People v. Whitfield
Decision Date | 29 May 1986 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 72630,No. 7,7 |
Citation | 388 N.W.2d 206,425 Mich. 116 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David WHITFIELD, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar425 Mich. 116, 388 N.W.2d 206 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Timothy A. Baughman, Deputy Chief, Civil and Appeals, Thomas M. Chambers, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Sheldon Halpern, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
David Whitfield was charged and ultimately convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(a). Mr. Whitfield's first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not agree on a verdict. A second trial resulted in the conviction challenged in the instant appeal. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the conviction in a per curiam opinion. This appeal followed. Because we agree that prejudicial error occurred in Mr. Whitfield's second trial, we reverse the conviction.
The basic facts are ably set out in Judge Wahl's partial dissent to the Court of Appeals opinion:
At both trials, the defendant offered the expert testimony of Dr. Samuel Lerman on the question whether gonorrhea can be transmitted in a nonsexual manner. At defendant's first trial, Dr. Lerman testified that gonorrhea can be transmitted without sexual contact, although such transmission is uncommon. Dr. Lerman also said that gonorrhea could be transmitted by a wet towel or washcloth or by one person sitting on a damp surface that an infected person had just sat on. At defendant's second trial, the trial court ruled that Dr. Lerman lacked the expertise needed to qualify as an expert on the transmission of gonorrhea.
On appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Dr. Lerman's testimony and that the error cannot be considered harmless. We agree.
Michigan Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
"If the court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Under MRE 702, the trial court determines whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact. The trial court also determines whether the proffered witness is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." MRE 702; MRE 104(a). The determination of whether a witness is an "expert" is within the discretion of the trial court, Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 591, 248 N.W.2d 171 (1976), and the decision generally is not reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
In this case, expert testimony concerning the transmission of gonorrhea was clearly of potential assistance in understanding the evidence. Several physicians called by the prosecution testified, on direct and cross-examination, concerning the transmission of gonorrhea. Thus, the initial issue here is whether the trial court erred in the decision that defendant's witness, Dr. Lerman, could not testify concerning the transmission of gonorrhea.
Dr. Lerman's qualifications are summarized in Judge Wahl's dissent:
Under MRE 702, a witness can be an "expert" due to "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." The federal advisory committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, upon which MRE 702 was modeled, observes:
Commenting on FRE 702, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "a proposed expert witness 'should not be required to satisfy an overly narrow test of his own qualifications.' " United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (C.A. 6, 1977) (citations omitted).
The same is true of expert witnesses under MRE 702. While the trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether an individual may testify as an expert, United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (C.A. 5, 1983), a proposed expert should not be scrutinized by an overly narrow test of qualifications. Dr. Lerman was clearly qualified by knowledge, experience, and training to testify concerning the transmission of gonorrhea. He had treated patients with gonorrhea, including one three-year-old child, and he was familiar with the literature on the subject. While Dr. Lerman's expertise might not have been as great as the prosecutor's experts, such a consideration goes to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility. It is for the jury to decide what weight to give to the evidence. People v. Goodrode, 132 Mich. 542, 548, 94 N.W. 14 (1903). As Judge McCree noted in Barker, supra,
Id. at 1024 (citations omitted).
Dr. Lerman's testimony concerning the transmission of gonorrhea should have been admitted under MRE 702.
Because of the circumstances of this case and the nature of the testimony excluded, we cannot say that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 1 In the context of a Confrontation Clause violation, consisting of improper limitation of cross-examination of a prosecution witness for bias, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its rejection of automatic reversal for error of constitutional magnitude and reviewed some of the factors a reviewing court should consider in determining whether a constitutional error can be considered harmless:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Beckley
...406 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.1987).20 161 Mich.App. at 129, 409 N.W.2d 759.21 FRE 702 Advisory committee notes. See also People v. Whitfield, 425 Mich. 116, 388 N.W.2d 206 (1986).22 People v. Kosters, 175 Mich.App. 748, 438 N.W.2d 651 (1989).23 People v. Stull, 127 Mich.App. 14, 338 N.W.2d 403 (198......
-
People v. Shahideh
...who would have confessed to the charged crime violated the defendant's right to present a defense); People v. Whitfield, 425 Mich. 116, 124 n. 1, 388 N.W.2d 206 (1986) (holding that barring the defendant from presenting the testimony of a medical expert violated the defendant's right to pre......
-
People v. Johnson
...824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); People v. Whitfield, 425 Mich. 116, 388 N.W.2d 206 (1986).2 M.C.L. Sec. 766.1; M.S.A. Sec. 28.919 provides:"The state and accused shall be entitled to a prompt examination and de......
-
People v. Haywood
...a trial court should not require a proposed expert witness to satisfy an overly narrow test of qualifications. People v. Whitfield, 425 Mich. 116, 122-124, 388 N.W.2d 206 (1986); People v. Moye, 194 Mich.App. 373, 378, 487 N.W.2d 777 (1992), rev'd on other grounds 441 Mich. 864, 491 N.W.2d ......