People v. White

• Decision Date: 16 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 109616.,109616.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,v.Pierre WHITE, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2011 IL 109616
953 N.E.2d 398
352 Ill.Dec. 159

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Pierre WHITE, Appellee.

No. 109616.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 2011.

[953 N.E.2d 399]

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette N. Collins, Jennifer N. Bruzan, Alan J. Spellberg, Susan R. Schierl Sullivan, Veronica Calderon Malavia and Kathryn A. Schierl, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan J. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and Darrel F. Oman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.[352 Ill.Dec. 160] OPINION Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this case, we address the following question: When the factual basis entered for a guilty plea makes it clear that a defendant is subject to a mandatory sentencing enhancement, may the trial court enter judgment imposing a sentence that does not include the enhancement on the basis that the enhancement was excluded by the parties from the plea agreement? The appellate court answered this question in the negative and held that, because a mandatory sentencing enhancement was not included in defendant's sentence in this case, the sentence and plea were void. No. 1–07–2102 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 Background

¶ 3 Defendant Pierre White was charged with three counts of first degree murder, one count of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed robbery in connection with the November 6, 2004, armed robbery and murder of Karim Ally, a taxi cab [352 Ill.Dec. 161]

[953 N.E.2d 400]

driver. In November 2006, following the trial court's denial of defendant's first motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, defense counsel told the court, “the State and I are attempting to resolve the case short of trial.” On January 23, 2007, defense counsel stated, “Judge, I had asked the State if they would make an offer. They wanted to reach out to the family of the victim. They have not done that.”

¶ 4 In February 2007, the State offered defendant a 30–year sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty to first degree murder, which defendant rejected. Additional attempts to resolve the matter failed and the case was set for trial on April 30, 2007. The court continued the case to June 12, 2007. And on that date, defense counsel advised the court that the State had made an offer, which defendant accepted. Under the terms of this offer, defendant would plead guilty and receive a 28–year sentence on the charge of first degree murder and a 4–year sentence on the charge of possession of contraband while in a penal institution, to be served consecutively.¹

¶ 5 Prior to accepting defendant's plea, the trial court admonished defendant in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402. In doing so, the court advised defendant, in pertinent part, that he was charged with first degree murder and that the sentencing range for this offense was 20 to 60 years' imprisonment. After defendant acknowledged the rights he was waiving and stated his desire to proceed, the State presented a factual basis for both pleas.

¶ 6 The State offered the following as the factual basis for first degree murder:

“[I]t would be hereby stipulated to by and between the parties that the victim in this case, Karim Ally, * * * was a taxi driver and on November 6, 2004 was alive and well and was 48 years of age.

At approximately 11:10 that evening he did pick up the defendant, * * * whom would be identified in court by other witnesses as being in Karim Ally's cab along with a cohort by the name of Huzell Washington * * *.

Both the defendant and Huzell Washington planned to rob the victim, Karim Ally. And prior to getting into Karim Ally's cab, they were in a different person's cab, a person by the name of William Wesley. William Wesley would also identify the defendant in open court as having been in his cab prior to getting into Karim Ally's cab along with Huzell Washington.

Once in Karim Ally's cab, the—they had planned to rob the victim. And the defendant admitted in a videotaped confession that he was acting as a lookout and looking outside of the cab for police to drive up.

When Karim Ally brought them to their destination at 6350 South King Drive, both the defendant and Huzell Washington exited the cab and the victim was shot in the temple one time with a handgun.

The defendant, in a videotaped confession, does not state that he is the shooter, however, does admit to taking the gun from Mr. Huzell Washington after the incident and putting it in his back pocket.

They both go to Patricia Jones' home, and Patricia Jones is Huzell Washington's girlfriend, who would identify the [352 Ill.Dec. 162]

[953 N.E.2d 401]

defendant in open court as arriving at her apartment with her boyfriend, Huzell Washington. She would identify the defendant was wearing a White Sox jacket when he entered into her home.

Both the defendant and Huzell Washington both then left from the apartment and upon leaving the apartment, Mr. John Edwards, who was working security in that area, stopped the defendant because the defendant was trying to exit from a gated area.

Mr. John Edwards did a protective pat-down and did recover a weapon from the defendant. That weapon, it would be testified to by an Illinois State Police Forensic Scientist by the name of Jennifer Alber. She would be qualified to testify in the area of ballistics, and she would testify that the weapon that was recovered from the defendant did match the one fired bullet that was recovered from the victim's body.

Further, there was GSR testing conducted on the White Sox jacket that was recovered from Huzell Washington's girlfriend's home, and that jacket was tested for GSR by Robert Berke, and he would be qualified to testify as an expert in the field of, I guess ballistics also, Judge. And he would testify that the right cuff of that Sox jacket did contact the PGSR related item or was in the environment of a discharged firearm.

Further, Judge, Dr. Adrienne Segovia * * * would testify that she was the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, Karim Ally. * * * And after conducting an autopsy, it would be her opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty, that the victim did die as a result of a gunshot wound of the head.”

The State then offered a factual basis for the possession charge.

¶ 7 The trial court accepted the pleas and the State nol-prossed the remaining counts against defendant. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to 28 years' imprisonment for murder and 4 years' imprisonment for possession of contraband, in accordance with the plea agreement.

¶ 8 On June 18, defendant, through his attorney, orally moved to withdraw the guilty plea on the basis that it was involuntary. Counsel argued that defendant did not fully understand the implications of his decision and he had been rushed into making a decision. The State objected, arguing that defendant should file a written motion and the State be given an opportunity to respond. The trial court allowed the State's request and deferred ruling until a written motion was filed.

¶ 9 On June 21, defendant filed a written motion to vacate his guilty plea. In addition to arguing that he did not understand the implication of pleading guilty, defendant also argued that he was not properly admonished about the sentencing range. Specifically, defendant alleged that he was subject to the 15–year mandatory firearm enhancement provision (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2004)) for being armed with a firearm, making the actual sentence range 35 to 75 years, not 20 to 60 years. Thus, defendant argued that the 28–year sentence he received was not authorized by statute and, therefore, was void. Accordingly, the plea agreement had to be vacated.

¶ 10 At the hearing on this motion, the State maintained that the factual basis for the plea did not include a statement that the defendant himself was armed with a firearm and that the trial court had not made a specific finding to that effect. Thus, according to the State, the statutory enhancement was not triggered and the [352 Ill.Dec. 163]

[953 N.E.2d 402]

20–to–60–year sentencing admonishment was correct.

¶ 11 The trial court denied defendant's motion. It found that the 15–year sentencing enhancement provision did not apply to defendant because he was found guilty on a theory of accountability. However, the court reasoned that, even if the enhancement did apply to defendant, defendant was not prejudiced by his plea.

¶ 12 Defendant appealed, again arguing that his sentence was void. The appellate court reversed and remanded. No. 1–07–2102 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Citing to People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill.2d 285, 322 Ill.Dec. 563, 891 N.E.2d 854 (2008), the appellate court found that the 15–year enhancement provision applies to a defendant whose guilt is based on accountability, as was the case here, but that defendant was neither admonished of the 15–year enhancement nor sentenced to it. Pursuant to People v. Torres, 228 Ill.2d 382, 320 Ill.Dec. 874, 888 N.E.2d 91 (2008), the appellate court concluded that defendant's sentence must be vacated because it fell below the permissible minimum 35 years mandated by statute. By failing to properly sentence defendant, the trial court exceeded its statutory authority and the sentence was void.

¶ 13 The appellate court rejected the State's argument that the trial court was required to make an additional factual finding to impose the 15–year sentencing enhancement under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Relying on People v. Townsell, 209 Ill.2d 543, 283 Ill.Dec. 910, 809 N.E.2d 103 (2004), the...