People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 27 October 2016
• Citation: 145 A.D.3d 100,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07102,40 N.Y.S.3d 94
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christian WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

145 A.D.3d 100

40 N.Y.S.3d 94

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07102

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Christian WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Oct. 27, 2016.

Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Anita Aboagye–Agyeman and Alexandra Keeling of counsel), for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Beth Fisch Cohen of counsel), for respondent.

TOM, J.P., RENWICK, ANDRIAS, GESMER, JJ.

TOM, J.

The Court of Appeals, in its remittitur of this case(People v. Williams,27 N.Y.3d 212, 32 N.Y.S.3d 17, 51 N.E.3d 528[2016], revg.123 A.D.3d 240, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559[1st Dept.2014] ), asks this Court to decide whether defendant's unpreserved challenge to the validity of his plea should be reviewed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (id. at 224, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559 ).

After his arrest and indictment on drug sale charges, defendant entered into a negotiated plea bargain.In exchange for his guilty plea, defendant was promised a three-year determinate sentence followed by a two-year period of postrelease supervision with the proviso that he not commit another crime before sentence was pronounced, among other conditions.The court and the parties mistakenly believed that the three-year sentence was the minimum permissible sentence.

During the plea colloquy, the court explicitly advised defendant that if he violated the conditions, “I don't have to give you the three years with the two years.I might, but I don't have to, and I could theoretically sentence you up to 12 years.”In response to the court's questions, defendant stated that he understood and that he had spoken to his counsel about the plea deal and understood the conditions of the plea and the consequences of failing to fulfill them.

The three-year prison term was not a sentence lawfully available to defendant, because of his predicate felony status.Because defendant was a second felony drug offender previously convicted of a violent felony, he faced a statutory sentencing range of 6 to 15 years in prison on his third-degree drug sale conviction (seePenal Law § 70.70[4][b][i] ).But, the court was not informed of this issue and never discovered it on its own.

Before the sentencing, defendant was arrested for marijuana and trespass offenses.The court held a hearing pursuant to People v. Outley , 80 N.Y.2d 702, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356(1993) to determine whether defendant had violated the terms of his plea agreement.After hearing testimony from a police officer and the parties' arguments, the court found that defendant had violated the terms of the plea by engaging in misconduct constituting criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree (seePenal Law § 221.10[1] ).

At the sentencing proceeding, the court reiterated that defendant had violated the terms of his plea deal, and the court noted that, based on the People's written submissions, it appeared that defendant had tried to suborn perjury and arrange for the presentation of false evidence of an alibi in connection with his postplea marijuana offense.

At no point did defendant challenge the legality of the initial promised three-year determinate sentence or the sentencing range.The court then stated, “So he's sentenced to 6 years [in prison], which is an appropriate enhancement in view of all of the things that went on related to this case.”Subsequently, defendant appealed.

A divided panel of this Court reversed the judgment, on the law, vacated defendant's guilty plea and remanded the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings (seePeople v. Williams,123 A.D.3d at 241–247, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559 ).The majority concluded that the plea had violated due process because it was induced by an illegal sentence and that preservation therefore was not required (id. at 244, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559 ).On the merits, the Court ruled that Supreme Court's error had affected the voluntariness of defendant's plea, and therefore vacatur of the plea was the only proper remedy (seeid. at 245–247, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559 ).

Two Justices dissented and voted to affirm (seeid. at 247–250, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559[Tom, J.P., dissenting] ).According to the dissent, defendant had to preserve his challenge to the legality of his guilty plea, and the court's imposition of a lawful six-year prison term was within the range of sentence promised in the event that defendant violated the terms of the plea agreement and therefore met his legitimate sentencing expectations (seeid. at 248–250, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559 ).

The Court of Appeals reversed this Court on preservation grounds, holding that defendant was “obligated to preserve his claim”(27 N.Y.3d at 225, 32 N.Y.S.3d 17, 51 N.E.3d 528 ), and had a “reasonable opportunity to attack the legality of his guilty plea in the court of first instance” but did not “take advantage of that opportunity,” and thus “failed to preserve his current claim for appellate review”(id. at 214, 32 N.Y.S.3d 17, 51 N.E.3d 528 ).

The Court of Appeals remitted this case for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on the prior appeal to this Court.Specifically, we are to consider whether to review defendant's unpreserved challenge to the validity of his plea as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (id. at 224, 32 N.Y.S.3d 17, 51 N.E.3d 528 ).We decline to do so.

Defendant contends that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because the initial promised sentence which induced the plea was illegal, and because the plea conditions were ambiguous.The dissent concludes that the plea violated defendant's due process rights because “the evident misunderstanding by the trial court and by the parties in this matter [regarding the correct sentencing range], result[ed] in defendant's incomplete understanding of the implications of entering a guilty plea”(quotingWilliams at 247, 995 N.Y.S.2d 559 ).

It is settled that when a criminal defendant waives the fundamental right to trial by jury and pleads guilty, due process requires that the waiver be knowing, voluntary and intelligent (People v. Catu,4 N.Y.3d 242, 245, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081[2005] ).However, defendant's present due process claim is without merit.The Court of Appeals implied that the illegality of the promised sentence does not, in itself, render a defendant's guilty plea unknowing and involuntary (seePeople v. Williams,87 N.Y.2d 1014, 1015, 643 N.Y.S.2d 469, 666 N.E.2d 174[1996] ).In Williams,the Supreme Court, sua sponte, resentenced defendant to 3 ½ to 10 ½ years pursuant to a guilty plea to burglary in the second degree because the originally-imposed sentence of 3 ½ to 7 years was unlawful (id. ).The Court of Appeals, in rejecting the defendant's attempt to vacate the plea on double jeopardy grounds stated, “That claim would be colorable only if the defendant's sentence had been increased beyond his legitimate expectations of what the final sentence should be”(id. ).Since the sentencing court informed the defendant during the plea proceeding that he could receive a sentence of up to 15 years in prison, the sentence of 3 ½ to 10 ½ years was within his legitimate expectation of the final sentence (id.;see alsoPeople v. Collier,22 N.Y.3d 429, 433–434, 982 N.Y.S.2d 34, 5 N.E.3d 5[2013], cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2730, 189 L.Ed.2d 770[2014] ).Indeed, in Collier,the Court of Appeals held that

“if the originally promised sentence cannot be imposed in strict compliance with the plea agreement, the sentencing court may impose another lawful sentence that comports with the defendant's legitimate expectations.Again, ‘the reasonable understanding and expectations of the parties, rather than technical distinctions in semantics, control the question of whether a particular sentence imposed violates a plea agreement’ ”(id. at 434, 982 N.Y.S.2d 34, 5 N.E.3d 5, quotingGammarano v. United States,732 F.2d 273, 276[2d Cir.1984] ).

Here, defendant was told that he could receive up to 12 years' imprisonment if he failed to comply with the conditions set by the court.In fact, he was expressly warned during the plea proceedings that if he committed another crime before the sentence was pronounced he could be sentenced up to 12 years, that he would not get his plea back, and that the court would decide the appropriate sentence.Thus, the six-year statutory minimum sentence finally imposed after defendant violated the conditions of the plea was clearly within the legitimate expected sentencing range of up to 12 years (Collier,22 N.Y.3d at 434, 982 N.Y.S.2d 34, 5 N.E.3d 5;see alsoPeople v. DeValle,94 N.Y.2d 870, 871–872, 704 N.Y.S.2d 924, 726 N.E.2d 476[2000] ).The dissent focuses on the promised sentence of three years.However, this was a conditional plea agreement and defendant violated the conditions of the plea.Thus, he was no longer entitled to the three-year sentence.Because the final sentence was lawful and within the expectations of the parties, defendant's plea did not violate his due process rights.More succinctly, because defendant violated the conditions of the plea, “there could be no expectation of finality on his part with respect to the lesser and illegal sentence”(People v. Williams,87 N.Y.2d at 1015, 643 N.Y.S.2d 469, 666 N.E.2d 174 ).

Notably, the Court of Appeals' binding rulings in Williams,Collier, and DeValle are controlling law and dispositive of defendant's due process claim.The dissent relies on the dissenting opinion to the Court of Appeals' decision remitting this case to us(seePeople v. Williams,27 N.Y.3d at 225–235, 32 N.Y.S.3d 17, 51 N.E.3d 528 ), to refute these rulings.However, even that dissenting opinion recognized that a sentencing court has the power to correct an illegal sentence (id. at 228, 32 N.Y.S.3d 17, 51 N.E.3d 528 ).Further, that dissenting opinion addresses the situation where a defendant violates...