People v. Wilder

• Decision Date: 09 March 1970
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 383 Mich. 122,174 N.W.2d 562
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis WILDER, a/k/a Pridano Salvage, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 562

174 N.W.2d 562

383 Mich. 122

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis WILDER, a/k/a Pridano Salvage, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 9, 1970.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Patricia J. Pernick, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

George E. Lee, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

DETHMERS, Justice.

The trial judge, sitting as trier of the facts without a jury, found defendant guilty of felonious assault as charged. The judge wrote a lengthy opinion giving his findings of fact and stating the reasons therefor.

During the trial defendant was represented by counsel and the people by an assistant prosecuting attorney. The judge asked a great many questions of the witnesses on both sides, totalling in number more than those asked by counsel.

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. In so doing the Court of Appeals, in its opinion, stated:

'While a trial judge may ask questions of witnesses now and then for the purpose of clarifying points that appear obscure, and the supplying of facts omitted, which the interest of justice requires, comments, extensive examination, and action reflecting partiality on the part of the trial judge constitute grounds for reversible error. People v. Cole (1957), 349 Mich. 175, 84 N.W.2d 711; Wheeler v. Wallace (1884), 53 Mich. 355, 19 N.W. 33; People v. Young (1961), 364 Mich. 554, 111 N.W.2d 870.' 11 Mich.App. 152, 160 N.W.2d 749.

The cited cases involved jury trials. The Court concluded its opinion with the following paragraph:

'In this trial, the examination conducted by the court was extremely thorough and exhaustive. Good and sufficient reason may be present for this. However, a criminal matter is essentially an adversary proceeding and when the character of the judicial examination removes the adversary nature from the proceeding, reversible error follows.'

The Court of Appeals did not point to any specific questions asked by the judge as being unfair or prejudicial nor did it say that any were. Neither do we, from examination of the record, find that any were. That leaves the Court of Appeals reversal resting on a finding that the judge asked witnesses more questions than counsel did, that this stripped the proceedings of their adversary nature, and that that constituted reversible error. We do not agree with such concept under the record in this case, showing no intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair or partial questions being asked by the judge. No bias on the judge's part is disclosed by the record during the questioning at the trial.

A jury might well be unfavorably influenced against the defendant in a criminal case by the nature of the questions asked by the trial judge, the manner of his questioning and his apparent reaction thereto. Here there is nothing to suggest that the judge, as trier of the facts, was improperly influenced by the character of his questions propounded to the witness or the method of asking them or other demeanor of the judge. To suppose this would be ludicrous indeed.

The only question presented to the Court of Appeals, and now to this Court...