People v. Wells

• Citation: 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8,136 P.3d 810,38 Cal.4th 1078
• Decision Date: 26 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. S128640.,S128640.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Susan WELLS, Defendant and Appellant.

45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8

38 Cal.4th 1078

136 P.3d 810

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Susan WELLS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S128640.

Supreme Court of California.

June 26, 2006.

Elizabeth Campbell, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Janet E. Neeley, Doris Calandra, Kathleen A. McKenna, Robert P. Whitlock and Connie A. Proctor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

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We granted this case to consider under what circumstances, if any, police officers may stop a vehicle and detain its driver based solely on an

[136 P.3d 1081]

uncorroborated phoned-in tip that accurately describes the vehicle and its location and relates that a possibly intoxicated person is behind the wheel, "weaving all over the roadway." As we explain, although the law appears somewhat unsettled, the better rule, firmly supported by many cases as well as by considerations of public safety and common sense, is that a limited traffic stop is permitted under such circumstances to confirm the officer's reasonable suspicion of intoxicated driving before a serious traffic accident can occur.

FACTS

The following uncontradicted facts are taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in this case. On February 14, 2003, at 1:43 a.m., California Highway Patrol traffic officer Julian Irigoyen was engaged in traffic enforcement on Highway 99 in Kern County north of Bakersfield. He received a dispatch report of a possibly intoxicated driver "weaving all over the roadway." (The record is silent as to the identity of the caller or circumstances leading to the call, but we may reasonably infer that the report was based on an anonymous phoned-in tip.) The subject vehicle was described as an '80's model blue van traveling northbound on Highway 99 at Airport Drive. Officer Irigoyen was headed southbound three to four miles north of that location, with only one entry/exit ramp between his position and the reported location of the van.

Upon receiving the dispatch, Officer Irigoyen positioned himself on the shoulder of northbound Highway 99 and watched for the described vehicle. Two or three minutes later, when he saw a blue van traveling approximately 50 miles per hour, he activated his patrol car lights and stopped the van to investigate whether the driver was impaired. The officer did not observe the van weaving, speeding, or otherwise violating any traffic laws, perhaps because he stopped the van so soon after spotting it.

Defendant was the driver of the van. While speaking with her at the scene, the officer noticed that she had constricted pupils and a dry mouth. The officer asked her to exit the vehicle, at which time she became visibly nervous. The officer suspected that she was under the influence of illegal drugs and began conducting field sobriety tests. At the conclusion of the tests, the officer placed her under arrest for driving under the influence. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a).) Later, her urine tested positive for THC, cocaine, and opiates. During an inventory search of the van, police found a black suitcase containing several syringes and some heroin.

Following the preliminary hearing, defendant was charged with possession of heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), driving under the influence of a controlled substance (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), being

[136 P.3d 1082]

under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), and possession of a device for injecting a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11364). Defendant initially pleaded not guilty.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, asserting that the stop of her van was improper. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.) The court found that the stop was proper, noting that the description of the vehicle was specific, and the vehicle itself (an '80's model blue van) was distinctive. Moreover, defendant's van was traveling in the same direction and at the same location as the suspected van. Based on these factors, the trial court found that the stop was reasonable and denied defendant's motion to suppress.

After the court denied the suppression motion, defendant withdrew her plea and pursuant to a plea agreement pleaded no contest to possession of heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and driving under the influence (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). She was sentenced to 16 months in state prison on the possession count, and a concurrent six-month term on the driving under the influence count.

On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion because she was detained without reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention, concluding that the anonymous tip, amply corroborated in its "innocent" details, afforded reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate. Defendant now seeks our review. We will affirm.

DISCUSSION

The issue can be easily stated, although somewhat less easily resolved: Does an anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a possibly intoxicated highway driver afford a police officer reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a temporary detention to investigate further? The answer requires an examination of seemingly conflicting case law and a weighing of considerations of public safety with expectations of personal privacy. As will appear, we have concluded that, under the circumstances in this case, the grave risks posed by an intoxicated highway driver justified the minimal intrusion of a brief investigatory traffic stop.

Under the cases, an officer may stop and detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law. (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 693, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911; People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205; People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785; see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 892-894, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366,

[136 P.3d 1083]

582 P.2d 957.) The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 892, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) In making our determination, we examine "the totality of the circumstances" in each case. (E.g., Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301; United States v. Wheat (8th Cir.2001) 278 F.3d 722, 726 (Wheat).)

Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause, and can arise from less reliable information than required for probable cause, including an anonymous tip. (E.g., Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412.) But to be reasonable, the officer's suspicion must be supported by some specific, articulable facts that are "reasonably `consistent with criminal activity.'" (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) The officer's subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and "an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 893, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) But where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, "the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances `in the proper exercise of the officer's duties.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 894, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.)

In this case, Officer Irigoyen could reasonably believe that the blue van described in the dispatched tip was the same car he eventually stopped, as it matched the description, and was traveling in the same direction and at the same time and location as described. But, in the brief period while observing the van before stopping it, the officer saw nothing to indicate the driver was intoxicated. Is an anonymous citizen's tip of a possibly intoxicated highway driver "weaving all over the roadway" sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that would justify an investigatory stop and detention under these circumstances? We believe so.

The California cases indicate that a citizen's tip may itself create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a temporary vehicle stop or detention, especially if the circumstances are deemed exigent by reason of possible reckless driving or similar threats to public safety. (Lowry v. Gutierrez (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 926, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 [phoned-in tip of erratic driving]; People v. Rios (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 616, 189 Cal.Rptr. 634 [car illegally parked and traffic hazard]; People v. Superior Court (Meyer) (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 579, 173 Cal.Rptr. 544 [reckless driving, driver pointing gun].)

Lowry v. Gutierrez, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 926, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 912, is closely apposite, as it involved an anonymous cell phone tip that a specific vehicle was being driven the wrong way on a city street and had turned into oncoming traffic.

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Although the detaining officer himself observed no erratic driving, the Court of Appeal agreed that an immediate investigatory stop was appropriate under these exigent circumstances. (Id. at pp. 940-942, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 912.) The court, citing California Highway Patrol statistics, noted the grave public safety hazard posed by drunken drivers. (Id. at p. 940, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 912.) The court also stressed the unlikelihood of a false report, and the tipster's detailed description of the car, its location, and the nature of the erratic driving, making it likely the caller was an eyewitness. (Id. at p. 941, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 912.)

Defendant relies on the ...