People v. Wilcox

Decision Date06 November 1975
Docket NumberNo. 74--255,74--255
Citation337 N.E.2d 211,33 Ill.App.3d 432
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald A. WILCOX, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Julius Lucius Echeles, Carolyn Jaffe, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

John J. Bowman, State's Atty., Malcolm F. Smith, Asst. State's Atty., Wheaton, for plaintiff-appellee.

SEIDENFELD, Presiding Justice:

The defendant was convicted of rape and deviate sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 11--1, par. 11--3) in a trial before the court without a jury. He appeals, contending that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he was prejudiced by various rulings on evidence. He also claims that the court erred in refusing to grant his post-trial motion for a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness.

The complaining witness was a college student who had met the defendant about three weeks prior to the incident at a restaurant where he was employed as a waiter. She testified that she had seen defendant about six or seven times prior to the incident and had normal intercourse with him four or five of those times. She said she had not been afraid of him on those occasions.

The incident occurred at approximately 1:30 A.M. on October 26, 1973. She testified that in the evening of October 25th they had gone to a restaurant and to a club both of which were near defendant's apartment. While they were at the club she had called her boy friend in California and had talked for about ten minutes. She said she and the defendant were arguing and she drove him to the garage of his apartment building to drop him off and drove into the garage when he asked her to. She testified that he then got out of the car, shut the garage door and came back to the car; that he told her to remove her clothes which she did, as did he. He then asked her to engage in oral copulation which she said she refused. She said that the defendant then struck her in the face several times; that she became hysterical; that he instructed her to go into a small room adjoining the garage telling her that he would hurt her otherwise. She said she saw an axe on the wall of the room.

She testified that defendant tied her wrists with a clothesline to pipes running along the ceiling; that he placed newspaper under the rope which she said was to avoid leaving marks. She was crying and kept telling him 'no' but he told her to do as he said. Defendant then had anal intercourse with her. Because she was crying she said defendant gagged her. While she was gagged he started sweeping her body with an old broom that had been lying in the room and beat her with a flexible nozzle wrapped in a curtain. She testified that she screamed as much as she could with a gag on. He then untied her, tried to kiss her and again told her to orally copulate or he would harm her more. She testified to what she considered further deviate sexual acts over her protests.

She related that then they had normal sex and thereafter he took the broom and stuck the handle in her vagina during the course of which she was hysterical and kept screaming and asking him to stop.

She said she told him she was getting cold and he then let her go to the car for a sweater. She tried to open the garage door but could not. While she was getting her sweater she also removed her car keys from his pants pocket where he had put them. She took his clothes out of the car, put the keys on the floor of the car, shut the car door and locked the passenger side. She then returned to the room. She said she was required to again engage in deviate sexual conduct nad did not resist because she was afraid. She testified that she then asked if she could go to the car again and that he permitted her. He was drowsy. She was making small noises to see if he could hear her; it was very dark. He told her to come back; when she looked in the room he was asleep. She ran out, dressed, and after having difficuly working the lock she finally got the garage opened and drove off after shutting it.

She said that she then telephoned her girl friend Rosemary Camden but she was not there. She then called a mutual friend, Williard Merritt, and told him she had been raped and beaten, then she locked herself in the car and waited to be picked up. Merritt did so immediately and took her to Rosemary's home and stayed with her until her friend arrived. She said that she also told Rosemary of the beating and rape, mentioning that 'Donald' had done it.

Merritt testified that when he picked her up she was screaming and that he observed that her face was swollen and putty colored and her eye was starting to turn black. He also said she was crying.

Rosemary Camden testified that she spent the afternoon of October 26th trying to calm the complaining witness. Later she suggested that it was a matter for the police. A detective whom the complaining witness's friend knew was called and took statements.

In rebuttal testimony the complaining witness said that she had never had any discussion with defendant regarding bondage or trying up and that before the day in question defendant had never placed his penis in her anus nor had she ever placed her mouth upon his penis.

Defendant testified, essentially, that the complaining witness willingly engaged in a form of sexual experimentation, willingly engaged in normal intercourse after she was untied, came into the garage and left it voluntarily. He testified that they had had relations ten or more times prior to October 26th, including oral and anal sex.

Defendant related that on the evening of October 25th, the complaining witness had talked to her boy friend in California for more than 50 minutes, was crying and upset; that they discussed where to go to have sex and that she agreed to go to the garage; that after arriving there they argued about the friend in California and defendant slapped the prosecutrix when she continued to cry and was somewhat hysterical. He said that she then calmed down, that each took off their clothes, and went naked into the trash room. He explained that they had discussed 'tying up' and various sexual activities on previous occasions. He said she held the newspapers in place as he tied her; that he tied a gag in her mouth to simulate the phantasy; that they had normal sexual intercourse after which he fell asleep; that when he awoke she was gone but that his clothes were folded on a box near the wall. He denied he struck her with a broom or nozzle and denied he inserted a broom into her vagina. He said that the other portion of the broom was used but for a light sweeping of her body to evoke sexual sensitivity.

The doctor who examined the complaining witness after the incident was reported to the authorities testified at the trial. He indicated that there was no evidence of bleeding or abrasion in or around the vaginal canal, anal area or perineal area.

A prior conviction of defendant for robbery in 1971 for which he spent nine months in prison was introduced to impeach his credibility.

At the conclusion of the trial the judge said that he believed the complaining witness, believed that there was a forcible rape and that there were two acts of deviate sexual conduct, and that he did not believe that the defendant was a credible witness in his own behalf. He concluded that forcible rape and deviate sexual conduct were not what was 'bargained for' in the fact situation before him.

Defendant first argues that he was not proven guilty of rape and deviate sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, in view of the prior relationship between himself and the complainant, her failure to sufficiently resist, the medical evidence contradicting her testimony regarding force, and a lapse of time before her complaint was made to the police.

It is an essential element of rape that the proof must show that the act was against the will of the complaint but a determination of the amount of resistance required must be made from the facts and circumstances of each particular case. (People v. Montgomery, 19 Ill.App.3d 206, 210, 311 N.E.2d 361 (1974); People v. Boatman, 3 Ill.App.3d 652, 656, 279 N.E.2d 425 (1972).) If the complaining witness has the use of her faculties and physical powers the evidence must show such resistance as will demonstrate that the act was against her will. (People v. Boatman, 3 Ill.App.3d 652, 656, 279 N.E.2d 425; see also People v. Smith, 8 Ill.App.3d 36, 39, 288 N.E.2d 694 (1972).) If the victim retains the power to resist, her voluntary submission, no matter how reluctantly yielded, constitutes consent. (People v. Chambers, 127 Ill.App.2d 215, 221--222, 262 N.E.2d 170 (1970).) However, resistance is not required where it would be futile and would endanger the life of the victim or where the victim is overcome by superior strength or paralyzed by fear. People v. Jones, 28 Ill.App.3d 896, 329 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1975); People v. Flournoy, 1 Ill.App.3d 918, 921, 275 N.E.2d 289 (1971). See also People v. Borak, 13 Ill.App.3d 815, 818, 301 N.E.2d 1 (1973); People v. Chambers, 127 Ill.App.2d 215, 221--222, 262 N.E.2d 170.

It is also clearly established that where a conviction for rape depends upon the testimony of the complainant it must be clear and convincing or corroborated by other evidence. (People v. Simental, 11 Ill.App.3d 537, 541, 297 N.E.2d 356 (1973); People v. Jones, 28 Ill.App.3d 896, 329 N.E.2d 855, 859 (1975); People v. Jackson, 3 Ill.App.3d 303, 306, 279 N.E.2d 8 (1971).) Equally familiar is the rule that a court of review will not set aside a finding of guilt unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding or so unreasonably improbable or unsatisfactory as to cause reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. People v. Reese, 54 Ill.2d 51, 57--58, 294 N.E.2d 288 (1973).

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14 cases
  • People v. Clark
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 4, 1979
    ...County funds. However, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded otherwise. See, People v. Wilcox, 33 Ill.App.3d 432, 438, 337 N.E.2d 211 (1975). The loans came shortly after Clark had requested the county board to designate MICHIGAN as a depository. As the count......
  • People v. Witte
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 20, 1983
    ...turns on the complainant's testimony, it must be clear and convincing, or corroborated by other evidence. (People v. Wilcox, 33 Ill.App.3d 432, 436, 337 N.E.2d 211 (1975).) When the victim retains the power to resist, voluntary submission, however reluctant, constitutes consent. (People v. ......
  • People v. Jackson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 28, 1987
    ...sexual gratification. Defendant's intentions may be inferred from his actions and the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Wilcox (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 432, 337 N.E.2d 211.) The State contends that no other inference can be drawn from defendant's conduct except that he was attempting to ob......
  • People v. Visgar
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 20, 1983
    ...could and did cross-examine. Accord People v. Leggans (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 51, 35 Ill.Dec. 515, 399 N.E.2d 349; People v. Wilcox (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 432, 337 N.E.2d 211. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago AFFIRMED. HOPF and NASH, JJ., concur. ...
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