People v. White

Decision Date17 April 1996
Citation642 N.Y.S.2d 492,169 Misc.2d 89
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Caven WHITE, Defendant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

David J. Kirschner, for defendant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney of Bronx County (Astrid Borgstedt, of counsel), for plaintiff.

GERALD SHEINDLIN, Justice.

The defendant was indicted for Robbery in the First Degree and related charges. A Wade hearing was commenced prior to trial. The complainant appeared but adamantly refused to testify in the courtroom so long as the defendant was present. The Court was reluctantly compelled to dismiss the indictment, but ordered that the records remain unsealed. The defendant now moves for (1) the sealing of all official records and papers concerning the instant indictment and (2) the return of the defendant's photographs, fingerprints and palmprints. The People oppose the defendant's application. This written decision supplements the oral decision previously rendered. The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On May 30, 1995, two aged cases were assigned to this Court for hearings and trial. Indictment Number 1016/93 charged the defendant with Rape in the First Degree, Robbery in the First Degree and related charges. Indictment Number 900/93, the instant matter, charged the defendant with Robbery in the First Degree and related charges.

The prosecution elected to try Indictment Number 1016/93 first. In a jury trial, the complainant testified that the defendant forcibly entered her premises and raped and robbed her at gunpoint during a twenty minute spree of terror. The police were promptly notified and obtained a detailed description of the perpetrator. The description revealed that the assailant had an unusual appearance: he was young, big and had a shiny bald head. The defendant was arrested two weeks after the incident when the victim pointed him out on the street. He matched the description previously supplied.

Immediately after the incident, the victim was examined at a local hospital where semen was recovered from her vaginal cavity. The victim also revealed that she had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend the evening before the morning rape. Accordingly, a blood sample was obtained from him with his consent. A sample of the defendant's blood was obtained by Court order. The semen recovered from the victim consisted of a mixed sample of the boyfriend and the assailant. As fortune would have it, the defendant's The defendant testified in his own behalf. He denied being the rapist and claimed that he was on his way to work on the date and time in question. He denied ever being on the street where the victim lived. The defense also presented a witness who claimed that the defendant was on his way to work on the date and approximate time in question. However, this witness' testimony did not exclude the defendant's presence at the scene at the block of time in question. A second defense witness testified that the defendant was at work in the morning hours. However, it was established on cross examination that the defendant's time card indicated this was the first time he was late for work. This evidence also did not exclude his presence at the scene.

blood sample and the boyfriend's blood sample each revealed the exact same DNA PCR DQ-Alpha genetic profile, to wit: 1.2, 4. Accordingly, DNA PCR tests conducted on the semen recovered from the complainant did not exclude the defendant as a source of the semen but [169 Misc.2d 91] were inconclusive. Nonetheless, the DNA results were received in evidence by stipulation between the parties. However, the stipulation required the court to instruct the jury that the DNA tests could only be used as evidence that the defendant was not excluded from a class of people who might have deposited the sperm sample. This stipulation was in accordance with the expert's report on the DNA PCR testing results.

On June 7, 1995, the jury acquitted the defendant of all charges. On June 9, 1995, the instant indictment was scheduled for hearings and trial. In this case, the female victim promptly reported the details of a push-in gunpoint robbery wherein the assailant ran when the victim screamed. She described the perpetrator as a large young man with a shiny bald head and later identified the defendant at a lineup. The People were not ready to proceed on both June 9, 1995 and June 16, 1995 because the complainant, the only witness in the case who could offer evidence in support of the charges against the defendant, failed to appear in court.

On July 3, 1995 the Court ordered the Wade hearing to commence. The People called Detective Richard Johnson. However, they could not rest their case without the complainant's testimony to clarify whether anything suggestive occurred when an investigator escorted her to the precinct to view the line-up. The People were unable to continue their case on the Wade hearing because the complainant failed to appear to testify for the third time. The court granted the People's request for a brief adjournment.

On July 5, 1995, the complainant appeared in the District Attorney's office and agreed to testify only if the defendant was not present. The assigned Assistant District Attorney and her supervisor spoke with the victim for approximately three hours to try to persuade her of the impossibility of her request. However, even with these lengthy discussions, she refused to appear in the same room as the defendant. She was then escorted to the robing room where she was interviewed by this Court in the presence of the defense attorney and prosecutor for a substantial period of time. She maintained her willingness to testify, her insistence on the defendant's guilt, and her firm refusal to testify in the defendant's presence. Her continued refusal to cooperate, despite the Court's urging, resulted in her excusal from further participation in the proceedings.

The Court could make only partial findings of fact on the aborted Wade hearing and reluctantly granted the defendant's motion to suppress both the out-of-court and in-court identifications of the defendant by the victim. The indictment was thereafter dismissed with leave granted to the People to file a DOR. 1 The Court ordered that the file remain unsealed. The defendant subsequently filed the instant motion.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

C.P.L. § 160.50(1) provides that upon the termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person in favor of such person, the record of the action or proceeding shall be sealed unless the interests of justice require otherwise. The district attorney or the court may move for the records to remain unsealed. In either case, the court must state its reasons for any decision not to seal the action on the record.

C.P.L. § 160.50 became effective in 1976 to replace section 79-e of the Civil Rights Law and section 516 of the Penal Law of 1909. The current law differs from the predecessor statutes in two important respects. First, the sealing of records is authorized in addition to the return of photographs, palmprints and fingerprints. Second, the statute defines the twelve circumstances an action or proceeding is considered terminated in favor of a person. (People v. Blackman, 90 Misc.2d 977, 978, 396 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Crim.Ct.Queens Cty.1977); People v. Casella, 90 Misc.2d 442, 445, 395 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Crim.Ct.Richmond Cty.1977); C.P.L. § 160.50(3)).

As the Court of Appeals has stated, C.P.L. § 160.50 was enacted to insure

"that one who is charged but not convicted of an offense suffers no stigma as a result of his having once been the object of an unsustained accusation. That detriment to one's reputation and employment prospects often flows from merely having been subjected to criminal process has long been recognized as a serious and unfortunate by-product of even unsuccessful prosecutions."

(Matter of Hynes v. Karassik, 47 N.Y.2d 659, 662, 419 N.Y.S.2d 942, 393 N.E.2d 1015 (1979). 2 See also Matter of Joseph M., 82 N.Y.2d 128, 131, 603 N.Y.S.2d 804, 623 N.E.2d 1154 (1993); People v. Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711, 716, 579 N.Y.S.2d 617, 587 N.E.2d 255 (1991)).

This Court is confronted with two questions: (1) Was the action terminated in favor of the accused, and, if so, (2) do the interests of justice require that the records remain unsealed?

C.P.L. § 160.50(3) dictates when an action is considered terminated in favor of an accused for the purposes of sealing. Dismissals of felony indictments that fall within the gambit of this section include dismissals on appeal, dismissals of indictments or a count thereof pursuant to C.P.L. § 210.20, acquittals after trial, trial orders of dismissal from which no appeals are taken, orders setting aside verdicts, and dismissals by a grand jury. C.P.L. § 160.50(3). The Legislature's exhaustive listing of when an action may be considered terminated in favor of the defendant for purposes of this statute removes the court's need to interpret the phrase "terminated in favor of such person." (People v. Blackman, supra at p. 978, 396 N.Y.S.2d 982.) As the Blackman court stated:

"Once the Legislature has explicitly and specifically set forth the circumstances under which a proceeding can be deemed terminated favorably to a defendant, there is no longer any room for judicial interpretation or to seek the intent of the Legislature. The intent is specifically set forth ... In such case the Legislature has mandated the meaning of 'terminated in favor of such person' and the court is bound by such mandate. If the Legislature was guilty of an oversight, it is up to that body to correct it. Under the circumstances of the clear definitions of C.P.L. § 160.50 ... judicial action to fill a void, if one exists, would be unwarranted."

(People v. Blackman, supra, at 979, 396 N.Y.S.2d 982; see also, People v. Casella, supra at p. 451, 395 N.Y.S.2d 909 (the comprehensive list of situations...

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4 cases
  • People v. Cruz, 2004 NY Slip Op 50004(U) (NY 1/5/2004)
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • January 5, 2004
    ...has been recognized as conferring the power to unseal upon courts in extraordinary circumstances to serve fairness and justice." People v. White, 169 Misc.2d 89 (Sup Ct. Bronx Cty. 1996), relied on the cases of People v. Abedi, 159 Misc.2d 1010 (Sup Ct. New York Cty. 1994), and People v. Ne......
  • People v. Schleyer
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    • New York District Court
    • July 18, 2002
    ...in favor of an accused. The Legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous; there is no room for judicial interpretation (People v White, 169 Misc 2d 89; People v Ryan, 127 Misc 2d 138, 141; People v Blackman, 90 Misc 2d 977; People v Casella, 90 Misc 2d 442). Pursuant to the rules of statut......
  • RJZ v. People
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    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • August 12, 2004
    ...with a history of violence against women escaped conviction because the victim was afraid to testify, see People v. White, 169 Misc.2d 89, 642 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996)(denying motion to seal records where interests of justice required that records remain unsealed), or where a defendan......
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    • New York Supreme Court
    • July 1, 2010

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