People v. Williams

Decision Date04 May 2021
Docket NumberB304345
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TIMOTHY THOMAS WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA099542)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________ On August 6, 1996, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Timothy Thomas Williams of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1)1 with a robbery-murder special circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), robbery (§ 211; count 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 13). As to counts 1 through 3, the jury also found principal firearm use allegations to be true. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus 10 years four months. On direct appeal, we modified defendant's sentence to strike a four-month principal armed enhancement attached to count 3 and affirmed the judgment as modified. (People v. Key (Aug. 5, 1998, B105415) [nonpub. opn.], at pp. 4, 31 (Key).) The abstract of judgment was amended to reflect defendant's new sentence.

On March 18, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. Over the People's opposition, the trial court found that defendant had established a prima facie case and held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d). Following the presentation of evidence and argument, the trial court denied defendant's petition, finding that (1) he was a direct aider and abettor who had the intent to kill, and (2) he was a major participant in the crimes who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Defendant timely appealed. On appeal, he argues that the trial court's order denying his section 1170.95 petition must be reversed because (1) the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard requiring that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of murder under the current law;and (2) there is insufficient evidence that he either aided and abetted with intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. We are not convinced by defendant's arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

"On the morning of July 20, 1994, [Sonja] Key, [defendant], [Zoelee] Isaac, and one other man entered Home Bank. They were all armed.2 Key was wearing a wig. [Defendant], dressed in what appeared to be a brown United Parcel Service uniform, approached the bank guard Juan Corona. An argument and struggle for Corona's gun ensued. Key walked over to the two men. She began to struggle with Corona. She said, 'Get him off me or I'll pop him.' Key shot Corona in the neck, and he subsequently bled to death. Key ordered everyone in the bank to the floor. Isaac and the fourth robber brandished their weapons and demanded money. They demanded that teller Jumpee Sue Martinez and corporate officer Roy Foster give them money from the teller drawers. They did so. The robbers took $2,869 in all from unlocked teller stations and then fled in a stolen hot-wired van. They abandoned the van and were driven off in a Pontiac. The van contained wigs and a bucket of soapy water." (Key, supra, B105415, at p. 6.)

Approximately two weeks later, defendant, Isaac, and codefendant Tianay Robinson (Robinson) "were apprehended in a stolen hot-wired van within 200 feet of a Wells Fargo Bank."(Key, supra, B105415, at p. 7.) Two other codefendants and Key were apprehended in a red Pontiac. "Police, who had been watching defendants' activities, concluded that they were about to rob the bank." (Ibid.) Three of the coconspirators were wearing wigs, and four "were all wearing heavy makeup. The police found loaded guns, a laundry basket with plastic trash bag liners filled with water, wigs, a pillowcase, and a police scanner and manual in the vehicles. They also found incriminating evidence in Key's apartment, from which" most (if not all) of the coconspirators had exited just prior to driving to the Wells Fargo Bank. (Ibid.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Defendant's section 1170.95 petition

On March 18, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing and requested that counsel be appointed to represent him during the resentencing process. The trial court appointed counsel and requested briefing on the petition.

II. The People's opposition

On July 19, 2019, the People filed an opposition to defendant's petition. The People argued, inter alia, that defendant was not entitled to relief because both the jury at trial and the Court of Appeal on direct appeal found that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

According to the People, they were "tasked with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant could have been convicted under a theory of homicide still viable under SB 1437." And, they met their burden of demonstrating that defendant was ineligible for resentencing "beyond a reasonable doubt." In support, they pointed out that defendant played a key role in thesophisticated plan to rob the bank. He was dressed in a brown uniform and immediately attempted to take the security guard's gun. He and the "robbery crew" then "took the bank's money and fled in a stolen van which contained water to mitigate the powder packets that may have been triggered." After they fled the scene, they switched cars.

The People also asserted that defendant had to have been aware of the particular danger of his crime given that his role was to take the security guard by surprise and then take his gun. And, defendant was in a position to facilitate or prevent the murder. He was present at the scene of the crime; Key told him that she was going to kill Corona if someone did not get him off of her; and he did not intervene or render aid to the dying man.

Attached to the opposition, the People provided the trial court with a copy of Key, a copy of the jury verdict, and a copy of the jury instructions given at defendant's trial.

III. Defendant's response

Through counsel, defendant responded to the People's opposition. Among other things, counsel argued that the People did not meet their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could be convicted today on a theory of accomplice liability. Specifically, when urging the trial court not to consider Key, defense counsel asserted that "the appellate court applied a highly deferential standard and was required to uphold the guilty verdict if possible—which is a completely different standard than this Court must apply when deciding whether to issue an OSC here. Following a guilty verdict, an appellate court reviewing the conviction must view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment. The reviewing court does not determine 'whether it believes that the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond areasonable doubt,'" which "is the opposite of what the Court now is bound to use in determining whether to issue an OSC." Citing subdivision (d)(3) of section 1170.95, defense counsel concluded that the People bore "the ultimate burden" of proving defendant ineligible for resentencing "'beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Counsel went on to argue why the People had not met their burden and why the evidence did not support a finding that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. He did not offer any additional evidence in support of his petition.

IV. Hearing on defendant's petition and trial court order

On January 15, 2020, the trial court determined that defendant had set forth a prima facie case for relief because the People had prosecuted him on a felony murder theory. It then proceeded into a hearing on the petition, pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d).

The parties submitted on their briefs and whatever materials had been submitted by the parties to the trial court. Defendant declined an opportunity to testify, no new evidence was presented, and there was no discussion of the burden of proof.

After entertaining oral argument, the trial court denied defendant's section 1170.95 petition. It stated: "[B]ased on his conduct during the Home Bank robbery he was a direct aider and abettor of the robbery who had the intent to kill. [Defendant] entered the bank in disguise, an afro wig, brownish uniform . . . , and the express purpose was to rob the bank. [¶] [Defendant] struggled with the security guard, Corona, and attempted to obtain his gun. Co-defendant Key joined in the struggle with Corona and announced, 'get him off me or I will pop him.' Shethen drew a semiautomatic handgun from under her sweater and shot Corona. [¶] [Defendant] was part of a sophisticated ring of robbers who went around robbing banks and many of the participants in the robbery were armed. . . . [¶] [Defendant] exhibited intent to kill by engaging in this violent robbery, by taking on the armed security guard, and by helping Ms. Key, who eventually shot the security guard." The trial court added: "You can also infer these are not amateurs or beginners. I indicated that [defendant's] actions trying to take the gun from Corona facilitated the murder. I guess that goes to the aiding and...

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