People v. Wells

• Decision Date: 05 December 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-1772
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan Lester WELLS, Defendant-Appellant. 87 Mich.App. 402, 274 N.W.2d 797
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 797

274 N.W.2d 797

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan Lester WELLS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 77-1772.

87 Mich.App. 402, 274 N.W.2d 797

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Dec. 5, 1978.

Released for Publication Feb. 9, 1979.

[87 MICHAPP 404] Ronald P. Weitzman, Madison Heights, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward R. Wilson, App. Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., H. Gail McKnight, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RILEY, P. J., and CAVANAGH and HENSICK, ^* JJ.

RILEY, Presiding Judge.

The present matter concerns a single issue; I. e., whether the prosecution's case in chief established the corpus delicti of first-degree, premeditated murder absent the introduction of defendant's confession.

Defendant Nathan Wells was charged with first-degree murder, contrary to M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and sentenced to life imprisonment. For the purposes of the issue on appeal, the testimony presented at defendant's trial will be set forth in some detail.

The victim's husband testified that he and his wife were separated. On Friday, November 12, 1976, he called his wife's apartment and spoke to defendant, who stated that the wife was not at home at that time. The following day the witness again called the apartment and this time did speak to his wife. The next evening the witness drove to his wife's apartment, where he discovered her body in the bedroom. A second witness testified that he accompanied the victim's husband to [87 MICHAPP 405] the apartment and corroborated the testimony concerning the discovery of the body.

The decedent's mother testified that she, the victim's grandmother, and defendant (who is this witness's cousin) went to the apartment on November 12, 1976, to help the victim pack. The mother testified that when she and the grandmother left to go home the defendant remained at the apartment with the decedent. The grandmother (defendant's aunt) testified to these same facts.

Several police officers testified as to the condition of the body and of the apartment, and as to the investigation of the scene. Several items of evidence were removed from the apartment and blood samples were taken. Subsequently, defendant's fingerprint was found on a candlestick that had been removed from the apartment.

A doctor from the Wayne County Medical Examiner's Office testified that the autopsy revealed that the decedent had sustained two stab wounds and multiple abrasions to the head and neck area. There was also evidence that the victim had been sexually assaulted.

A serologist from the police crime lab testified that traces of blood were found on three of four knives that were discovered soaking in a pan of water in decedent's kitchen and that traces of hair matching defendant's were found on a washcloth in the apartment.

A medical technologist testified that tests were performed on a sample of seminal fluid taken from the victim's body and on a sample of defendant's saliva, the results of which did not exclude defendant as a possible source of the seminal fluid.

Following these witnesses, the prosecution presented the testimony of a police officer who had taken a statement from defendant. In the statement[87 MICHAPP 406] defendant admitted choking the decedent and, believing her to be dead, having intercourse with her and then inflicting the stab wounds.

At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal of first-degree murder. The motion was denied and the court eventually instructed on both first- and second-degree murder.

It is a long-standing rule of law in Michigan that the corpus delicti of an offense must be established by evidence independent of the confession of the accused. People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973); People v. Kirby, 223 Mich. 440, 194 N.W. 142 (1923); People v. Lane, 49 Mich. 340, 13 N.W. 622 (1882); People v. Allen, 39 Mich.App. 483, 486 fn. 2, 197 N.W.2d 874 (1972).

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Allen, supra, the corpus delicti of murder was established by "proof of the dead body and evidence of an unnatural cause of death". People v. Allen, 39 Mich.App. at 487, 197 N.W.2d at 876. See People v. Jackzo, 206 Mich. 183, 172 N.W. 557 (1919); People v. Jackson, 1 Mich.App. 207, 135 N.W.2d 557 (1965). The majority opinion of this Court in Allen, supra, adhering to the traditional rule, held that the corpus delicti of felony murder did not require proof of the underlying felony independent of the defendant's confession.

The Supreme Court in Allen, supra, reversed, adopting Judge (now Justice) Levin's dissent in the Court of Appeals' Allen decision. 390 Mich. at 385-386, 212 N.W.2d 21. In his dissent, Judge Levin made a comprehensive argument that the corpus delicti of any offense requires proof on each of the essential elements of that offense:

"Whatever may be the correct etymological definition [87 MICHAPP 407] of the term 'Corpus delicti,' and, although there are quotations in Michigan cases from other authorities to the effect that the Corpus delicti of an offense is established upon showing a specified Injury and someone's criminality as the source of the injury, the law in this state is clear that the Corpus delicti of an offense is not established until the people have introduced evidence from which the trier of fact may reasonably find that acts constituting All the essential elements of the offense have been committed and that someone's criminality was responsible for the commission of those acts." (Footnote omitted.) 39 Mich.App. at 495-496, 197 N.W.2d at 880.

Consistent with this argument, Judge Levin concluded that the corpus delicti of first-degree murder, including the element which distinguishes the charge from second-degree murder, must be established Aliunde the confession:

"Just as the people must establish with evidence the essential element distinguishing second-degree murder from first-degree murder in order to convict an accused person of the aggravated offense, so, too, in order to prove the Corpus delicti, that distinguishing element must be established by evidence independent of the accused person's confession. Otherwise the policy underlying the rule requiring that All the elements of the offense be established independently of a confession consistently enforced in many Michigan cases would be eroded in the category of cases where the stakes are the highest, where the accused person has the most to lose and where one would think that the law would be the most solicitous of his rights." (Footnote omitted.) 39 Mich.App. at 503-504, 197 N.W.2d at 885.

Although we read the Allen rule set forth in Judge Levin's dissent as applying to all criminal charges, one panel of this Court held that the decision was limited to felony murder, the specific charge in Allen. In People v. Sparks, 53 Mich.App. 452, 220 N.W.2d 153 (1974), the Court stated:

[87 MICHAPP 408] "The requirement of independent proof is to assure that an accused not be convicted on the basis of his confession to a nonexistent crime. Proof of unnatural death provides that protection. People v. Allen, supra (390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973)). Defendant quotes this case and, while seeming to support defendant's contentions, Allen is distinguishable. The decision there was only that the element of an underlying felony must be proved without defendant's confession in a felony-murder case. Allen leaves intact the present body of corpus delicti law regarding other first-degree murder." 53 Mich.App. at 459, 220 N.W.2d at 157.

The Supreme Court denied Sparks' application for leave to appeal, but worded the denial in such a manner as to cast doubt on the viability of the Sparks Court's limitation of the Allen rule:

"On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the same hereby is denied, because the appellant has failed to persuade the Court that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. In denying leave, this Court does not wish to be understood as accepting the distinction between felony and premeditated murder in the application of the rule enunciated in People v Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973), drawn by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case." People v. Sparks, 393 Mich. 135, 224 N.W.2d 481 (1974).

We hold, given the Supreme Court's position, that the Court of Appeals' Sparks decision erroneously limited the Allen corpus delicti rule. The language of Judge Levin's dissent was not confined solely to the felony element of felony-murder. In addition, the Sparks Court, while applying their distinction, nevertheless went on to hold that under the facts of that case premeditation could [87 MICHAPP 409] reasonably have been inferred absent...