People v. White

• Decision Date: 30 October 1969
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 52542
• Citation: 253 N.E.2d 654,116 Ill.App.2d 180
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene WHITE and Morris R. Smith, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 654

253 N.E.2d 654

116 Ill.App.2d 180

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene WHITE and Morris R. Smith, Defendants-Appellants.

Gen. No. 52542.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Oct. 30, 1969.

Gerald W. Getty, James J. Doherty, Shelvin Singer, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

Edward V. Hanrahan, Elmer C. Kissane, Michael D. Stevenson, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

DEMPSEY, Presiding Justice.

In a non-jury trial the defendants, Eugene White and Morris Smith, were found guilty of armed robbery. White received a sentence of four to ten years; Smith three to ten years. On appeal, they contend that a pre-trial identification was highly suggestive and that they did not knowingly and freely waive their right to a trial by jury.

At 1:45 A.M., December 4, 1966, two men held up a gasoline station located at 130 East 75th Street, Chicago. The men drove up in a black 1966 Pontiac Bonneville convertible. The passenger alighted from the car, displayed a gun and demanded money from Oliver Harris, an employee who was on duty at the time. He ordered Harris to go inside the station. The driver of the car got out and also entered the station. Harris gave the men about $60.00. A customer then pulled up and Harris, followed by the man whith the gun, walked outside to take care of him. He serviced three cars in all, selling cigarettes but no gasoline to each. After waiting on the last customer, Harris handed over the rest of the money to the men and they left. The men had been at the well-lighted station about five or ten minutes.

On the night of December 5th, the police called Harris and asked him to come to the police station to identify two men who fit the description which he had given them. He arrived at the station about 11:30 P.M. and was taken to the cells where he looked into a cell which contained four men. After he left the cell area the police asked him if he had seen the men who had robbed him and Harris replied that he had, 'the short one and the taller one.' The identified persons were the defendants, White and Smith.

White and Smith had been arrested earlier that evening by a police officer who staked out a 1966 Pontiac Bonneville convertible which was similar to the one described by Harris. They were arrested as they entered the car. White claimed that the car belonged to a friend of his but could not name him.

Both defendants denied committing the robbery. They testified that they were drinking at a tavern on the night and early morning of the robbery. Smith said that he left the tavern about 1:30 A.M. with a girl friend and walked to his home a block and a half away. The girl friend's testimony supported his, except that she said that they were at a different tavern. White testified that after Smith left the tavern he and a girl whose name he had since forgotten, walked next door to another tavern where they stayed about 15 or 20 minutes. At about 1:45 A.M. they entered the girl's 1966 Bonneville, stopped for some food and drove to the girl's residence. The girl told him that he could use the car until the next day. White dropped the girl off and drove home. He parked the car about 2:30 A.M. at the place where he and Smith were arrested the next evening. White claimed that an effort had been made to locate the girl but that she could not be found.

Smith testified that he and White were locked in a cell with two other men. The police then took them out of the cell and brought them to the receiving area to be photographed. While their pictures were being taken, Harris entered and viewed them. White and Smith were the only prisoners present at the time.

At their trial, Harris identified the defendants as the persons who committed the robbery; he further testified as to the police-station identification. The defendants contend that under either Smith's or Harris' version of what took place at the police station the confrontation was highly suggestive--that testimony about it should not have been permitted, and that prior to the courtroom identification a hearing should have been held to determine whether or not the identification was tainted by the suggestive confrontation.

Smith's version is claimed to be prejudicial because of the lack of other prisoners from whom Harris could choose and because of the suggestion of guilt arising from the act of the police photographing the defendants. Harris' version is attacked because the cellmates were too dissimilar--one was of a different race and another looked younger than the others and was of a height in between that of the defendants. Harris' version is further criticized because of the poor lighting conditions in the cell area. Harris admitted that the lighting 'was not the best' and said that he did not know how the prisoners were dressed because it was 'kind of dark,' but upon further questioning added that he did not pay attention to the clothing. He said he saw the men's faces clearly but could not describe what the youngest appearing prisoner looked like because he 'wasn't too close' to him.

A confrontation for the purpose of identification may be so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the defendant is denied due process of law. Whether or not a confrontation violates due process depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); People v. Nelson, 40 Ill.2d 146, 238 N.E.2d 378 (1968); People v. McMath, 104 Ill.App.2d 302, 244 N.E.2d 330 (1968). An in-court identification which is dependent on and influenced by an illegal pre-trial confrontation is inadmissible. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); see also People v. Nelson, Supra; People v. McMath, Supra.

Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the in-court identification was independent of and uninfluenced by the pre-trial confrontation. At the time of the robbery, Harris viewed the defendants from five to ten minutes. Both defendants entered the station with him. One accompanied Harris while he waited on three customers. Thus, Harris' opportunity to observe the defendants was sufficient to enable him to identify them independently of any suggestion arising from the policestation confrontation. People v. Speck, 41 Ill.2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968); People v. Thomas, 104 Ill.App.2d 56, 243 N.E.2d 611 (1968).

Other evidence in the case strengthened the identification and left no reasonable doubt as to the defendants' guilt. Harris described the men's height and weight to the police and the defendants substantially fit the description. The defendants were arrested entering a car similar to the one reported by Harris. The car belonged to a man, not to the girl who, White had said, loaned it to him.

The defendant next contend that their jury waiver was not knowingly and understandingly made because it was induced by an unfulfilled promise of an assistant State's attorney to recommend one to six-year sentences. This point was first made in a motion to vacate and reduce the sentences received by the defendants. Their counsel explained to the trial court that his failure to object at the time the higher sentences were imposed was occasioned by the absence of the assistant who promised to recommend the lower sentences. In his argument in support of the motion, the defendants' counsel stated that prior to trial he and the assistant had a conversation in which the assistant stated that he would recommend a sentence of one to four years in the event the defendants pleaded guilty and one to six years in the event they waived a jury and were found guilty. The assistant informed the court that he told the defendants' counsel that if the defendants would plead guilty to the instant charge and to a second charge that was pending against them, he might possibly recommend a sentence of one to four years on the first; or if the defendants would waive a jury and were convicted on the first charge and would plead guilty to the second, he might possibly recommend a...