People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 14 May 1959
• Parties: , 159 N.E.2d 549 PEOPLE of the State of New, York, Respondent, v. Walter WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 750

187 N.Y.S.2d 750

6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E.2d 549

PEOPLE of the State of New, York, Respondent, v. Walter WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 14, 1959.

David Kashman, Brooklyn, and Matthew M. Brandenburg, New York City, for appellant.

Frank D. O'Connor, Dist. Atty., Long Island City (Benj. J. Jacobson, Long Island City, of counsel), for respondent.

CONWAY, Chief Judge.

The defendant Walter Williams was convicted of selling a quantity of heroin at his home to one James Giles on the evening of July 17, 1956. Giles, the principal witness for the People, testified to the actual sale by the defendant, and his testimony was substantially as follows. At about 5:30 p. m. on the day in question Giles telephoned the defendant at his home and, during a cryptic conversation in which they spoke in terms of laundry, the defendant told Giles how to come by bus to his home in East Elmhurst, Long Island. Giles came from Manhattan to the defendant's home and arrived there at approximately 7:00 p. m. He was greeted at the door by the defendant, and the two of them went into the defendant's living room where he received a package of heroin from the defendant for which he paid s10 and promised $10 more. They had a conversation during which the defendant told Giles that one Jackson, from whom Giles had been buying narcotics, had been drinking heavily and was no longer responsible. He told Giles that he was thereafter to buy the narcotics from the defendant himself or his wife at their home, and that Giles was to call him before coming to his home but was never to speak in terms of narcotics but rather in terms of laundry, washing windows or something to that effect. Giles left by the back entrance, returned to Manhattan by bus, and at 125th Street and Lexington Avenue entered a taxicab when he was apprehended by three detectives who had followed him from defendant's home. Except for the actual purchase in the defendant's home, Giles' testimony was substantially corroborated by three detectives, assigned to the Narcotics Squad, who had been keeping the defendant's home under surveillance. These detectives testified that they monitored a tap on the defendant's telephone pursuant to court order for what appears to have been at least 15 days before the day in question; that they waited for Giles to come to the defendant's home and kept him under observation as he went to, and entered, the defendant's home; and that they followed Giles as he left the defendant's home and along his bus trip to Manhattan where they apprehended him, took him to the police station, and found on his person a package of white powder which proved to be heroin. Other witnesses for the People testified to such things as the affidavit upon the basis of which a Supreme Court Justice signed an order authorizing a wire tap on the defendant's phone, the installation of the wire-tap equipment, the analysis of the white powder found on Giles' person, and the arrest of the defendant on August 28, 1956.

At the trial the credibility of Giles was strenuously attacked by defense counsel. One attempt at impeachment was based upon Giles' history of narcotic addiction. For about five years prior to the sale in question, Giles had been addicted to the daily use of heroin by introducing the drug hypodermically into his veins and muscles. However, he took no such injections on the day in question nor at any time thereafter up to and including the day he testified. He had been in jail all of this time a period of about four months. After his arrest on the day of the sale the police did permit him to receive two injections of 'dope' at Bellevue Hospital. But at no time since then had he received in any manner a narcotic drug of any kind. Furthermore, he testified at the trial that he was no longer addicted to narcotics. This was the posture of the case relating to Giles' addiction when the defendant called a physician to the stand to give testimony on the effects of narcotic addiction upon the veracity of addicts.

The questions propounded to this doctor were extremely vague. Thus, defense counsel asked the doctor to give his opinion on the 'characteristics' and 'personality changes' of an addict, and on whether 'a person addicted to (drugs) is as a mainliner can testify to facts in a normal manner'. Prosecution objections were sustained. The Trial Judge appears to have been most patient in this matter, and he made several attempts to ascertain the purpose of these questions. Defense counsel first explained his purpose in this way: 'My purpose is this, your Honor. The question of the credibility of the witness Giles based on medical experience and opinion of this doctor.' His next explanation was that part of his purpose was to have the doctor testify as to whether or not Giles was telling the truth. Later he told the court, 'I want him to give us a medical opinion as to the characteristics of a person who is addicted to heroin as a mainliner', and he said, 'I submit I have a right to show this Jury by medical proof that a person such as Giles who is addicted to heroin, because of his condition is not worthy of belief.' And his last explanation was: 'I'm not talking about credibility, your Honor. I'm talking about medical opinion.' Throughout the examination of this witness and the intervening colloquies, the Trial Judge insisted that this witness could not pass upon the credibility of another witness, and that Giles' credibility was solely for the jury to determine. It is upon this record that appellate counsel now strenuously argues that the exclusion of this doctor's testimony is prejudicial error.

It is a cardinal and well-settled principle that offers of proof must be made clearly and unambiguously. 'Before a party excepts on account of the rejection of evidence, he should make the offer in such plain and unequivocal terms as to leave no room for debate about what was intended. If he fail to do so, and leave the offer fairly open to two constructions, he has no right to insist, in a court of review, upon that construction which is most favorable to himself, unless it appears that it was so understood by the court which rejected the evidence.' Daniels v. Patterson, 3 N.Y. 47, 51, emphasis added; see, also, Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N.Y. 56, 60-61; Young v. Anthony, 119 App.Div. 612, 618, 104 N.Y.S. 87, 91 (dissenting opinion); 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice, pp. 540-541. And the eloquence of appellate counsel must bend to the weight of the record whether it be favorable or unfavorable to his argument. We have carefully examined this record to ascertain the Trial Judge's understanding of the offers of proof here. He repeatedly ruled that this doctor could not testify flatly that Giles was not telling the truth. We discover further, during defense counsel's summation, a statement by the Trial Judge that the main purpose of this doctor was 'to establish that an addict could not tell the truth.' The record permits no broader review in this regard, therefore, than upon the following two questions: Was it error for the Trial Judge to exclude the doctor's testimony (1) that mainliners addicted to heroin are unworthy of belief; and (2) that, therefore, Giles was unworthy of belief? There is no question properly presented here regarding the admissibility of expert testimony of the effects of narcotic addiction upon the memory or perceptive powers of the addict.

Taking the second question first, we hold that the Trial Judge was clearly correct in refusing to permit the doctor to testify flatly that Giles' testimony was not entitled to credit. Just as the Trial Judge rules, whether or not Giles was telling the truth was a conclusion to be drawn solely by the jury, and an opinion which was exclusively their province to render. Upon this point there can be no doubt, and accordingly this court is unanimous in so holding. Returning to the first question, that is the one concerning which we are not all in agreement. The only proof here, as noted earlier, is that Giles had taken no narcotics of any kind for about four months before the trial, and that he was no longer addicted to drugs. However, defense counsel attempted to show that Giles was still using narcotics by describing to the doctor Giles' behavior on the witness stand and asking him whether such behavior evidenced the influence of, or addiction to, narcotics. A prosecution objection was sustained. In view of this, we assume that the doctor would have been able to testify affirmatively, and accordingly we reach the question of whether a doctor may testify that narcotic addicts are unworthy of belief in the sense that they are, in the words of appellate counsel, pathological liars.

We have carefully examined numerous authorities upon the subject of impeachment of witnesses by proof of drug addiction and its effects. See Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 34 S.Ct. 347, 58 L.Ed. 728; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. McKenna, 8 Cir., 74 F.2d 155, 158; Kelly v. Maryland Casualty Co., D.C., 45 F.2d 782, affirmed D.C., 45 F.2d 788; People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 34 N.E. 730; Standard Oil Co. v. Carter, 210 Ala. 572, 98 So. 575; People v. Bell, 138 Cal.App.2d 7, 10, 291 P.2d 150; Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262, 49 P.2d 381; Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 1038, 128 So. 1; Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162, 183, 9 So. 448; Gordon v. Gilmore, 141 Ga. 347, 80 S.E. 1007; State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 P. 233, L.R.A.1916F, 1198; People v. Hamby, 6 Ill.2d 559, 129 N.E.2d 746; People v. Crump, 5 Ill.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615, 52 A.L.R.2d 834; Williams v. United States, 6 Ind.Terr. 1, 88 S.W. 334; State v. Prentice, 192 Iowa 207, 183 N.W. 411, 15 A.L.R. 904; Markowitz v. Markowitz, Mo.App., 290 S.W. 119, 122; State v. King, 88 Minn. 175, 92 N.W. 965; State v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 P. 998, 31 L.R.A. 294; Effinger v. Effinger, 48 Nev. 205, 228 P. 615, 239 P. 801; State v. Juliano, 103 N.J.L. 663, 138...