People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 July 2018
• Docket Number: 108026,109016
• Citation: 163 A.D.3d 1160,80 N.Y.S.3d 547
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Naquan S. WILLIAMS, Also Known as Crome, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

163 A.D.3d 1160

80 N.Y.S.3d 547

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Naquan S. WILLIAMS, Also Known as Crome, Appellant.

108026

109016

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: May 29, 2018

Decided and Entered: July 12, 2018

Stephen W. Herrick, Public Defender, Albany (Jessica M. Gorman of counsel), for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Emily A. Schultz of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Clark, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Garry, P.J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.), rendered April 3, 2015 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered December 9, 2016 in Albany County, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing.

Defendant was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree after a controlled transaction in which he sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant (hereinafter CI). He rejected a plea bargain that would have required him to plead guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in exchange for a sentence of two years in prison followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Later, he accepted a second agreement by which he pleaded guilty to the same offense in exchange for a prison term of four years followed by three years of postrelease supervision. He subsequently withdrew his guilty plea. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to a prison term of 14 years followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Thereafter, acting pro se, he filed a CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate the judgment of conviction, which Supreme Court denied without a hearing. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the order denying his CPL 440.10 motion.

Defendant contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence in that the People failed to prove his identity as the seller. The legal insufficiency claim is unpreserved, as defendant's motion for a trial order of dismissal was not specifically based upon the identification issue (see People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 [1995] ; People v. Green, 141 A.D.3d 1036, 1037, 36 N.Y.S.3d 312 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1072, 47 N.Y.S.3d 231, 69 N.E.3d 1027 [2016] ). Nevertheless, defendant's challenge to the weight of the evidence requires this Court to determine whether each element of the charged crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ; People v. Scippio, 144 A.D.3d 1184, 1185, 41 N.Y.S.3d 563 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1150, 52 N.Y.S.3d 302, 74 N.E.3d 687 [2017] ).

At trial, a detective of the City of Albany Police Department (hereinafter the detective) testified that he met with the CI before the transaction and searched him to ensure that he was not carrying contraband. The CI then placed a telephone call to a person whom he called Crome, followed by an exchange of text messages. The detective listened to the telephone call and testified that he recognized the speaker's voice as that of defendant, whom he had met on several previous occasions. The detective then drove the CI to a spot near the prearranged location, equipped him with a digital recording device and gave him cash for the purchase. A second detective testified that he watched the CI constantly for about 20 minutes while he waited for defendant's arrival, and that the CI did not interact with anyone during this period. A vehicle that the detective described as "a gold Volvo XE 90 with chrome rims" then arrived at the designated location, and the CI got into the car briefly. The detective recognized the driver as defendant, and he also recognized the Volvo, having made a previous traffic stop in which defendant was driving that vehicle. He was located about 37 yards away. Although the transaction took place after sunset, he testified that the Volvo was parked directly under a street light, making it possible for him to see defendant's features clearly through the vehicle's windows. He identified defendant in court as the person who was driving the Volvo, and stated that there was no one else in the car.

After the transaction, the CI returned to the detective's vehicle and handed over a substance that proved to be crack cocaine. A second search of his person revealed no contraband. Defendant was driving a different vehicle when he was arrested some eight months later, but the detective testified that the car contained paperwork from a Volvo dealership referencing the Volvo and including defendant's name. A third detective who did not participate in the controlled transaction testified that he later listened to an audio recording of the transaction and recognized the seller's voice as that of defendant, whom he had known since the mid–1990s and with whom he had previously interacted 50 to 100 times. He stated that defendant's voice was distinctive and identified him in court.

The CI's testimony about the transaction was consistent with that of the detectives. He stated that he had known defendant only as Crome until he learned defendant's name from police when he identified his photograph shortly before the transaction. He knew defendant's phone number because he had used it to contact him on previous occasions. He described the vehicle where the transaction occurred as a "jeep Volvo," acknowledged that he had previously described it only as a "jeep" and stated that he was familiar with the vehicle because he had been in it "many times." He identified defendant in court as the person whom he had formerly known as Crome and from whom he had bought drugs in the controlled transaction.

The CI testified that he had agreed to engage in the transaction because he "had two sales [himself]" and that he had received a favorable sentence in exchange for his cooperation. On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he was at risk of being sentenced as a persistent felon if he had not cooperated with police, that he had violated the terms of his contract by continuing to sell drugs while working as a CI and that police had nevertheless permitted him to continue to work for them. He also stated on cross-examination that he had obtained the drugs that he sold in the other transactions from defendant, and he added on redirect that he had purchased drugs from defendant "a lot of times." Finally, the CI described an incident in which a private investigator had visited him while he was incarcerated and had tried unsuccessfully to persuade him to sign an affidavit stating that he had bought the drugs in the controlled transaction from someone other than defendant.

Defendant asserts that the detective's identification is unreliable because of the dark and distance, and further, that the identification testimony of the other witnesses is unworthy of belief. If the jury had accepted these arguments, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable. Thus, this Court must "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" to determine whether the jury gave the evidence the weight that it should have been accorded ( People v. Scippio, 144 A.D.3d at 1185, 41 N.Y.S.3d 563 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord People v. Cruz, 152 A.D.3d 822, 823, 57 N.Y.S.3d 753 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1018, 70 N.Y.S.3d 451, 93 N.E.3d 1215 [2017] ). Upon our review, deferring to the jury's credibility assessments and viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we are persuaded that the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v. Scott, 129 A.D.3d 1306, 1307, 12 N.Y.S.3d 335 [2015], lvs denied 26 N.Y.3d 1089, 1092, 23 N.Y.S.3d 646, 649, 44 N.E.3d 944, 947 [2015]; People v. Watkins, 121 A.D.3d 1425, 1426, 995 N.Y.S.2d 803 [2014], lvs denied 24 N.Y.3d 1123, 1124, 3 N.Y.S.3d 765, 27 N.E.3d 479 [2015] ).

We reject defendant's contention that the identification evidence should not have been admitted in the absence of a Rodriguez hearing to test the witnesses' claims of prior familiarity with defendant. Defendant requested a Rodriguez hearing for the first time on the first day of trial. Supreme Court was authorized to summarily deny this untimely request, and, as defendant made no showing of good cause for the delay, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to entertain the motion (see CPL 255.20[1], [3] ; see generally People v. Jackson, 48 A.D.3d 891, 893, 851 N.Y.S.2d 677 [2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 841, 859 N.Y.S.2d 400, 889 N.E.2d 87 [2008] ; People v. Sheremet, 41 A.D.3d 1038, 1039–1040, 838 N.Y.S.2d 251 [2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 881, 842 N.Y.S.2d 793, 874 N.E.2d 760 [2007] ).

Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial by Supreme Court's admission of alleged improper testimony. Initially, we reject the claim that the detective's testimony about his previous contacts with defendant was inadmissible. Contrary to defendant's assertion, no Molineux hearing was required, as the challenged testimony did not describe any uncharged crimes or bad acts; the detective merely stated that he had encountered defendant on several occasions before the controlled transaction, without mention of arrests or other crime-related conduct. Even if, as defendant suggests, the testimony was prejudicial because the jury could have inferred that defendant had been involved in other criminal activity, the detective's testimony provided necessary background information explaining his ability to identify defendant (see People v. McCommons, 143 A.D.3d 1150, 1153, 40...