People v. Watson

• Decision Date: 23 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 86059.,86059.
• Citation: 241 Ill.Dec. 590,719 N.E.2d 719,187 Ill.2d 448
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael WATSON, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

719 N.E.2d 719

187 Ill.2d 448

241 Ill.Dec. 590

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael WATSON, Appellee.

No. 86059.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 23, 1999.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Michael T. James, State's Attorney, Ottawa (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Stephen F. Potts, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin, Gary F. Gnidovec, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Sherry Silvern, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for Appellee.

Justice HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Does the filing of an amended post-conviction petition restart the 90-day period in which the circuit court may dismiss a petition as frivolous or patently without merit? The answer is yes.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnaping, and was sentenced to natural life plus 65 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Watson, No. 3-93-0444, 276 Ill.App.3d 1140, 231 Ill.Dec. 742, 697 N.E.2d 23 (1995) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of La Salle County on May 31, 1996. In that petition, he sought leave to file an amended petition, which the circuit court subsequently granted. Defendant's amended petition was filed August 30, 1996. On September 5, 1996, the circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous or patently without merit.

On appeal of the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, defendant argued that the circuit court erred in finding his petition frivolous or patently without merit. Defendant also argued that the circuit court was not authorized to dismiss the petition because it entered its ruling more than 90 days after the filing of his original petition. The appellate court agreed with this second argument, and reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit court for appointment of counsel to represent defendant on further consideration of the petition. No. 3-96-0886 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal and now reverse the appellate court.

Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)), the court in which a post-conviction petition is filed must, within 90 days of the filing, examine the petition, and, if the court determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit, enter an order dismissing it. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1996). If the court does not dismiss the petition in this manner, it must docket the petition for further consideration and, if satisfied that the petitioner desires but has no means to procure counsel, appoint counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b), 122-4 (West 1996). Defendant in the instant case contends that, because the court failed to dismiss the petition within 90 days from the filing of his original petition, the court was required to docket the petition for further consideration and grant his request for appointed counsel. The State responds that the 90-day period restarted when defendant filed his amended petition. We agree with the State.

The General Assembly has authorized a court considering a post-conviction petition to allow amendments to the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1996). It would be unreasonable to authorize the court to allow amendments to the petition and yet require the court to rule on the petition within the period remaining for consideration of the original petition. The unreasonableness of defendant's position is well illustrated by the instant case. After requesting and receiving leave to amend his original petition, defendant mailed the amended petition on the eighty-eighth day of the original period. Under defendant's suggestion, the circuit court would then have had only two days to consider the merits of the amended petition. Such a truncated time frame to consider the petition would be both inadequate and unfair. Such a rule could work only to the detriment of all, including both defendants and prosecutors.

Accordingly, we hold that, when a defendant who has filed an original post-conviction petition subsequently files an amended petition, the 90-day period in which the court must examine the defendant's petition and enter an order thereon is to be calculated from the filing of the amended petition. We thus reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand this cause to the appellate court to address defendant's arguments on the merits of his petition.

Appellate court judgment reversed; cause remanded.

Chief Justice FREEMAN, specially concurring:

Although I agree with the court's holding, I write separately because I believe that today's opinion provides too cursory an analysis concerning the construction of section 122-5 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1996)). I also believe that the opinion has the potential to cause undue confusion in future cases.

Like my colleagues in the majority, I agree that the filing of an amended post-conviction petition will restart the 90-day period in which the circuit court may dismiss a petition as frivolous or patently without merit. Moreover, I agree that the reason the above is true is because the General Assembly has authorized the circuit court to allow for amended petitions, such as that at issue here, to be filed under the Act. That authorization can be found in section 122-5, as the court correctly holds. 187 Ill.2d at 451, 241 Ill.Dec. at 591, 719 N.E.2d at 720. However, the court declares this holding in a single sentence (see 187 Ill.2d at 451, 241 Ill.Dec. at 591, 719 N.E.2d at 720) (stating that the section "authorize[s] a court considering a post-conviction petition to allow amendments to the petition") without first engaging in any statutory construction analysis. Instead, the opinion refers only to reasons of policy that support its interpretation of the language. See 187 Ill.2d at 451, 241 Ill.Dec. at 591, 719 N.E.2d at 720. Although I do not disagree with the policy reasons identified in the court's opinion, I feel that our analysis in this case should begin with an examination of the language contained in section 122-5.

Section 122-5 provides as follows:

"Within 30 days after the making of an order pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 122-2.1, or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall answer or move to dismiss. In the event that a motion to dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an answer within 20 days after such denial. No other or further pleadings shall be filed except as the court may order on its own motion or on that of either party. The court may in its discretion grant leave, at any stage of the proceeding prior to the entry of judgment, to withdraw the petition. The court may in its discretion make such order as to amendment of the petition or any other pleading, or as to pleading over, or filing further pleadings, or extending the time for filing any pleading other than the original petition, as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable and as is generally provided in civil cases." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1996).

The plain language of section 122-5 demonstrates that the section deals with two distinct subjects. The first relates to the State's obligations once a petition has been docketed pursuant to section 122-2.1(b). Under section 122-5, the State, as the responding party, may seek a dismissal of the petition or else it may answer. If a motion to dismiss is denied, the State's answer must be filed within 20 days after the denial unless more time is given by the court. The next portion of section 122-5, underscored in the above quotation, relates to the discretion the circuit court has in its control of the case "at any stage of the proceeding." The General Assembly has permitted the circuit court to allow for a withdrawal of the petition and for any amendments "as shall be appropriate, just, and reasonable, and as is generally provided in civil cases." Under our rules of civil procedure, which govern civil cases, a plaintiff may seek to amend its original pleading with leave of court prior to entry of a final judgment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 1996).

When a court engages in statutory construction, as we do here, its sole task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. To do so, the court must look first to the language of the statute, examining the language as a whole and considering each part or section in connection with every other part or section. Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 Ill.2d 477, 167 Ill.Dec. 981, 588 N.E.2d 1111 (1992). In so doing, I find no reason to read section 122-5 in isolation, as the dissent suggests. 187 Ill.2d at 456-58, 241 Ill.Dec. at 592-593, 719 N.E.2d at 721-722 (Rathje, J., dissenting). The first half of section 122-5 refers back to section 122-2.1(b). The second half of section 122-5 refers to any stage in the proceeding and, at one point, specifically refers to the period before the entry of a final judgment. Petitions dismissed as frivolous or as patently without merit are dismissed under section 122-2.1(a)(2) and such orders of dismissal constitute "final judgment[s]." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1996). Thus, the discretion given in the latter portion of section 122-5 relates to any stage in the proceeding prior to the entry of a final judgment. Reading the statute as a whole and giving effect to its language, I find no support for the position that petitioners cannot file amendments (with court approval) under section 122-2.1, for such a prohibition is nowhere stated in the entirety of the Act.¹ Nor do I find any support for the position that the latter provisions of section 122-5 apply only to petitions...