People v. White

Decision Date02 February 1979
Docket NumberCr. 32161
Citation152 Cal.Rptr. 312,89 Cal.App.3d 143
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John George WHITE, aka Jack Todd White, Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond C. Youngquist, Pomona, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Shunji Asari and Owen Lee Kwong, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of violating Penal Code section 266i. The information charged that defendant committed the offense between June 1975 and October 1975, by procuring Jeanine, a female, a place as an inmate of a house of prostitution. Defendant waived trial by jury and was convicted in a court trial. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law.

The sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for a period of five years subject to certain specified conditions, including spending one year in the county jail. 1

I The Factual Background

Jeanine, a 16-year old female, sought employment at the Cover Girl Studio at 360 East Holt in the City of Pomona. Jeanine represented herself to be an adult and used her sister's birth certificate. She was advised that the female employees posed in the nude for customers who could take photographs of them in the nude.

At the time of her initial contacts with the Cover Girl Studio, Jeanine was living with Gerald Fransen whom she later married. Forrester, with whom she talked about a job at Cover Girl Studio, came to the residence of Jeanine and Gerald and gave them the name and telephone number of Sherry (Carol) and defendant, who would arrange for Jeanine's employment at Cover Girl Studio. Jeanine and Gerald called Sherry and made an appointment to visit the latter's home in West Covina. Defendant told Jeanine and Gerald that he, with Forrester, was the owner of the Cover Girl Studio in Pomona and of one in Whittier. Defendant and his wife Carol advised Jeanine of the various prices to the customers for the nude posing. Defendant also advised Jeanine that she would be engaging in various sexual acts with the customers, and advised Jeanine of the separate charges she was to make for different sexual acts such as one amount for straight intercourse and a higher sum for oral copulation.

In addition, defendant and Carol advised Jeanine of how she should handle a male solicitation for sexual acts if there were indications the customer was a police officer. Gerald was present and heard the entire conversation at the home of defendant.

The next day, Jeanine went to the Cover Girl Studio in Whittier for orientation and began work the next day. Jeanine worked at both the Pomona Studio and the Whittier Studio. The studios had a card index system with different colors of ink to be used to indicate the type of sexual act involved and the charge to the customer. The females who worked at the studios received a commission on the amount charged by the studio for the nude modeling sessions, depending on the length of the session and whether a customer used his own camera or the studio's camera. The Cover Girl Studios were arranged physically with a reception room in front and separate rooms in the back for the nude modeling and prostitution activities.

Jeanine testified that she saw defendant at the studios about once a week. Between June 1975 and October 1975, Jeanine said she performed approximately 1,000 sexual acts for money and earned about $7,000. The customers paid her directly for sexual acts. She did not pay any of the money she earned for sexual acts to defendant.

In August 1975, defendant opened a new nude-girl studio in Anaheim and Jeanine worked at this studio and performed sexual acts there also.

Jeanine admitted signing, along with other females employed at the studios, a document reciting that if any employee, during the course of her employment, committed any sexual acts with a customer, she would be fired. Jeanine stated that she continued to engage in sexual activity with customers after she signed the document.

II Defendant's Contentions

Defendant advances the following contentions on this appeal: (1) The evidence is insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction because Penal Code section 266i does not cover sexual acts of oral copulation. (2) The prosecution's evidence did not constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction. (3) It was due process error for the trial court not to require the prosecution to rely upon some specific acts of prostitution on the part of the victim.

III The Meaning of a "House of Prostitution" Under Penal Code Section 266i

Penal Code section 266i defines the felony offense of pandering. In pertinent part, section 266i, subdivision (c), sets forth the offense for any person who "procures for another person a place as inmate in a house of prostitution or as an inmate of any place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state."

It is defendant's contention that the prosecution's evidence establishes only that Jeanine on one occasion said that she had performed an act of oral copulation with a customer of the Cover Girl Studio for money and that her testimony that she performed numerous "sexual acts" for money at the Cover Girl Studios does not establish that sexual intercourse for money was being performed at defendant's Cover Girl Studios. Defendant argues that a "house of prostitution," as that term is used in Penal Code section 266i, is limited to a place where sexual intercourse is practiced for money, and does not cover other sexual acts such as oral copulation or sodomy.

We need not decide whether a "house of prostitution," as that term is used in Penal Code section 266i, is limited to a place where regular sexual intercourse is practiced for money and does not cover a place where other sexual acts are performed such as oral copulation or sodomy. 2 We do not agree with defendant's contention that the prosecution's evidence was limited to proof that Jeanine engaged in only acts of oral copulation while employed at defendant's Cover Girl Studios. Jeanine testified that at the initial conversation she and Gerald had at defendant's home, defendant and Carol set forth minimum prices Jeanine was to charge for various types of sexual acts with the customers, with a different charge for oral copulation, as contrasted with regular sexual intercourse. In light of this initial conversation, Jeanine's testimony that she had engaged in numerous sexual acts for money while working at the defendant's Cover Girl Studios is subject to the reasonable interpretation that these sexual acts included sexual intercourse. The fact that her sexual acts also included oral copulation and other forms of sexual activity would not change the fact that, when having regular sexual intercourse with customers, she was engaging in prostitution at defendant's Cover Girl Studios.

IV Sufficiency of the Evidence To Sustain Defendant's Conviction Under the Substantial Evidence and Solid Value Rule

Defendant argues that the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We start with the principle of appellate review that, "in reviewing a criminal conviction on appeal to determine whether the record contains any substantial evidence tending to support the finding of the trier of fact, and in considering this question we (the appellate court) must view this evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. (Citation.) The test is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citations.)" (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 808, 103 Cal.Rptr. 425, 429, 500 P.2d 1, 5.) On the contrary, we must make a determination of whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution had established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant argues, however, that the record does not satisfy the requirement that the evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty. Defendant relies upon the principle that " ' "in determining whether the record is sufficient in this respect the appellate court can give credit only to 'substantial' evidence, i. e., evidence that reasonably inspires confidence and is 'of solid value.' " ' " (In re Roderick P., supra, 7 Cal.3d 801, 809, 103 Cal.Rptr. 425, 429, 500 P.2d 1, 6.)

Defendant points out that there was no evidence that any of the other female employees of defendant's Cover Girl Studios engaged in prostitution. Jeanine testified that she had never seen or heard indications that any of the other female employees were so engaged.

Jeanine also testified that, in August 1975, she was arrested in Orange County for soliciting a customer who turned out to be a police officer. In the Fullerton Municipal Court she testified that she had never solicited a male for sexual intercourse; but she was found guilty in that court, fined and put on probation. In her testimony in the case at bench she stated that she had committed perjury in the Fullerton trial.

Evidence from an admitted perjurer is certainly not of the most trustworthy character. The credibility of Jeanine as a witness leaves much to be desired. But under the accepted standard of appellate review, we cannot substitute our judgment of the weight of the evidence for that of the trial judge. Although the prosecution's case against defendant was not particularly strong, we are unable to conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could not have believed Jeanine's testimony and found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We are required to conclude, therefore, that the prosecution's evidence amounts to "substantial" evidence within the meaning of the decisional law evidence that is of solid value and that reasonably inspires confidence.

V Was the Prosecution Required...

To continue reading

Request your trial
29 cases
  • People v. Van Leonard
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • July 18, 2014
    ...ongoing nature....” (See People v. Dell (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 248, 265–266, 283 Cal.Rptr. 361 (Dell ); see also People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151, 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 (White ).) Walser could therefore join in the pandering of Jordan and Hanson as an aider and abettor as long as th......
  • People v. Melendez
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 1990
    ......white sweater was in the store. He left and returned a few minutes later. Defendant entered the store and was being helped by Shirher when Provencio ......
  • People v. Dell, B043674
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 1991
    ......Lewis (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 143 Cal.Rptr. 587 [reversed multiple convictions for single course of conduct as pimp] ); (People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 [no denial of due process for witness to testify to several acts of prostitution because panderer can ......
  • People v. Madden, Cr. 4097
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • February 24, 1981
    ......White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151, 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717, 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 (child abuse); People ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT