People v. Westbrook

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCHAEFER
• Citation: People v. Westbrook, 411 Ill. 301, 103 N.E.2d 494, 29 A.L.R.2d 1341 (Ill. 1952)
• Decision Date: 24 January 1952
• Docket Number: No. 32161,32161
• Parties: , 29 A.L.R.2d 1341 PEOPLE v. WESTBROOK.

Page 494

103 N.E.2d 494

411 Ill. 301, 29 A.L.R.2d 1341

PEOPLE v. WESTBROOK.

No. 32161.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 24, 1952.

Charles Westbrook, pro se.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. and Scott Hoover, State's Attorney, of Taylorville (Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The defendant, Charles Westbrook, was indicted in the circuit court of Christian County for the crime of armed robbery. A jury found him guilty. Judgment was entered on the verdict and defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary. The court fixed both the minimum and maximum duration of imprisonment at lief. Appearing pro se, defendant prosecutes this writ of error.

The sole question for decision is whether a sentence for armed robbery fixing identical minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment is proper under the applicable provisions of the Sentence and Parole Act. Section 1 of that act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 801,) provides for definite sentences for the crimes of misprision of treason, murder, rape and kidnapping, and for indeterminate sentences for all other crimes. Section 2 requires the courts, in imposing sentences for crimes other than those specifically mentioned in section 1, to fix the minimum and maximum limits of imprisonment. The penalty for armed robbery is fixed by section 246 of division I of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 501,) at imprisonment 'in the penitentiary for any term of years not less than one year or for life.' We have held that a sentence for armed robbery falls within section 2 of the Sentence and Parole Act, and must be an indeterminate rather than a definite sentence. People v. Ross, 396, Ill. 11, 71 N.E.2d 65; People v. Secco, 303 Ill. 546, 135 N.E. 884.

To sustain the judgment, the People argue that the sentence falls literally within the following language of section 2: 'The minimum limit fixed by the court may be greater but shall not be less than the minimum term provided by law for the offense and the maximum limit fixed by the court may be less but shall not be greater than the maximum term provided by law therefor.' It is true, of course, that the minimum sentence here imposed, life, does not exceed the maximum allowed by the statute; but the question remains whether a sentence 'from life to life' is an indeterminate sentence.

This question has not previously been considered in Illinois, but similar issues have been presented for decision in other jurisdictions. The indeterminate sentence acts of Alabama and Montana are indistinguishable, for present purposes, from our statute. In Sanders v. State, 19 Ala.App. 367, 97 So. 294, 295, the court held that a sentence fixing the same minimum and maximum terms of 'not less than 24 months nor more than 24 months' in the penitentiary constituted a definite rather than an indeterminate sentence, as required by the Alabama statute. The same conclusion was reached in Jones v. State, 23 Ala.App. 384, 125 So. 898, and in Bailey v. State, 23 Ala.App. 369, 125 So. 693, each of which involved identical minimum and maximum terms of ten years. In Ex parte Collins, 51 Mont. 215, 152 P. 40, the Supreme Court of Montana held that a sentence of not less than two nor more than two years' imprisonment failed to meet the requirements of the statute. A contrary result was...