People v. Watt

• Decision Date: 21 April 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 162377
• Citation: 210 Mich.App. 92,533 N.W.2d 325
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Dee WATT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 325

533 N.W.2d 325

210 Mich.App. 92

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Dee WATT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 162377.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1995, at Grand Rapids.

Decided April 21, 1995, at 9:55 a.m.

Released for Publication June 19, 1995.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., William A. Forsyth, Pros. Atty., and Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., for the People.

Cynthia G. Carowitz, Grand Rapids, for defendant on appeal.

Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and NEFF, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant originally was charged with jail escape, M.C.L. § 750.197(2); M.S.A. § 28.394(2), and forgery, M.C.L. § 750.248; M.S.A. § 28.445. The escape charge was subsequently dismissed and defendant pleaded guilty of attempted forgery, M.C.L. § 750.92; M.S.A. § 28.287. He was sentenced to 2 1/2 to 5 years' imprisonment and now appeals as of right. We affirm.

The underlying facts are undisputed. Defendant escaped from the Kent County Jail, where he was housed awaiting sentencing on a federal bank robbery conviction. Defendant accomplished the escape by assuming the identity of his cellmate, who was then about to be released on bond, and forging a signature on the cellmate's state bail-bond form. He pleaded guilty of federal escape charges, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), and on July 17, 1992, was sentenced in federal district court to fifty months' incarceration. On July 27, 1992, defendant was charged with escape and forgery under Michigan law. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the Michigan escape charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but declined to dismiss the Michigan forgery charge. The parties agree that the federal government could not have brought forgery charges, apparently because a state bail bond was involved.

The sole issue on appeal is whether defendant's Michigan forgery conviction was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15, or was permissible under the dual-sovereignty doctrine. That doctrine, as originally set forth in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959), and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), allows successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments for the same act. The parties agree that the controlling guidelines for resolving the question were established by our Supreme Court in People v. Cooper, 398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866 (1976). Cooper was explained by the Court in People v. Gay, 407 Mich. 681, 289 N.W.2d 651 (1980):

This Court broke with Federal precedent and held in People v Cooper that limitations did exist under the Michigan Constitution upon the state's ability to prosecute a defendant in a state court following a conviction in Federal court for crimes arising out of the same acts. 398 Mich [at] 457, 460-461, 247 N.W.2d 866. We recognized in Cooper that state criminal justice systems must retain their strength and independence. This principle of dual sovereignty has long maintained ascendance in the American system of justice....

However, we found that emerging Federal trends in recent years and the dictates of our own Constitution required us to impose limits on what dual sovereignty would permit. We held that where a criminal act involves the legitimate interests of both the state and Federal governments and the Federal criminal prosecution cannot adequately represent the state's independent interests, then the state in those rare instances is justified in protecting its interest by prosecuting the defendant, even after conviction or acquittal in Federal court. 398 Mich [at] 459-460, 247 N.W.2d 866. Dual prosecution of these differing interests violates neither the Federal nor Michigan Constitution.

On the other hand, this Court also recognized the fundamental need to safeguard defendants' constitutional rights. We therefore prohibited dual prosecution where the interests of the state are not "substantially different." People v Cooper, supra, 461 ....

* * * * * *

Cooper represents a strong and uncompromising statement by this Court that a defendant's right not to be twice tried in Federal and State court for the same criminal act will be jealously guarded except in extreme cases where Federal laws are framed to protect substantially different social interests. 398 Mich [at] 459, 247 N.W.2d 866. Cooper makes clear that as a firm rule dual prosecution ordinarily will not be tolerated in Michigan. It is only in the rare instance where the social interests of the state are not addressed in substance by the Federal statute that a second prosecution will be allowed. [407 Mich [at] 693-695, 289 N.W.2d 651. Citations omitted.]

To assist courts in determining whether a former federal prosecution satisfies the state's interest, the Cooper Court suggested three guidelines: (1) whether the maximum penalties of the two jurisdictions' statutes are greatly disparate, (2) whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully the other jurisdiction's interests in securing a conviction, and (3) whether the differences in the statutes are substantive, as well as jurisdictional. 398 Mich. at 461, 247 N.W.2d 866. See also People v. Formicola, 407 Mich. 293, 298, 284 N.W.2d 334 (1979); People v. Morillo, 90 Mich.App. 655, 660-665, 282 N.W.2d 434 (1979); People v. Tyler, 100 Mich.App. 782, 788-790, 300 N.W.2d 411 (1980); People v. Bero, 168 Mich.App. 545, 558-559, 425 N.W.2d 138 (1988); People v. Mezy, 208 Mich.App. 545, 528 N.W.2d 783 (1995).

Examination of the second and third factors in the context of this case leads to the conclusion that the interests being protected by the State of Michigan in securing defendant's forgery conviction are substantially different from...