People v. Williams
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | Justices QUINN and CONNORS concurred in the judgment and opinion. |
| Citation | People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, 982 N.E.2d 181, 367 Ill.Dec. 503 (Ill. App. 2012) |
| Decision Date | 12 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1–11–2251.,Nos. 1–11–1145,s. 1–11–1145 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Carl WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Recognized as Unconstitutional
S.H.A. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(ii)Michael L. Sklar, P.C. (Michael L. Sklar, of counsel), and Ungaretti & Harris LLP (John Ruskusky, Timothy E. Horton, Maura M. McIntyre, and Brittany A. Smith, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, William L. Tofenetti, and Mary P. Needham, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Here we are called upon to determine whether the denial of defendant Carl Williams' petition for an evidentiary hearing to show actual innocence should be reversed. We are also required to determine whether the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), prohibiting mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles should be retroactively applied. We answer yes to both issues.
¶ 2 Defendant appeals the dismissal of two of his successive petitions (third and fourth petitions) for relief under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2010)). In his third petition, which the circuit court reviewed as a second-stage proceeding under the Act, defendant made a claim of actual innocence, and claimed that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that he was arrested without probable cause. The circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss his third petition. In his motion for leave to file his fourth petition, defendant alleged that his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional. The circuit court denied him leave to file his fourth petition. At issue is whether defendant has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights have been violated such that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims in his third petition; and whether defendant has satisfied the cause-and-prejudice requirements codified under section 122–1(f) of the Act such that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to file his fourth petition challenging his sentence. 725 ILCS 5/122–1(f) (West 2010).
¶ 4 On March 15, 2011, the circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss defendant's third petition. Defendant timely appealed on April 12, 2011. On that same day, defendant sought leave from the circuit court to file his fourth petition, which sought to modify his sentence. On June 28, 2011, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file his fourth petition. Defendant timely appealed on July 28, 2011. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 602, 606(a), and 651. Ill. S.Ct. R. 602 ( ); R. 606 (eff. Mar. 20, 2009); R. 651 (eff. Apr. 26, 2012). On August 30, 2011, this court granted defendant's motion to consolidate the appeals under case number 1–11–1145.
¶ 6 All pertinent factual background concerning defendant's trial and initial appeal is well stated in this court's 1999 opinion. People v. Williams, 305 Ill.App.3d 517, 238 Ill.Dec. 779, 712 N.E.2d 883 (1999). Pertinent factual background concerning defendant's first three postconviction petitions is well stated in this court's 2009 opinion. People v. Williams, 392 Ill.App.3d 359, 331 Ill.Dec. 218, 910 N.E.2d 627 (2009). Below, we will discuss relevant facts from defendant's third petition and from this court's 2009 opinion.
¶ 8 In January of 2008, defendant, represented by counsel, filed a motion for leave to file his third petition. In his third petition, based on new affidavits and facts he obtained, he argued he should be granted leave to file his petition in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice based on his actual innocence. Specifically, he argued that the newly discovered evidence, i.e., the descriptions of the alleged fifth perpetrator provided by his codefendants in their affidavits, combined with his ex-girlfriend Tameka Johnson's affidavit which provided an alibi for defendant, supported his claim of actual innocence. He also argued that the State withheld exculpatory evidence from him in violation of his right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by not disclosing statements favorable to him from three out of his four codefendants,1 and that there was insufficient factual justification to support probable cause for his warrantless arrest. Defendant alleged he was not able to discover the new evidence sooner because he was hampered by the difficulties of communicating between prisons, by his codefendants' and his ex-girlfriend's refusals to help him, and because the witness who told the police about defendant's whereabouts, Clinton Taylor, gave the police an alias, i.e., Larry McGee. To support his petition, defendant attached the affidavits of his codefendants Zarice Johnson, Stanley Hamelin, and Scott Chambers; his attorney at trial, Stephen Richards; and his ex-girlfriend Tameka Johnson; his own affidavit; an identity sheet from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC); an affidavit showing his attempts to secure the newly discovered evidence; and the unpublished order denying his second petition.2
¶ 9 Codefendant Johnson attested that there were four other perpetrators besides himself involved in the crime for which he was convicted; Hamelin, Brown, Chambers, and a person that he did not know (hereinafter, the fifth person). At the time of the incident, he sat next to the fifth person in the backseat of Brown's car for approximately an hour or two. He described the fifth person's appearance as “very dark skinned, wore a full untrimmed beard, was of slim athletic build and over six feet in height.” He remembered the fifth perpetrator's height because “he had much difficulty getting his large body out of the back seat of the * * * car” and that “[o]nce out of the car his frame was much taller than I would have stood and I'm 5'9?.” Once Johnson was arrested, he was separated from his codefendants and “left in a dark room for what seemed like several hours.” He was shown photographs by the police of the other perpetrator. He identified Hamelin, Brown, and Chambers, but was unable to identify the photograph of the alleged fifth perpetrator. Johnson attested, “I repeatedly told the interrogating detectives that the person in the remaining photo was not the tall, dark skinned, bearded man that sat next to me in Brown's car,” and that he did not know the person in the photograph. The police “insisted” he was wrong and told him that Hamelin and Chambers had identified the fifth perpetrator as the person shown in the photograph. Johnson also attested that the police hit and slapped him, and at one point hit him with a telephone book. Johnson agreed to sign a confession implicatingthe alleged fifth perpetrator to end the physical abuse from the police and to protect himself. He insisted that the police did not have the correct fifth perpetrator, but the police and assistant State's Attorney (ASA) told him “it didn't matter because the others had identified him.” Johnson also attested that he did not know who “Larry McGee” was, and he was not in the car with him when he was arrested.
¶ 10 Johnson acknowledged that he did receive communications from defendant asking for help, but did not respond “because I didn't want to open up this very painful chapter in my life and I was very bitter about what happened to me.” He also doubted that he would be able to help or that defendant's efforts would be successful. He did not agree to help defendant until he met defendant's brother in prison “[s]ometime in 2001 or 2002.” Defendant's brother was released, but he did not hear from defendant “for another year or so.” He “didn't respond for the same reasons as before.” A friend of defendant's eventually contacted him in “early 2006.” Johnson informed her that he would not help defendant unless a “professional person” became involved.
¶ 11 Hamelin, in his affidavit, attested that he does not know defendant. The first time he saw defendant was when the police showed him a photograph. He attested that he told the police that he did not know the person in the photograph shown to him. He further stated that the police coerced him into identifying defendant as the fifth perpetrator with threats and physical beatings. Hamelin also attested that the police told him that his accomplices had also identified defendant as the fifth perpetrator. He only agreed to implicate defendant to stop the police from physically abusing him further. Hamelin attested that he described the fifth perpetrator to the police as “a very light skinned man with very long hair who was tall around 6'1–6'3 in height.” However, he was told by the police “to forget that and agree that it was [defendant].”
¶ 12 Chambers, in his affidavit, attested that he also did not know the fifth perpetrator. He only knew that the fifth perpetrator was a friend of Brown's, “who was called ‘Carl’ by Brown.” Chambers attested that in the statement he gave to Detective Winstead, he “described this ‘Carl’ from my memory as about 6 foot 1 to 6 foot 3 in height, light skinned and with very long hair reaching down to his shoulders.” Chambers attested that the police provided him with a photograph of the person whom they thought was the fifth perpetrator. Later he viewed the alleged fifth perpetrator in person. Chambers told the police that the person shown to him in the photograph and in person was not the “ ‘Carl’ ” that he described to...
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