People v. Widhalm, 81SA476
Decision Date | 15 March 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 81SA476,81SA476 |
Citation | 642 P.2d 498 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David Chaney WIDHALM, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Paul Q. Beacom, Dist. Atty., Steven Bernard, Kathryn J. Aragon, Deputy Dist. Attys., Brighton, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert L. McDougal, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
The district attorney prosecutes this appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R.S.1973 , and requests us to determine whether section 16-7-403(2), C.R.S.1973 , requires the court to enter a judgment of conviction upon finding at a revocation hearing that the defendant has violated the condition of a deferred judgment. We hold that the statute mandates the entry of a judgment of conviction under such circumstances and, accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the district court.
On March 31, 1980, an information was filed in the Adams County District Court charging the defendant with felony-theft of a motor vehicle engine and an automobile seat, the crime allegedly having been committed sometime during the period from March 31 to August 7, 1979. Pursuant to a plea agreement the defendant, the defendant's attorney, and the district attorney consented in writing to the entry of a guilty plea to the charge and to the deferral of judgment and sentence for a period of one year. The written plea agreement expressly provided that the defendant would be placed under probationary supervision for a period of one year and would make restitution to the victim of the theft in the amount of $1900, payable through the registry of the court in twelve monthly installments of $158.33. The court approved the written agreement and on August 28, 1980, the defendant entered a plea of guilty which the court accepted. By written order the court placed the defendant under supervision of the probation department for a period of one year under conditions which included periodic reporting to the supervising officer and the payment of restitution as agreed in the prior written consent to the deferred judgment.
On June 24, 1981 the district attorney filed an application to revoke the deferred judgment on the grounds that the defendant had failed to maintain contact with his probation officer and had made no restitution payments. An evidentiary hearing was conducted by the court on August 7, 1981, and at the conclusion of the evidence the court found that the petition to revoke had been sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 In its ruling the court noted that the defendant totally ignored his reporting responsibilities, and in spite of his financial ability to pay restitution, had violated this condition of the deferred judgment as well. 2 Instead of entering a judgment of conviction, the court, over the district attorney's objection, continued the defendant under the deferred judgment and extended the period of deferral for an additional year. This appeal followed in due course. 3
A deferred judgment and sentence, as authorized by section 16-7-403, C.R.S.1973 , is a unique dispositional alternative to the traditional plea of guilty. It permits a defendant to plead guilty without the entry of a judgment of conviction and accords him the opportunity to withdraw that plea and obtain a dismissal of the charges with prejudice upon compliance with stipulated conditions during the period of deferral. Subsection 2 of section 16-7-403 outlines the substantive and procedural consequences flowing from such a disposition:
The purpose of the written stipulation is to ensure that the defendant knows prior to the entry of a guilty plea the consequences of violating the conditions of the deferred judgment and sentence. Upon a judicial determination that such violation has occurred, the statutory direction in section 16-7-403(2) is clear and unequivocal: the court shall enter a judgment of conviction upon the previously entered plea of guilty. This legislative mandate is irreconcilable with a judicial discretion to continue the defendant under a deferred judgment, notwithstanding a judicial determination that he already has violated the conditions of the deferred judgment. We have held in several cases that a court is not free to disregard a specific legislative mandate relating to sentencing, even though another alternative might appear to be more appropriately suited to ...
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...a guilty plea and continue the case for a period up to four years from the date of the plea. § 18–1.3–102(1)(a); People v. Widhalm, 642 P.2d 498, 500 (Colo.1982). The statute provides, in part, as follows: In any case in which the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, the court accepting ......
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