People v. White

• Decision Date: 15 November 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 303228.
• Citation: People v. White, 294 Mich.App. 622, 823 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. App. 2011)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WHITE.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

294 Mich.App. 622

823 N.W.2d 118

PEOPLE

v.WHITE.

Docket No. 303228.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 13, 2011, at Lansing.

Decided Nov. 15, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Henry C. Zavislak, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Rappleye & Rappleye, P.C., Jackson (by Robert K. Gaecke, Jr.), for defendant.

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and WILDER and MURRAY, JJ.

MURRAY, J.

Plaintiff appeals by leave granted the trial court's March 8, 2011, order granting defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, arising from the shooting death of Benjamin Willard. The prosecutor's theory was that defendant attempted to rob Willard at gunpoint and when Willard resisted, defendant shot him. After defendant was arrested, he was provided his warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and he asserted his right to remain silent. In response, the following occurred between the interviewing detective (Detective Stiles) and defendant:

[ Detective Stiles ]: Okay. [T]his is what they call the acknowledgment and waiver paragraph I'm going to read this to you. If you wish to talk to me, I'm going to need you to sign and date the form. Even though you sign and date the form, you still have your rights to stop at any time you wish. Do you understand that?

[ Defendant ]: No. No thank you sir. I'm not going to sign it.

[ Detective Stiles ]: Okay. Okay. Sounds good.

[ Defendant ]: I don't even want to speak.

[ Detective Stiles ]: I understand. I understand Kadeem.

Okay then. The only thing I can tell you Kadeem, is good luck man.

Okay. Don't take this personal. It's not personal between me and you, I think I may have had one contact with you on the street. Okay. I've got to do my job. And I understand you've got to [do] what you've got to do to protect your best interests. Okay.

The only thing that I can tell you is this, and I'm not asking you questions, I'm just telling you. I hope that the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold [sic] of it and nobody else can get hurt by it, okay?

All right?

[ Defendant ]: I didn't even mean for it to happen like that. It was a complete accident.

[ Detective Stiles ]: I understand. I understand.

But like I said, you, uhh, you get your attorney, man.

Hey, look dude, I don't think you're a monster, all right? I don't think that. You could have came down to me and turned yourself in and there ain't no damn way I'd beat you up.

[ Defendant ]: Yeah.

[ Detective Stiles ]: Okay, man?

You all set, you straight with me?

Who knows you're here? Who knows of your family? Because I know a lot of your family in town now.

[ Defendant ]: (unintelligible reply). I know that I didn't mean to do it. I guarantee that, I know I didn't mean to do it. [Emphasis added.]

Defendant moved to suppress his statement arguing that the detective's statement constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The trial court agreed, focusing on the presumed purpose of the question, which was inferred from the fact that the detective made the statement directly to defendant:

Or where Innis does appear to be on point, the case concludes that Miranda safeguards are applicable whenever a person in custody is subject to either expressed questioning or its functional equivalent. Now, in this case there's no dispute that defendant was in custody and I think anybody reviewing the tape would find that the officer's statement was not expressed questioning, not in the way that it was worded. Then we come to the other portion where the Court identified the functional equivalent, any words or actions on part of the police other than those normally intended to arrest in custody, that the police should know or reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response for the suspect.... The ultimate question is whether the officer should have known that such a response would be the result of his statement. And, in this particular case it's difficult to find another reason for making the statement, the officer made the statement while looking directly at the defendant.... Now, (Inaudible)—made distinction in Innis is that the officers were speaking to each other. Here the officer and the defendant were the only ones in the room, it may have been reasonable to make a similar statement to any other person within the defendant's hearing and not expect a response, but when the statement is made directly to the defendant while looking directly at him it suggest [sic] that the remark was designed to elicit a response as to the location of the gun. Therefore, the [c]ourt is granting the motion to suppress on self-incrimination grounds. The only reasonable interpretation of the officer's statement at that point appears to be [de]signed to elicit information about the location of the gun. The information qualifies as an incriminating statement and the statement qualifies as the functional equivalent of expressed questioning, because it occurred after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. It must be suppressed, however it can be used for impeachment purposes should your client take the witness stand. [Emphasis added.]

Based on this ruling on the record, the trial court ordered defendant's subsequent statements suppressed. It is from that order that we granted leave to appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for clear error; it reviews attendant questions of law de novo. People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 496, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003); People v. Sobczak–Obetts, 463 Mich. 687, 694, 625 N.W.2d 764 (2001); People v. Unger, 278 Mich.App. 210, 243, 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008). What this means is that if factual findings are made by the trial court in relation to the motion to suppress, we defer to those findings by use of the clearly erroneous standard of review. People v. Kowalski, 230 Mich.App. 464, 471–472, 584 N.W.2d 613 (1998). The application of those facts to the constitutionalprovision at issue-the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution-is a legal determination to which we owe no deference to the trial court, and therefore we apply a de novo standard of review to the ultimate conclusion. Id.; see also People v. Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626, 631, 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999), quoting People v. Nelson, 443 Mich. 626, 631 n. 7, 505 N.W.2d 266 (1993) (“ ‘Application of constitutional standards by the trial court is not entitled to the same deference as factual findings.’ ”).

The right against compelled self-incrimination is guaranteed by both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. U.S. Const., Am. V; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17; People v. Tierney, 266 Mich.App. 687, 707, 703 N.W.2d 204 (2005). Non-volunteered statements made during custodial interrogations are admissible only if a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. People v. Akins, 259 Mich.App. 545, 564, 675 N.W.2d 863 (2003). There is no dispute that defendant was in custody at the time he made the statement, and that he had previously invoked his right to remain silent. Thus, the only question is whether the trial court erred by concluding that the detective's comments to defendant regarding the location of the gun constituted the “functional equivalent of interrogation.”

We agree with the prosecution that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Innis, 446 U.S. at 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, mandates reversal of the trial court's order suppressing defendant's statement. In Innis, three police officers were transporting the respondent to the police station following his arrest. While en route, one of the officers commented that “there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves,” and that it would be “too bad” if a girl picked up the gun used in the armed robbery in which the respondent was a suspect and killed herself. Id. at 294–295, 100 S.Ct. 1682. A second officer also expressed his concern about the location of the weapon. Id. at 295, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The respondent, having previously been advised of his Miranda rights, “interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.” He then directed the officers to the gun, which he had hidden in a field near the location of his arrest. Id. at 294–295, 100 S.Ct. 1682.

The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent was not subjected to interrogation, within the meaning of Miranda, when being subjected to the conversation between the officers. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302–303, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The Court first explained that

the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the...