People v. White

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MARKMAN
• Citation: People v. White, 493 Mich. 187, 828 N.W.2d 329 (Mich. 2013)
• Decision Date: 13 February 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 144387.,Calendar No. 8.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WHITE.

493 Mich. 187

828 N.W.2d 329

PEOPLE

v.WHITE.

Docket No. 144387.

Calendar No. 8.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 11, 2012.

Decided Feb. 13, 2013.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Henry C. Zavislak, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.

Rappleye & Rappleye, P.C., Jackson (by Robert Karl Gaecke, Jr.), for defendant.

Opinion of the Court

MARKMAN, J.

The issue here is whether, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), defendant was subjected to “interrogation” or, more specifically, “express questioning or its functional equivalent,” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), after he invoked his right to remain silent. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant was not subjected to such questioning after he invoked his right to remain silent, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which correctly reversed the trial court's decision to suppress defendant's voluntarily given confession.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant allegedly turned a drug buy into an armed robbery by pulling out a gun instead of proffering cash. He and the victim allegedly struggled over the gun, the gun went off, and the victim was killed. Defendant was then taken into custody. After a police officer read defendant his Miranda rights, the following colloquy, which was recorded on a DVD, immediately ensued:

[ Officer ]: Okay. This is what they call the acknowledgement and waiver paragraph. I'm going to read this to you. If you wish to talk to me, I'm going to need you to sign and date [the] form. Even though you sign and date the form, you still have your rights to stop at any time you wish. Do you understand that?

[ Defendant ]: No. No thank you sir. I'm not going to sign it.

[ Officer ]: Okay. Okay. Sounds good.

[ Defendant ]: I don't even want to speak.

[ Officer ]: I understand. I understand Kadeem. Okay then. The only thing I can tell you Kadeem, is good luck man. Okay. Don't take this personal. It's not personal between me and you, I think I may have had one contact with you on the street. Okay. I've got to do my job. And I understand you've got to do what you've got to do to protect your best interests. Okay. The only thing that I can tell you is this, and I'm not asking you questions, I'm just telling you. I hope that the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold of it and nobody else can get hurt by it, okay. All right.

[ Defendant ]: I didn't even mean for it to happen like that. It was a complete accident.

[ Officer ]: I understand. I understand. But like I said, you, uhh, you get your attorney, man. Hey, look dude, I don't think you're a monster, all right. I don't think that. You could have came down to me and turned yourself in and there ain't no damn way I'd beat you up. Yeah. Okay, man? You all set, you straight with me? Who knows you're here? Who knows of your family? Because I know a lot of your family in town now.

[ Defendant ]: I know that I didn't mean to do it. I guarantee that, I know I didn't mean to do it.

[ Officer ]: Does your dad know you're down here?

[ Defendant ]: Yeah.

Defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to the police officer. The trial court granted defendant's motion, finding the officer's comment—“I hope that the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold of it and nobody else can get hurt by it”—to be the functional equivalent of express questioning, which is prohibited after a defendant has invoked his right to remain silent. In a published, and split, decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. People v. White, 294 Mich.App. 622, 823 N.W.2d 118 (2011). The majority held that the officer's comment did not constitute the functional equivalent of express questioning under Innis and thus that there was no constitutionalviolation. The dissent would have suppressed the confession because, with the word “okay” appended to his expression of concern regarding the firearm, the officer's comment constituted an express question. At the very least, the dissent concluded, the officer's comment constituted the functional equivalent of a question and was thus prohibited. This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. People v. White, 491 Mich. 890, 810 N.W.2d 36 (2012).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the pertinent facts here are undisputed, we review de novo the trial court's decision regarding whether defendant was subjected to “interrogation” or, more specifically, “express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300–301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. We agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that the majority erred by applying the “clear error” standard of review in evaluating whether such questioning occurred. As the dissent explained, given that the facts are undisputed, the de novo standard of review, not review for clear error, is applicable. See People v. Attebury, 463 Mich. 662, 668, 624 N.W.2d 912 (2001) (“To the extent that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.”). However, this error was harmless because the majority held that “[e]ven under a de novo review of the evidence, ... we conclude, as did the trial court, that no express questioning occurred.” White, 294 Mich.App. at 633, 823 N.W.2d 118.

III. ANALYSIS

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” U.S. Const., Am. V. See also Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17. Notwithstanding the apparent textual focus of the Fifth Amendment on whether a defendant's confession was undertaken voluntarily and without coercion,¹ the United States Supreme Court has held since Miranda that in the context of a “custodial interrogation,” advising a defendant of his Miranda rights ² is necessary to protect his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and “[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 473–474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If the police continue to “interrogate” the defendant after he has invoked his right to remain silent, and the defendant confesses as a result of that “interrogation,” the confession is inadmissible. Id. at 444–445, 86 S.Ct. 1602. However, Miranda also clarified that voluntarily given confessions that are not the result of impermissible custodial interrogations remain admissible:

In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. [Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602.]

In this case, there is no question that defendant was in “custody” and that after defendant was read his Miranda rights, he invoked his right to remain silent. Thus, the question here is whether, after defendant invoked his right to remain silent, he was then subjected to “interrogation.”

In Innis, 446 U.S. at 300–302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, the United States Supreme Court explained the circumstances under which a defendant is deemed to have been subjected to “interrogation”:

[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. [Emphasis in the original.]

The Court further explained, however, that the underlying intent of the police is not irrelevant:

[I]t may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have...