People v. Wilcox

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BUTZEL
• Citation: People v. Wilcox, 303 Mich. 287, 6 N.W.2d 518 (Mich. 1942)
• Decision Date: 24 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 52.,52.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WILCOX et al.

303 Mich. 287

6 N.W.2d 518

PEOPLE

v.WILCOX et al.

No. 52.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 24, 1942.

Thomas C. Wilcox and others were convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice, and the named defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Earl C. Pugsley, Judge.

Before the entire bench, except WIEST and BOYLES, JJ.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Thomas A. Kenney, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Chester P. O'Hara, Sp. Pros. Atty., of Detroit, for the People.

George S. Fitzgerald and Frank G. Schemanske, both of Detroit, for defendants and appellants.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Thomas C. Wilcox, one of the defendants in the case of People v. McCrea et al., Mich., 6 N.W.2d 489, filed a separate appeal. It is presented together with the separate appeals of other co-defendants, and comes to us on the same record that was presented in the appeals of Mr. McCrea and the other separate appellants. In the opinions filed this day in the appeals of defendant McCrea and other co-defendants (People v. McCrea, 6 N.W.2d 489;People v. Malone, 6 N.W.2d 521;People v. Staebler, 6 N.W.2d 522;People v. Stambaugh, 6 N.W. 522;People v. Way, 6 N.W.2d 523;People v. Scaduto, 6 N.W.2d 525;People v. Garska, 6 N.W.2d 527), we discussed and decided almost all of what we regard as the important questions raised by appellant on his appeal. We, therefore, find it unnecessary to repeat what was said in the opinions deciding the appeals of McCrea and others, but include what was said therein by reference and without repetition. There are but few other questions raised by appellant Wilcox that in our opinion require discussion.

The general outline of the charges against appellant Wilcox and others is set forth in the statement of fact in the McCrea opinion. As the question of the weight of the evidence only was raised by appellants McCrea, Garska and Scaduto and not by appellant Wilcox or any of the other co-defendants, it becomes unnecessary to go into more detail in this opinion in regard to the testimony offered by the prosecution.

Appellant claims, that, as the Honorable Homer Ferguson Circuit Judge was designated to make an investigation into certain conditions claimed to have existed in Wayne County, thus he was limited in scope in inquiring into gambling conditions; that he could not investigate other vice conditions. Unfortunately, the petition and order for the investigation have not been included in the record. The petition for the investigation of suspected offenses was made in accordance with 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 17217 (Stat.Ann. § 28.943). The special prosecutor, however, calls our attention to the fact that the petition has been before us in other cases and that we considered it in Re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652, 655. The petition, as shown in the Watson case, was ‘for the purpose of investigating the existence of gambling and the possible protection thereof by any officials in Wayne county, and matters relating thereto, including any failure to enforce the criminal law prohibiting gambling and the operation of gambling institutions or places, and the possible connection between such enterprises and law enforcement officials.’ Through an abundance of caution, we have sent for the original petition and find that it stresses the corruption of law-enforcing officials in connection with such gambling. It further states that there was probable cause to suspect that certain crimes, causes and misdemeanors had been committed within the county of Wayne, State of Michigan, and particularly that such gambling has been permitted with the knowledge and consent of law-enforcing officials.

Appellant claims that a one man grand jury having been appointed for the special purpose of investigating gambling could not go on a ‘fishing expedition’ to investigate crime in general. Section 17217, 3 Comp.Laws 1929 (Stat.Ann. § 28.943) reads as follows: ‘Whenever by reason of the filing of any complaint, which may be upon information and belief, any justice of the peace, police judge or judge of a court of record shall have probable cause to suspect that any crime, offense, misdemeanor or violation of any city ordinance shall have been committed within his jurisdiction, and that any person may be able to give any material evidence respecting such offense, such justice or judge in his discretion may, and upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, or city attorney in the case of suspected violation of ordinances, shall require such person to attend before him as a witness and answer such questions as such justice or judge may require concerning any violation of law about which he may be questioned; and the proceedings to summon such witness and to compel him to testify shall, as far as possible, be the same as proceedings to summon witnesses and compel their attendance and testimony, and such witnesses shall be entitled to the same compensation as in other criminal proceedings.’ The prosecution claims that the statute does not restrict the scope of the investigation when once begun. The question before us in the instant case is further limited to the query whether, in an investigation involving corruption and connivance of public officials in permitting commercialized gambling, if the testimony develops that the same persons who exacted payments from gambling houses also collected from the operators of houses of prostitution and other illegal enterprises and paid all of such sums to the same officials, an indictment should not include the entire conspiracy and all the conspirators.

In the case of Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 373, 50 L.Ed. 652, Mr. Justice Brown quoted with approval from a lecture given by Mr. Justice Wilson of the United States Supreme Court as follows: ‘It has been alleged that grand juries are confined, in their inquiries, to the bills offered to them, to the crimes given them in charge, and to the evidence brought before them by the prosecutor. But these conceptions are much too contracted; they present but a very imperfect and unsatisfactory view of the duty required from grand jurors, and of the trust reposed in them. They are not appointed for the prosecutor or for the court; they are appointed for the government and for the people; and of both the government and people it is surely the concernment that, on one hand, all crimes, whether given or not given in charge, whether described or not described with professional skill, should receive the punishment which the law denounces.’ The testimony shows that the conspiracy was for the purpose of collecting money from all types of illegal business including vice. The one-man grand jury did not exceed its authority.

Appellant Wilcox claims it was error to introduce testimony in regard to the suicide of Mrs. Janet McDonald and the murder of her child, and the letters she left claiming corruption of public officers. It was shown that defendant McCrea not only refused to do anything in regard to the charges but even attempted to stop an investigation. This became very material as far as defendant McCrea was concerned and the testimony was admitted as to defendant McCrea. The court distinctly stated that the testimony in regard to Mr. McCrea's conversation with Mr. Dowling could not be binding on anyone except defendant McCrea until the conspiracy was established. The court repeated this statement. The testimony was material as far as McCrea was concerned and properly received in evidence. It is true that frequently testimony, introduced in a conspiracy case, may not be binding upon all of the conspirators, but nevertheless it may be material in the proofs against some defendants and if the...