year to 25 years (depending on the quantity of drug sold or possessed), the concept of an indeterminate life sentence meant that defendants who were released on parole were subject to supervision for the remainder of their lives.

In addition to the increased penalties, the preexisting Penal Law definition of the term “sell” resulted in certain persons, who would not ordinarily be considered drug dealers, being swept within the life-imprisonment provisions of the Rockefeller Drug Laws ( see generallyArnold D. Hechtman, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law§ 220.00 at 13 [1980] ).This occurred because the term “sell” was defined as covering not only a traditional sale or exchange for consideration, but also to “give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same”(Penal Law § 220.00[1];cf.Penal Law of 1909 § 1751).Consequently, “any form of transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another”—no matter how minuscule the amount and regardless of whether there was a profit—was treated as a drug sale that could land the offender in prison for life (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law§ 220.00 at 22).In theory, this broad definition of “sell” included anyone who, upon request, offered to procure a small quantity of narcotics for another individual as a favor or without an expectation of personal benefit.

Defendants who became ensnared in this definitional net and faced charges of criminal sale of a controlled substance borrowed an “agency defense” theory that had been successfully used in criminal prosecutions during Prohibition ( see e.g.State v. Lynch,81 Ohio St. 336, 90 N.E. 935[1910] ).The “agency” doctrine was premised on the concept that a “person who acts solely as the agent of a buyer in procuring drugs for the buyer is not guilty of selling the drug to the buyer, or of possessing it with intent to sell it to the buyer”(William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law§ 220.00 at 33).

This Court endorsed the agency defense in the context of a drug sale in People v. Lam Lek Chong,45 N.Y.2d 64, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200(1978),cert. denied439 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 330, 58 L.Ed.2d 331[1978].We observed that the sale of controlled substances was treated more harshly than possession and that there “are certain cases where the defendant's mere delivery of the drugs does not appear to involve the same degree of culpability, or warrant the extreme penalties, associated with pushing drugs”( id. at 72, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200).We further reasoned that when the legislature drafted the definition of “sell,” it was presumably aware of the earlier decisional law that recognized agency as a defense to the sale of illegal substances; yet, the legislature did not evince an intent to require the courts to abandon application of the defense ( seeid. at 73–74, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200).We therefore held that the agency defense could be asserted in a drug sale case, which required the finder of fact to determine the extent of an intermediary's criminal liability, either as a seller or a purchaser for another ( seeid. at 74, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200).To reach that conclusion, we indicated that the jury should consider

“the nature and extent of the relationship between the defendant and the buyer, whether it was the buyer or the defendant who suggested the purchase, whether the defendant has had other drug dealings with this or other buyers or sellers and, of course, whether the defendant profited, or stood to profit, from the transaction”( id. at 75, 407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 379 N.E.2d 200).

In three cases decided on the same day as Lam Lek Chong,we further explained that an agency defense (1) must be charged to the jury if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it ( seePeople v. Roche,45 N.Y.2d 78, 86, 407 N.Y.S.2d 682, 379 N.E.2d 208[1978],cert. denied439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 359, 58 L.Ed.2d 350[1978] ); (2) cannot be used by a person who acts “at the very least as a middleman or a broker for his supplier”( People v. Argibay,45 N.Y.2d 45, 50, 407 N.Y.S.2d 664, 379 N.E.2d 191[1978],cert. denied sub nom.Hahn–Diguiseppe v. New York,439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 317, 58 L.Ed.2d 323[1978] ); and (3) does not apply to a drug possession charge ( seePeople v. Sierra,45 N.Y.2d 56, 58, 407 N.Y.S.2d 669, 379 N.E.2d 196[1978] ).The harshness of the sentences that were imposed under the Rockefeller Drug Laws have been mitigated ( see e.g.People v. Acevedo,14 N.Y.3d 828, 831, 901 N.Y.S.2d 578, 927 N.E.2d 1062[2010];People v. Utsey,7 N.Y.3d 398, 401, 822 N.Y.S.2d 475, 855 N.E.2d 791[2006][both discussing the Drug Law ReformAct of 2004(L. 2004, ch. 738)] ), but the agency defense nevertheless continues to provide a means of determining the extent of the intermediary's culpability as either a buyer or seller of narcotics ( see generallyPeople v. Davis,14 N.Y.3d 20, 24, 896 N.Y.S.2d 707, 923 N.E.2d 1095[2009] ).Surprisingly, in more than 30 years since our Court recognized the agency doctrine, we have not had occasion to consider whether it applies similarly to a charge of criminal facilitation.

II

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on July 24, 2007, an NYPD narcotics unit arrived at a location in Queens.Acting as an undercover buyer, a narcotics sergeant approached defendantTyrone Watson and asked him where he could find some “rock.”Defendant inquired how much he wanted and the officer stated that he had $40.Defendant indicated that he knew how to obtain cocaine and used a pay phone to place a call.When no one answered, defendant called another number but was again unsuccessful.Defendant then remarked “we can go to my boy's house on 123[rd] Street and Sutphin Boulevard.”Defendant suggested that they take a bus and offered to pay the officer's fare.

While en route, the officer gave defendant $40 in pre-recorded buy money.About 10 minutes later, the pair got off...