People v. Wetmore

• Decision Date: 26 September 1978
• Docket Number: Cr. 19738
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 583 P.2d 1308 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Laurence WETMORE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 265

149 Cal.Rptr. 265

22 Cal.3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Laurence WETMORE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 19738.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Sept. 26, 1978.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, John M. Moore, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Harold F. Shabo, Leon M. Salter and Dennis A. Fischer, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow and Roy C. Preminger, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Burt Pines, City Atty., Los Angeles, George C. Eskin, Chief Asst. City Atty., Ward G. McConnell, Asst. City Atty., S. Thomas Todd and Laurie Harris, Deputy City Attys., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Charged with burglary, defendant argued that psychiatric reports showed that as a result of mental illness he lacked the specific intent required for conviction of that crime. Relying on a dictum in People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, the trial court reasoned that because the reports described defendant's insanity as well as his diminished capacity, such description of defendant's condition in those reports should not be admitted to prove lack of specific intent. The court found defendant guilty of second degree burglary; subsequently, relying on the psychiatric reports, it found him insane.

We hold that the dictum from Wells on which the trial court relied must be rejected. The state bears the burden of proving every element of the offense charged; defendant cannot logically or constitutionally be denied the right to present probative evidence rebutting an element of the crime merely because such evidence also suggests insanity. Defendant's evidence established that he entered an apartment under a delusion that he owned that apartment and thus did not enter with the intent of committing a theft or felony. That evidence demonstrated that defendant lacked the specific intent required for a conviction of burglary; the trial court's refusal to consider the evidence at the guilt phase of the trial therefore constituted prejudicial error.

We reject the suggestion of amicus that we sustain the trial court by holding that a defense of diminished capacity cannot be raised whenever, owing to the lack of a lesser included offense, it might result in the defendant's acquittal. A defendant who, because of diminished capacity, does not entertain the specific intent required for a particular crime is entitled to be acquitted of that crime. If he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense and cannot safely be released, the state's remedy is to institute civil commitment proceedings, not to convict him of a specific intent crime which he did not commit.

The only evidence submitted to the trial court in this case was the testimony of Joseph Cacciatore, the victim of the burglary, at the preliminary hearing, and three psychiatric reports. Cacciatore testified that he left his apartment on March 7, 1975. When he returned three days later, he discovered defendant in his apartment. Defendant was wearing Cacciatore's clothes and cooking his food. The lock on the front door had been broken; the apartment lay in a shambles. Cacciatore called the police, who arrested defendant for burglary. Later Cacciatore discovered that a ring, a watch, a credit card, and items of clothing were missing. ¹

The psychiatric reports submitted to the court explain defendant's long history of psychotic illness, including at least 10 occasions of hospital confinement for treatment. According to the reports, defendant, shortly after his last release from Brentwood Veteran's Hospital, found himself with no place to go. He began to believe that he "owned" property, and was "directed" to Cacciatore's apartment. When he found the door unlocked he was sure he owned the apartment. He entered, rearranged the apartment, destroyed some advertising he felt was inappropriate, and put on Cacciatore's clothes. When the police arrived, defendant was shocked and embarrassed, and only then understood that he did not own the apartment.

Defendant pled not guilty to a charge of burglary and requested court appointment of a psychiatrist to advise him whether to enter a plea based on insanity. (See Evid.Code, §§ 730, 1017.) After receiving the report from Dr. John Woodward, defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court then appointed Drs. Michael Colburn and Marshall Cherkas to examine defendant.

When the matter was called for trial defendant personally and all counsel waived trial by jury and stipulated that the cause be submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, which contained only the testimony of Cacciatore, and the reports of Drs. Colburn and Cherkas. Defense counsel pointed out that burglary requires an entry with specific intent to commit larceny or felony. (See Pen.Code, § 459; People v. Conway (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 15, 18, 76 Cal.Rptr. 251; People v. Gant (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 101, 115, 60 Cal.Rptr. 154.) The reports of Drs. Colburn and Cherkas, counsel argued, indicate that defendant entered the apartment under the delusion that he owned the apartment and its contents; he thus had no intent to commit theft or any felony.

In response to counsel's argument, the court acknowledged that defendant might lack the specific intent required to commit the crime of burglary. It stated, however, that under the controlling cases, "if a defendant's mental capacity which would preclude the forming of a specific intent is that of insanity," that mental condition is "not admissible to establish the question of lack of specific intent due to diminished capacity." The court thereupon found defendant guilty of second degree burglary. Turning to the issue of insanity, ² the court found on the basis of the psychiatric reports that defendant was insane under the M'Naughten test then applicable ³ and, hence, not guilty by reason of insanity.

At a subsequent hearing the trial court found that defendant had not recovered his sanity. The court therefore ordered defendant committed to Patton State Hospital for treatment. Defendant appeals from the order of commitment. (See Pen.Code, § 1237, subd. 1; People v. Vanley, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 846, 848, fn. 1, 116 Cal.Rptr. 446.)

In holding that defendant's psychiatric evidence could not be utilized to prove that he lacked the specific intent required for the offense of burglary, the trial court followed a dictum laid down in our decision in People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53. Wells, the seminal decision which established the doctrine of diminished capacity in California law, held that "evidence of diminished mental capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma, or disease, can be used to show that a defendant did not have a specific mental state essential to an offense." (People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 316, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 818, 411 P.2d 911, 914.) In dictum, however, Wells stated that since sanity is conclusively presumed at the guilt trial, "evidence tending to show lack of mental capacity to commit the crime because of legal insanity is barred at that stage." (33 Cal.2d 330, 350, 202 P.2d 53, 65.) The Wells opinion later restated that conclusion in different terms: "if the proffered evidence tends to show not merely that he (defendant) Did or Did not, but rather that because of legal insanity he Could not, entertain the specific intent or other essential mental state, then that evidence is inadmissible under the not guilty plea . . . ." (P. 351, 202 P.2d p. 66.)

As we shall explain, the Wells dictum imposes an illogical and unworkable rule which has not been followed in subsequent cases. Wells spoke of excluding evidence which tended to prove "lack of mental capacity . . . because of legal insanity." (P. 350, 202 P.2d p. 65.) Mental incapacity does not occur "because of legal insanity"; instead both insanity and diminished capacity are legal conclusions derived from evidence of defendant's mental condition. (See Comment (1971) 18 UCLA L.Rev. 561, 563-564, fn. 11.) Consequently, if the evidence of a defendant's mental illness indicates that the defendant lacked the specific intent to commit the charged crime such evidence cannot reasonably be ignored at the guilt trial merely because it might (but might not) also persuade the trier of fact that the defendant is insane.

Wells' distinction between evidence that defendant Did not entertain the requisite intent, which is admissible, and evidence that he Could not entertain that intent, which is inadmissible, cannot be supported. "(A)s a matter of logic, any proof tending to show that a certain mental condition could not exist is relevant and should be admissible to show that it did not exist. And, of course, proof that something could not exist is the best possible evidence that it did not exist." (Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 805, 819.) Moreover, as Justice Kaus pointed out in People v. Steele (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 182, 190-191, 46 Cal.Rptr. 704, evidence which tends to prove that a defendant could not entertain a certain intent may, when subject to cross-examination, convince the trier of fact that defendant was able to entertain the intent but did not do so on the occasion of the crime. Thus, Steele concludes, the trial court cannot refuse to admit such evidence when offered to prove diminished capacity. ⁴

Numerous cases have repeated the Wells dictum barring evidence tending to prove insanity from admission at the guilt trial; ⁵ yet the courts, in violation of the Wells dictum, have consistently relied on such evidence to resolve issues of diminished capacity. A series of decisions of this court, beginning with People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959, illustrates the...