People v. Wells

Decision Date25 May 1962
Docket NumberNo. 35753,35753
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Curtis WELLS, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

J. William Braithwaite, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and John T. Gallagher and William L. Carlin, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

SOLFISBURG, Justice.

The defendant, Curtis Wells, was indicted on the charge of unlawful sale of narcotic drugs. He pleaded not guilty, waived a jury, was found guilty and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 10 to 12 years. He brings this writ of error to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the sole ground that the evidence establishes a defense of entrapment as a matter of law.

It appears from the record that on November 11, 1958, one Dantzler, a police informant, was searched by three police officers at the Narcotics Bureau of the Chicago Police Department. This search disclosed that Dantzler had no narcotics or money and the three policemen immediately took Dantzler to 63rd and Kenwood Streets in Chicago and gave him a marked $5 bill. Dantzler got out of the car and walked up to the defendant and one Raymond Stanley, and told them that he wanted some narcotics. Dantzler knew Stanley but had not met the defendant before. Defendant testified, and Dantzler denied, that Dantzler told defendant if he would get some narcotics, Dantzler would split them with him. The three of them went to an apartment building at 6239 Kenwood where Dantzler gave the defendant the $5 bill. The defendant then went into an apartment, came out and announced there were no narcotics available and returned the money to Dantzler. They were then about to leave the building when they met one Henry Moore. Moore then went upstairs with defendant, Dantzler and Stanley. Dantzler then returned the $5 bill to defendant who went back into the apartment with Moore, and a few minutes later came out and took Stanley and Dantzler to the fourth floor of the next building. Defendant then handed Dantzler a package of packages containing heroin.

The defendant, Wells, testifying in his own behalf, stated that on November 11, 1958, he was in a night club drinking when he was approached by Stanley who wanted to know if the defendant could get him some narcotics. He testified that he said he could not and then left the club. Stanley followed him and told defendant to wait and he would get some money to buy narcotics. He then testified that Dantzler came by and told defendant that if he would make a purchase for him, he would split the narcotics with defendant and Stanley. He, the defendant, got $5 from Dantzler and 80cents from Stanley, purchased two packs from Moore and gave both packs to Dantzler. He then claims that Dantzler gave defendant and Stanley a 'taste' for getting the narcotics.

On this record it is undisputed that the defendant received money from Dantzler and took the money and purchased narcotics from Moore and gave them to Dantzler. Dantzler denies aplitting the narcotics with defendant but insists that he immediately took the narcotics to the police. The sole question on this appeal is whether the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense.

The defense of entrapment has often been considered by this court, in accordance with the principles recently repeated in People v. McSmith, 23 Ill.2d 87, 178 N.E.2d 641, where we said: 'Entrapment is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid defense, and has been defined as the 'conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.' Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454, 53 S.Ct. 210, 217, 77 L.Ed. 413, 423. Stated differently, entrapment is established where it appears that officers of the law or their agents incited, induced, instigated or lured the accused into committing an offense which he otherwise would not have committed and had no intention of committing and if a criminal design or intent to commit the offense originates in the mind of the one who seeks to entrap the accused, and who lures him into its commission merely for the purpose of arresting and prosecuting him, no conviction may be had. 14 I.L.P. Criminal Law § 50. At the same time, however, a distinction based upon public order has been drawn between inducing an innocent man to do an unlawful act, and setting a trap by the use of decoys, artifice and deceit to catch one in the execution of a criminal act of his own conception and design. Thus is it that entrapment is not available as a defense to a person who has the intent and design to commit a criminal offense, and who does commit the essential acts constituting it, merely because an officer of the law, for the purpose of securing evidence, affords such a person the opportunity to commit the criminal act, or purposely aids and encourages him in its perpetration. 14 I.L.P. Criminal Law § 50; see also: Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413; People v. Outten, 13 Ill.2d 21, 147 N.E.2d 284; People v. Clark, 7 Ill.2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195; People v. Gaugliata, 362 Ill. 427, 200 N.E. 169, 103 A.L.R. 1035; 15 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, secs. 335-336; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45.'

Defendant's contention is that the defense of entrapment is available to him because there is no evidence that either the...

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19 cases
  • State v. Hageman, 206A82
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 3, 1982
    ...States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958, 94 S.Ct. 1973, 40 L.Ed.2d 308 (1974); People v. Wells, 25 Ill.2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689 (1962); State v. Burrow, 514 S.W.2d 585 (Mo.1974), which stand for the proposition that the police need not even have a reasonabl......
  • People v. Gulley
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 12, 1976
    ... ...         In Gassaway the defendant also asserted that his lack of prior record and the lack of any testimony tending to show that the defendant had a prior record was a significant factor in establishing the defense of entrapment. The court, citing People v. Wells, 25 Ill.2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689, rejected this argument by pointing out that although the absence of a prior record may be relevant, the State does not have the burden of proving that the defendant has a prior record ...         In People v. Washington, the defendant made several ... ...
  • People v. Washington
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 22, 1967
    ... ... It is settled, however, that while a defendant's past history may be a relevant consideration in determining whether there has been entrapment, it is not controlling. People v. Wells, 25 Ill.2d 146, 149, 182 N.E.2d 689. Similarly, defendant's initial or temporary reluctance to enter into a narcotics transaction has not been deemed determinative. In People v. McSmith, 23 Ill.2d 87, 94, 178 N.E.2d 641, 645, the evidence showed that defendant on two separate occasions disclaimed ... ...
  • People v. Gonzales
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 2, 1970
    ... ... The People v. Hall, 25 Ill.2d 297, 300, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962); The People v. Outten, 13 Ill.2d 21, 23, 147 N.E.2d 284 (1958); The People v. Wells, 25 Ill.2d 146, 149, 182 N.E.2d 689 (1962). The law distinguishes between a trap for the unwary criminal and a trap set to ensnare the innocent and law abiding into the commission of a crime. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958); The People v. Outten, supra, ... ...
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