People v. Weaver

• Decision Date: 22 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 41360,41360
• Citation: 243 N.E.2d 245,41 Ill.2d 434
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Tennie WEAVER, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 245

243 N.E.2d 245

41 Ill.2d 434

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Tennie WEAVER, Appellant.

No. 41360.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 22, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1969.

Robert H. Jones, Peoria, appointed by the court, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard Stengel, State's Atty., Rock Island (John Donald O'Shea, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

A jury in the circuit court of Rock Island County found the defendant, Tennie Weaver, guilty of burglary, possession of burglary tools, and theft, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary. On this appeal he attacks the constitutionality of a search of the automobile in which he had ridden to the scene of the alleged crime, contends that one of the three counts of the indictment failed to charge an offense, and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish guilt upon the other two counts--burglary and possession of burglary tools.

While cruising in their patrol car shortly after midnight on July 31, 1967, two officers of the East Moline police department saw two men, the defendant and Jerry York, in a well-lighted self-service laundromat. York was looking out of the front window, and the defendant was at a soft drink vending machine, the door of which was open. The officers knew of recent thefts and vandalism in laundromats located in that area; they drove on, circled, and entered the laundromat a minute or two later. York was still standing at the front window and the defendant had just flushed the toilet in the restroom at the rear of the laundromat. The men told the officers that they had stopped in the laundromat to use a telephone. They were frisked for weapons, and coins amounting to more than $50 were found in the defendant's pockets.

The defendant's hands were cuffed behind his back and he was placed in the front seat of the police car, where he shifted and squirmed about. York, accompanied by one of the officers, drove his car, which had been parked in front of the laundromat, to the police station. One of the officers, whose suspicions had been aroused by the defendant's squirming movements in the police car, searched the front seat of that car and found a key. The two officers returned to the laundromat and found that the key opened the outer door of the vending machine, although it did not open the coin receptacle. The officers testified that they returned again to the police station to secure a warrant for the search of York's car. The officer in charge of the shift telephoned a judge and was told that a warrant was not necessary. The officers then searched York's car, and found more coins and a plastic bag containing 303 keys, some of which were of the type used to open vending machines, and one of which opened the coin compartment of the machine here in question. Later that morning York's car was turned over to the sheriff, and proceedings for its forfeiture were instituted on the same day.

The defendant testified that he and York had stopped at the laundromat so that York could telephone his wife, and that while York was using the telephone, the defendant went to the restroom. The defendant's former wife, a waitress, testified that shortly before his arrest, he had visited her in the tavern where she worked and that she had given him $40 to $50 in change which she had received as tips. The proprietor of the tavern corroborated her testimony.

The defendant contends that his constitutional rights were violated when his motion to suppress the coins and the bag of keys found in York's car was denied. For this contention he relies upon Preston v. United States (1964), 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777. In our opinion, however, this issue is controlled not by Preston, but by Cooper v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730. See also People v. Carter, 38 Ill.2d 496, 500, 232 N.E.2d 692; People v. Nugara (1968), 39 Ill.2d 482, 236 N.E.2d 693, cert. den. 393 U.S. 925, 89 S.Ct. 257, 21 L.E.2d 261.

In our opinion the conduct of the officers was reasonable. When they first saw the suspects, one of them was apparently on guard at the front window while the other was busy with the vending machine. We regard as immaterial the fact that the search of the automobile took place after, rather than before, the suspects were taken to the station. The officers testified that they had radioed for assistance but that 'the other squad car was busy.' Their judgment that it was advisable to take the suspects to the station in order to prevent escape instead of searching the car at the scene, is not, in our opinion, subject to criticism. In a situation of this kind it is impossible for police officers to do simultaneously everything that needs to be done, and the fact that some steps are necessarily given priority over others does not affect their legality. The search in this case was, in the language of Cooper v. California, 'closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested.' (386 U.S. at 61, 87 S.Ct. at 791, 17 L.E.2d at 733.) We hold, therefore, that the search of the car was reasonable and did not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.

The defendant's attack upon the legal sufficiency of count III of the indictment is also phrased in constitutional terms. This count charged that the defendant 'committed the offense of felony theft' and it alleged that he had previously been twice convicted of theft of amounts not exceeding $150. In denying his motion to dismiss this count, the trial court directed that evidence of the defendant's...