People v. Wells

Citation187 Cal.App.2d 324,9 Cal.Rptr. 384
Decision Date12 December 1960
Docket NumberCr. 7176
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lloyd James WELLS, Robert Smith and Dupree Louis Bolton, Defendants, Lloyd James Wells and Dupree Louis Bolton, Appellants.

Anderson & Griffin, by Donald G. Griffin, Los Angeles, for appellant wells.

Dupree Louis Bolton, in pro. per., for appellant Bolton.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., William B. McKesson, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood and Robert J. Lord, Deputy Dist. Attys., Los Angeles, for respondent.

ASHBURN, Justice.

Defendants Bolton and Wells appeal from conviction of second degree burglary. Robert Smith who was convicted with them did not appeal.

The principal point raised by both appellants is insufficiency of the evidence and we must be guided by the rule set forth in People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885, 256 P.2d 911, 916: 'The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. It is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * 'The court on appeal 'will not attempt to determine the weight of the evidence, but will decide only whether upon the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt. For it is the function of the jury in the first instance, and of the trial court after verdict, to determine what facts are established by the evidence, and before the verdict of the jury, which has been approved by the trial court, can be set aside on appeal upon the ground' of insufficiency of the evidence, 'it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below. * * * We must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.' If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury. * * *''

The charge is burglary of the office and building occupied by Los Angeles Schools Equipment Company, located in Gardena, County of Los Angeles. Robert Ellis and his brother were working in the yard back of the shop; he noticed two colored boys near the large open front door of the building; asked 'may we help you,' one of them made a negative motion and both walked away. Neither one was carrying anything. They were at such a distance that Robert Ellis testified he could not identify them and his brother did not testify. This was about 2:30 to 2:45 in the afternoon of August 26, 1959. Within a few minutes, not over 15, Robert went into the office and noticed that an adding machine, typewriter and portable sander were missing from the office. They were returned by the police about a week later and were adequately identified at the trial.

About five or ten minutes after 3:00 of that same afternoon, State Traffic Officer Kreipl stopped a car which had made an improper turn at the intersection of Alameda and Ord Streets, three and one-half to four miles from the Schools Equipment Company plant. Defendant Wells was driving, Smith in the right front seat and Bolton in the right rear. 1 The car belonged to Bolton's brother. The officer asked for Wells' driver's license and that he get out of the car so a check of the brakes could be made. Wells complied and the brakes when tested proved defective. The officer saw on the floor in the rear some articles covered by a white Navy blanket with the handle of what proved to be a sander exposed to view and bearing the word 'Skill' on it. He asked Wells to go to the police car with him, about 20 feet to the rear, while he wrote a ticket for traffic violation and faulty brakes. As he passed the Bolton car at that time he saw that the handle marked 'Skill' was also covered by the blanket. Suspicious, he telephoned the Compton Police about a possible burglary and asked them to send someone to him. At 3:15 Officer Baguley of the Compton Police arrived and he and Kreipl went to the Bolton car. Bolton and Smith had disappeared. The officers lifted the blanket and there lay the adding machine, typewriter and sander which had been taken from the Schools Equipment Company plant; also an electric screw driver which did not belong to that company. Wells was not given a traffic citation but was arrested upon the burglary charge.

Clearly there had been a burglary and in less than an hour the three defendants were found in possession of the stolen property. This fact constitutes some evidence that they were the burglars but would not be sufficient, standing alone, to sustain a conviction of burglary. 'Possession alone of property stolen in a burglary is not of itself sufficient to sustain the possessor's conviction of that burglary. There must be corroborating evidence of acts, conduct, or declarations of the accused tending to show his guilt. [Citations.] When possession is shown, however, the corroborating evidence may be slight [citations], and the failure to show that possession was honestly obtained is itself a strong circumstance tending to show the possessor's guilt of the burglary. [Citations.]' People v. Citrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288, 294 P.2d 32, 35. Many cases say that the additional evidence need be but slight. People v. Russell, 120 Cal.App. 622, 625, 8 P.2d 209; People v. Morris, 124 Cal.App. 402, 404, 12 P.2d 679; People v. Walker, 160 Cal.App.2d 736, 740, 325 P.2d 594; People v. Wissenfeld, 36 Cal.2d 758, 763, 227 P.2d 833; People v. Holland, 82 Cal.App.2d 310, 312, 186 P.2d 58; People v. Kefry, 166 Cal.App.2d 179, 188, 332 P.2d 848. The possession of stolen property is a fact which is to be considered with all other facts bearing upon the identity of the burglar. Indeed, it is said, in People v. Goodall, 104 Cal.App.2d 242, 247, 231 P.2d 119, 122: 'Where one is found to be in possession of stolen articles, it may be presumed not only that he stole them but also made use of the means by which access to them was obtained.'

So far as Bolton is concerned his possession of the stolen property, plus his flight in the face of impending investigation, made a case against him. People v. Scott, 66 Cal.App. 200, 203, 225 P. 767: 'It is defendant's contention that this evidence shows only that the stolen property was found in his possession, and he cites the well-established rule that mere possession of stolen property, however recent, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction of larceny. Defendant apparently overlooks the fact, established at the trial, that after his arrest he escaped from the officers. Flight of a defendant, under the circumstances proven in this case, is always a circumstance to be taken into consideration by the jury, with the other facts proven in the case, in determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. We think that there can be no question that evidence that the stolen property was found in the possession of the defendant shortly after the same had been stolen, coupled with evidence of the flight of the defendant after his arrest, was sufficient to justify the jury in finding a verdict of guilty.' Flight, like possession of stolen property, is not enough, standing alone, to sustain a conviction (Pen.Code § 1127c; Fricke on Criminal Evidence (5th Ed.), p. 82); but they are strong enough to support each other, to supply that slight corroboration which each needs.

The situation of Wells is not quite so simple.

Obviously the three defendants were acting in concert with each other in transporting the stolen property with an ultimate objective of disposing of it in some manner. That constitutes conspiracy. In criminal cases it is not necessary to plead the conspiracy as a basis for imputing the act of one conspirator to all of them (People v. Williams, 145 Cal.App.2d 163, 167, 302 P.2d 393; People v. Tanner, 3 cal.2d 279, 299, 44 P.2d 324). Obviously such a conspiracy as the one at bar 'was not ended until the spoils had been divided.' People v. Dean, 66 Cal.App. 602, 608, 226 P. 943, 946. To the same effect, see also, People v. Fay, 82 Cal.App. 62, 68, 255 P. 239; People v. Ross, 46 Cal.App.2d 385, 396, 116 P.2d 81; 11 Cal.Jur.2d § 8, page 227. Each conspirator was bound by the acts of his confederates, even though they were dictated by the exigencies of the moment, if within the general scope of the conspiracy; for instance, evading or resisting arrest falls in this category. 'By many authorities, the principle is announced that escape by the perpetrators of a crime in general is part of the conspiracy to commit the crime [citations]; and consequently that the act or declaration of one of the conspirators committed or made by him respectively during the time of such escape is binding upon each and all of the conspirators; from which it should follow that at least during the time that appellant herein was engaged in making his escape from the scene of the robbery he was liable for any act which was committed by his aider and abettor in the commission of the crime.' People v. Corkery, 134 Cal.App. 294, 296, 25 P.2d 257, 258.

Fricke on Criminal Law (7th Ed.), pages 123-124: 'It does not follow that, when the declared object of a conspiracy has been accomplished, the conspiracy is at an end and that there is no further liability to any of the conspirators because of an act of one of its members. In a conspiracy to commit a crime the conspiracy continues not only until that crime has been committed but until the ultimate object of the crime has been...

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