People v. Westergerg

• Decision Date: 02 March 1936
• Docket Number: No. 119.,119.
• Citation: 274 Mich. 647,265 N.W. 489
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WESTERGERG.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

274 Mich. 647

265 N.W. 489

PEOPLE

v.WESTERGERG.

No. 119.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 2, 1936.

Helen Westerberg was convicted under an information charging the breaking and entering of a store in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, and she appeals.

Conviction set aside, and new trial granted.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Genesee County; Paul V. Gadola, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench except TOY, J.

Carton, Gault & Davison, of Flint, for appellant.

Andrew J. Transue, Pros. Atty., of Flint, for the People.

NORTH, Chief Justice.

Defendant, having been convicted under the information hereinafter quoted, has appealed. She challenges the sufficiency of the information which follows the complaint and warrant and in part reads: ‘* * * Helen Westerberg heretofore, to-wit, on or about the 27th day of April, in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five at the city of Flint in said Genesee county, did then and there in the night time of said day, break and enter the building, to-wit, a store of one William Crawford with intent then and there to commit a felony, * * *’

Obviously, the people sought to charge defendant under the following statute: ‘Any person who shall break and enter in the night time with intent to commit any felony, or any larceny therein, any * * * store, * * * shall be guilty of a felony.’ Section 110, Act No. 328, P.A.1931.

It is appellant's contention that the information did not apprise her of the offense charged because, as stated in her brief, ‘* * * it did not designate what felony the defendant intended to commit. The information merely alleged that the defendant did break and enter ‘with intent then and there to commit a felony.’ No designation was made of what felony defendant was supposed to have intended to commit.'

Upon arraignment, defendant stood mute. The question of the sufficiency of the information was raised prior to trial by her motion to quash information, and the question has been properly preserved and presented here. People v. Maki, 245 Mich. 455, 223 N.W. 70, 75, is controlling. The prevailing opinion in that case has established in this state the rule governing informations of this character, and the law as there settled should be followed. We quote: ‘Both in this state and elsewhere it is the rule that, where a statute uses general or generic terms in describing an offense, does not sufficiently define the crime, or set out all its essential elements, or where a charge in the language of the statute charges a mere legal conclusion, an information which alleges the crime in the words of the statute is not sufficient but a more particular statement of facts is necessary.’ Citing numerous early Michigan decisions. There is no answer, under...