People v. Weger

• Citation: 251 Cal.App.2d 584,59 Cal.Rptr. 661
• Decision Date: 05 June 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 13090
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Chester W. WEGER, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 661

59 Cal.Rptr. 661

251 Cal.App.2d 584

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Chester W. WEGER, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 13090.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

June 5, 1967.

As Modified June 23, 1967.

Hearing Denied July 26, 1967.

Byron B. Gentry, City Prosecutor, Pasadena and David Press, Asst. City Prosecutor, for plaintiff and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Evelle J. Younger, Dist. Atty., Los Angeles, Harry Wood, Chief, App. Div., Harry B. Sondheim, Deputy Dist. Atty., Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Philip E. Grey, Asst. City Atty., and Melvin L. Jensen, Deputy City Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of appellant.

Allen I. Neiman, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence R. Sperber, Los Angeles, for respondent.

McCOY, Associate Justice pro tem. ^*

In June 1966 the People filed a complaint in the Municipal Court for the Pasadena Judicial District, charging defendant with a violation of subdivision (e) of section 647 of the Penal Code. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer and ordered the case dismissed. (Pen.Code, § 1008.) On appeal by the People the Appellate Department of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County affirmed the judgment of dismissal and certified the case to this court. We ordered the case transferred in order to settle an important question of law.

The only question before us is the constitutionality of section 647, subdivision (e), of the Penal Code. That section provides in relevant part: 'Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: * * * (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.' ¹ We are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of defendant. We hold that the law is constitutional and that the judgment dismissing the action must be reversed.

We note at the outset that there is 'a presumption in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of a legislative act must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional.' (Patton v. La Bree, 60 Cal.2d 606, 608--609, 35 Cal.Rptr. 622, 624, 387 P.2d 398, 400.) 'As pointed out in People v. Superior Court (1937), 10 Cal.2d 288, 298(4), 73 P.2d 1221, 'judicial decisions abound with declarations to the effect that all presumptions and intendments favor the validity of statutes; that mere doubt by the judicial branch of the government as to the validity of a statute will not afford a sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of its invalidity * * *.' (Citations.)' (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 311, 14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 291, 363 P.2d 305, 307.) 'Statutes are to be so construed, if their language permits, as to render them valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional. County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal.2d 349, 353, 55 P.2d 206; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 115, p. 624.' (Erlich v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal.2d 553, 558, 11 Cal.Rptr. 758, 761, 360 P.2d 334, 337.) 'Statutes must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears.' (In re

Huddleson, 229 Cal.App.2d 618, 621, 40 Cal.Rptr. 581, 583.) Section 647, subdivision (e) is not Constitutionally Vague and Uncertain

Defendant contends that section 647, subdivision (e), of the Penal Code, is vague and uncertain and fails to establish clearly defined standards of guilt and thus deprives him and all others of due process of law. In our opinion this contention is not tenable.

The Supreme Court of the United States 'has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. '* * * (T)he Constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. * * *' United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7--8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L.Ed. 1877, 1883.' (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1510--1511.) 'A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation. But few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.' (Boyce Motor Lines v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367, 371.)

Similarly it has been held in this state that 'The requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law, is a well established element of the guarantee of due process of law. 'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids * * * 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. " Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888; see also Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed 322. Such also is the law of the State of California. People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal.2d 409, 414, 317 P.2d 974.' (In re Newbern, 53 Cal.2d 786, 792, 3 Cal.Rptr. 364, 368, 350 P.2d 116, 120.)

In In re De La O, 59 Cal.2d 128, 153, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 505, 378 P.2d 793, 809, 98 A.L.R.2d 705, it is said: 'Words used in a statute are ordinarily to be construed according to the context and 'the approved use of the language' (Civ.Code, § 13), and 'a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, 'notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ" (Lorenson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 49, 60(8), 216 P.2d 859, 866)' In People v. Victor, 62 Cal.2d 280, 298, at page 299, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, at page 211, 398 P.2d 391, at page 403, the court adhered to these rules, adding that admittedly a word as used in a particular statute may be 'a relevant one; but 'the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.' (Nash v. United States (1913) 229 U.S. 373, 377, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232.)'

In short, the presence of an element of degree in the definition of the words used 'does not of itself render the statutory language insufficiently certain to comply with due process. "Reasonable certainty is all that is required. A statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its language.' (Citation.) It will be upheld if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources.' (American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California v. Board of Education (1963) 59 Cal.2d 203, 218(9) 28 Cal.Rptr. 700, 379 P.2d 4.)' (People v. Victor, 62 Cal.2d 280, 300, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 211, 398 P.2d 391, 403). 'The complexities of the social problems dealt with by the Legislature require that a practical construction be given to the language employed by the draftsmen of legislation lest their purposes be too easily nullified by overrefined inquiries into the meanings of words.' (People v. Vaughn, 196 Cal.App.2d 622, 632, 16 Cal.Rptr. 711, 716.)

We turn now to a consideration of the words used in the statute. In doing so we are required 'to read the statute in the light of the objective sought to be achieved by it as well as the evil sought to be averted. (Wotton v. Bush (1953) 41 Cal.2d 460, 467, 261 P.2d 256.)' (In re Huddleson, 229 Cal.App.2d 618, 624, 40 Cal.Rptr. 581, 585.) 'Where the words have a broad and also a restricted meaning, if the apparent object of the statute will be subserved by construing them in their restricted sense, whereas a principal object would be defeated by construing them in their broad sense, the restricted interpretation will be preferred and the broad meaning rejected, though the latter may be the more usual meaning. But a narrow or restricted meaning should not be given a word if it would result in evasion of the evident purpose of the act, or if a broader meaning would prevent evasion and carry out the purpose.' (45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 140, p. 648.)

In 1961 the Legislature, after a lengthy study of the problems involved (see 22 Assembly Interim Committee Reports, No. 1 (1960)) repealed former section 647 of the Penal Code and adopted section 647 in its present form. (Stats.1961, ch. 560.) Former section 647 classified the crime of 'vagrancy' as a misdemeanor. ²

In repealing former section 647 and enacting the present section, the Legislature recognized, as urged by the principal draftsman of the new section, that the time had come to abandon the vagrancy concept of the former section 'for statutes which will harmonize with notions of a decent, fair and just administration of criminal justice and which will at the same time make it possible for police departments to discharge their responsibilities in a straightforward manner * * *.' In Professor Sherry's words, this was done 'by drafting legislation which will describe the acts to be proscribed with precision and which will be free of the...