People v. Weiss

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN
• Citation: People v. Weiss, 479 N.W.2d 30, 191 Mich.App. 553 (Mich. App. 1991)
• Decision Date: 21 October 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 124247
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. Daniel WEISS, Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant. 191 Mich.App. 553, 479 N.W.2d 30

Page 30

479 N.W.2d 30

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. Daniel WEISS, Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Docket No. 124247.

191 Mich.App. 553, 479 N.W.2d 30

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 13, 1991, at Detroit.

Decided Oct. 21, 1991, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 3, 1992.

[191 MICHAPP 554] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., and George E. Ward, Chief Asst. Prosecutor, for the People.

Harold Gurewitz, Detroit, for defendant-appellee cross-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., and Gary P. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae Secretary of State.

Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and GRIBBS and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, JJ.

RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, Judge.

In this case of first impression, the prosecutor appeals by leave granted a decision of the Detroit Recorder's Court affirming the district court's dismissal of misdemeanor criminal charges against defendant, Daniel Weiss. We affirm and hold that the phrase "knowingly violates" as used in Sec. 41(1) of the Campaign Finance Act, M.C.L. Sec. [191 MICHAPP 555] 169.201 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(1) et seq., requires proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was in violation of the disclosure law.

I

At issue in this appeal are two provisions of the Campaign Finance Act. In part, Sec. 41 of the act, M.C.L. Sec. 169.241; M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41), makes it illegal for any person to make or accept a campaign contribution of $20.01 or more in cash. Such contributions, pursuant to the statute, must be made by written instrument containing the names of both the payor and the payee. The statute further provides that "[a] person who knowingly violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.)

Section 15 of the act, M.C.L. Sec. 169.215; M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(15), outlines an enforcement mechanism for pursuing violations of the act. At the time of the instant prosecution, M.C.L. Sec. 169.215(2); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(15)(2) provided as follows:

A person may file a complaint with the secretary of state alleging a violation of this act. The secretary of state, upon receipt of a complaint, shall investigate the allegations pursuant to the rules promulgated under this act. If the secretary of state determines that there is reason to believe that a violation of this act has occurred, the secretary of state may endeavor to correct or prevent further violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, and may enter into a conciliation agreement with the person involved. A conciliation agreement, unless violated, shall constitute a complete bar to any further action with respect to matters covered in the conciliation agreement. If the secretary of state is unable to correct or prevent further violation by these informal methods, proceedings shall be commenced[191 MICHAPP 556] pursuant to the rules promulgated to implement this act. The secretary of state may forward the results of the investigation to the attorney general for enforcement of this act. [Emphasis added.]

In 1989, Sec. 15 of the act was amended. The changes included replacement of the emphasized word "may" with the word "shall."

In the case before us, two issues are raised. First, whether the phrase "knowingly violates" as used in Sec. 41(1) requires proof that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal in order to sustain a conviction. Second, whether Sec. 15 of the act vests in the Secretary of State and the Attorney General the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the act. In view of our resolution of the first issue, we express no opinion regarding the second.

II

The relevant facts are straightforward. On January 3, 1989, the Wayne County prosecutor's office filed a misdemeanor information in the 36th District Court charging Daniel Weiss with violating M.C.L. Sec. 169.241(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41)(1). Specifically, the information alleged that Weiss:

Did knowingly make a contribution to a political campaign of $20.01 or more in cash, contrary to MCL 169.241(1).

On May 9, 1989, the district court heard oral arguments regarding several motions filed by the parties. Through a motion in limine, the prosecutor sought to preclude any evidence or argument at trial concerning whether defendant knew it was against the law to make a political contribution of [191 MICHAPP 557] more than $20 in cash. The prosecutor argued that in order to satisfy the intent element of the crime, the people need only prove that the defendant knew that he was making a contribution of more than $20 in cash. Alternatively, the prosecution sought a jury instruction consistent with its interpretation of the intent element of the crime.

Also before the court were two separate motions to dismiss brought by Weiss. First, Weiss claimed that the prosecutor had failed to allege an essential element of the crime, namely, that defendant knew that his cash contribution was contrary to law. Second, Weiss claimed that the Wayne County prosecutor did not have the authority to prosecute a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 169.241(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41)(1). Defendant argued that the legislative scheme of the act requires that investigations regarding illegal contributions be conducted by the Secretary of State and that prosecutions, if any, be conducted by the Attorney General's office.

The district court agreed with defendant and granted the motion to dismiss on the basis of both grounds. Thereafter, the prosecutor appealed to the Detroit Recorder's Court. On December 15, 1989, the Recorder's Court issued an opinion affirming the dismissal. Although the court held that the district court misinterpreted the phrase "knowingly violates," it agreed with the district court that M.C.L. Sec. 169.215(2); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(15)(2) vested exclusive authority in the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to pursue violations of the act.

On June 5, 1990, this Court granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. Defendant has cross appealed, raising the issue regarding what constitutes a knowing violation of M.C.L. Sec. 169.241(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41)(1).

[191 MICHAPP 558]

III

The statute under which defendant was charged, M.C.L. Sec. 169.241(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41)(1), provides in pertinent part:

A person shall not make or accept any single contribution of $20.01 or more in cash nor make or accept any single expenditure of $50.01 or more in cash. Contributions of $20.01 or more and expenditures of $50.01 or more, other than an in-kind contribution or expenditure, shall be made by written instrument containing the names of the payor and the payee. A person who knowingly violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.

On its face, the Campaign Finance Act is ambiguous regarding the elements of the misdemeanor offense that it establishes. Standing alone, M.C.L. Sec. 169.241(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41)(1) may be interpreted legitimately in two ways: (1) any person who knowingly makes a cash contribution of $20.01 or more is guilty of a misdemeanor, or (2) any person who makes a cash contribution of $20.01 or more, knowing that such a contribution is unlawful, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Both constructions are plausible and arguably supported by the statutory language. None of the cases cited by the parties provide a definitive answer regarding which construction of the statute is correct. The dicta from People v. Frederighi, 192 Mich. 165, 158 N.W. 177 (1916), is not controlling. Accordingly, because this is a matter of first impression, we turn to the legislative history of the statute and apply traditional rules of statutory construction. After having done so, we conclude that Sec. 41(1) of the Campaign Finance Act requires proof that a defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful in order to sustain a conviction.

[191 MICHAPP 559]

IV

The primary goal of judicial construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Tracy, 186 Mich.App. 171, 174-175, 463 N.W.2d 457 (1990); People v. Hawkins, 181 Mich.App. 393, 396, 448 N.W.2d 858 (1989). Where reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of a statute, the court must look to the objective of the statute and the harm it is designed to remedy and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the statute's purpose. Tracy, supra, 186 Mich.App. at 175, 463 N.W.2d 457. Criminal statutes, however, must be strictly construed. People v. Johnson, 174 Mich.App. 108, 115, 435 N.W.2d 465 (1989).

A statutory provision should also be read in its entirety and in connection with the rest of the statute. Danto v. Michigan Bd. of Medicine, 168 Mich.App. 438, 442, 425 N.W.2d 171 (1988). Each provision of an act is to be read with reference to every other provision so as to produce an harmonious whole. In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich. 242, 251, 439 N.W.2d 246 (1989). By the same token, no language of a statute should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory. In re Kiogima, 189 Mich.App. 6, 13, 472 N.W.2d 13 (1991). Courts must give meaning to all the words in a statute because it will not be presumed that the Legislature intended to do a useless thing. Girard v. Wagenmaker, 437 Mich. 231, 244, 470 N.W.2d 372 (1991).

The term "contribution," as it appears in M.C.L. Sec. 169.241(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(41)(1), is specifically defined by Sec. 4 of the act. M.C.L. Sec. 169.204(1); M.S.A. Sec. 4.1703(4)(1) provides:

"Contribution" means a payment, gift, subscription, assessment, expenditure, contract, payment [191 MICHAPP 560] for services, dues, advance, forbearance, loan, or donation of money or anything of ascertainable monetary value, or a transfer of anything of ascertainable monetary value to a person, made for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate, or for the qualification, passage, or defeat of a ballot question. [...