People v. Whitfield

• Decision Date: 13 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 102985.,102985.
• Citation: 228 Ill.2d 502,888 N.E.2d 1166
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Travis WHITFIELD, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

888 N.E.2d 1166

228 Ill.2d 502

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Travis WHITFIELD, Appellee.

No. 102985.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 13, 2007.

Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 23, 2008.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Leah C. Myers, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Katherine Linehan, Ashley Romito and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Jonathan Krieger, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Defendant, Travis Whitfield, pled guilty to the offense of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to a term of probation. Shortly after sentencing, the State learned that defendant was ineligible for probation because of his criminal record and moved to vacate the plea. Defendant's plea was withdrawn, and he was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. A divided appellate court concluded that as a matter of fundamental fairness, the trial court should have considered granting defendant sentencing credit for the time he spent on probation. 366 Ill.App.3d 448, 303 Ill.Dec. 543, 851 N.E.2d 730. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal and now reverse the appellate court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2000, the victim, 75-year-old Emmerline Clarkston, hired defendant and another individual to do electrical work in her apartment. The project lasted several months, and Clarkston was home on some occasions when defendant and his partner were working. When home, Clarkston occasionally left her key ring, including her car key, hanging on a doorknob so she could locate it easily. On June 25, 2000, Clarkston's 1991 Lexus was stolen while parked in front of her house. She did not give anyone permission to take her car.

Almost one year later, on May 9, 2001, a police officer performed a license plate check on a Lexus being driven by defendant, which revealed that the car was stolen. Defendant was arrested and subsequently gave an oral statement indicating that he did some work at Clarkston's house, took her car key, copied it, and then stole her Lexus. Defendant admitted that he had been in possession of the car for approximately one year.

On September 30, 2002, defendant pled guilty to the offense of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Both defendant and the State waived a presentence investigation. The State advised the court that defendant had one prior felony conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle in 1987. Relying on this information, the trial court sentenced defendant to two years' probation and ordered him to complete 30 days of community service through the Sheriff's Work Alternative Program (SWAP) and pay $500 in restitution to Clarkston within one year.

On October 7, 2002, the State moved to vacate defendant's guilty plea, asserting that defendant's sentence was void. The facts pled in the motion demonstrated that the State mistakenly advised the court that defendant had one prior felony conviction when defendant actually had two prior felony convictions. Defendant was thus ineligible for probation and was subject to a mandatory Class X sentence. On October 16, 2002, the parties appeared on the State's motion to vacate and defense counsel requested a continuance to research the voidness issue.

Defense counsel requested additional continuances over a six-month period while waiting for certain trial transcripts. On May 15, 2003, defendant moved to vacate the judgment against him and withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant's motion was allowed on June 5, 2002, and, at that point, approximately eight months had passed since defendant was initially placed on probation. There is no information in the record as to whether defendant complied with his probation conditions during that eight-month period.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial, and defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. At sentencing, the trial court found that defendant was subject to a mandatory Class X term. The court then sentenced defendant to eight years in prison. The record does not indicate that the trial court considered giving defendant credit for the time he spent on probation for the instant offense, nor does the record show that defendant asked for such credit.

On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether he should receive sentencing credit for the time he spent on probation. Defendant admitted that there is no statutory provision specifically requiring the court to make such a consideration under the circumstances of his case. Defendant maintained, however, that he was entitled to this consideration based on section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2004)), which mandates that a court apply credit for all time spent in custody prior to sentencing, and section 5-6-4(h) of the Code, which permits a court, in its discretion, to give a defendant credit for time spent on probation after a defendant violates probation and is sentenced to prison (730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(h) (West 2004)). The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, concluded that neither of these statutes applied to defendant, but it still felt compelled to grant defendant some relief on grounds of fundamental fairness. The majority stated:

"[W]ere we to simply affirm the decision below without remand for further consideration of defendant's final sentence, we would be creating, in effect, two classes of similarly situated defendants treated in vastly different manners. That is, under our statutory scheme as evident in section 5-6-4(h), a defendant originally placed on probation but who then violates its terms and requires the trial court to again become involved in his cause to impose a prison sentence has the potential opportunity to receive some consideration for his time spent on probation. Meanwhile, a defendant (in the same shoes as defendant here) originally placed on probation and who complies with every one of its terms,[¹] participates in the community without further police encounters or legal difficulties, and meets all other conditions for a period of time would receive absolutely no consideration at all, simply because his probation was later declared void rather than revoked.

This is inherently, not to mention fundamentally, unfair. Ultimately, we are encroaching upon due process rights." 366 Ill.App.3d at 461-62, 303 Ill.Dec. 543, 851 N.E.2d 730.

The majority remanded the cause for the trial court to consider whether defendant should receive credit toward his prison sentence for the time he spent on probation.

The dissent concluded that defendant was not entitled to this consideration because his probation was void at its inception and should be treated as if it never existed. Further, the dissent did not agree that the issue invoked due process or fundamental fairness concerns because defendant did not identify any statutory or constitutional right to receive credit. 366 Ill.App.3d at 465-67, 303 Ill.Dec. 543, 851 N.E.2d 730 (O'Malley, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, defendant was "the fortuitous beneficiary of freedom to which he was not entitled." 366 Ill.App.3d at 468, 303 Ill.Dec. 543, 851 N.E.2d 730 (O'Malley, J., dissenting). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS

The State argues in its brief to this court that defendant forfeited review of the credit issue on appeal because he never requested credit for the time he spent on probation during the sentencing proceeding and did not raise the issue in posttrial motions. Defendant does not dispute the State's assertion that the claim was forfeited. However, defendant maintains that the forfeiture rule was properly relaxed by the appellate court.

We need not address the forfeiture argument raised by the State, or defendant's arguments in reply, because the State did not include the forfeiture issue in its petition for leave to appeal to this court. Supreme Court Rule 315(b) states that a petition for leave to appeal must contain "a statement of the points relied upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court." 177 Ill.2d R. 315(b)(3). Rule 315(b) also requires "a short argument (including appropriate authorities) stating why review by the Supreme Court is warranted and why the decision of the Appellate Court should be reversed or modified." 177 Ill.2d R. 315(b)(5). The State's petition for leave to appeal does not meet either of these requirements with respect to the issue of forfeiture. Accordingly, we decline to consider the State's forfeiture argument, as it was not properly preserved for our review. See People v. Campa, 217 Ill.2d 243, 269, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157 (2005), citing People v. Carter, 208 Ill.2d 309, 318, 280 Ill.Dec. 664, 802 N.E.2d 1185 (2003); see also People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 347, 250 Ill.Dec. 692, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000) ("The rules of waiver are applicable to the State as well as the defendant in criminal proceedings, and the State may waive an argument that the defendant waived an issue by failing to argue waiver in a timely manner"). We turn to the issues properly raised by the State.

Statutory or Precedential Authority

The parties agree that there is no statutory authority that would require the lower court to consider giving defendant sentencing credit for the time he spent on probation. The parties also agree that there is no precedent for the appellate court's actions. In fact, the State argues that the appellate court's decision to remand the matter...