People v. Williams

Decision Date12 December 1977
Docket NumberCr. 16181
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Lawrence R. Horn, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Derald E. Granberg, Jamie Jacobs-May, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

Appellant has appealed from a judgment of imprisonment entered on jury verdicts which found her guilty of murder in the second degree, aggravated by the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense. The victim died from wounds inflicted by the appellant's sister. She shot him with her own weapon in response to an appeal that she do so from the appellant. At the time the appellant was engaged in a struggle with the victim over her own weapon, which was never fired. The sister was acquitted, and the appellant contends that the verdict finding her guilty must be set aside because it is inconsistent with the verdict acquitting her sister, who in fact fired the fatal shots. She also asserts that the finding that she used a gun in the commission of the offense cannot be sustained under the circumstances of this case.

We conclude, from our examination of the record, that the jury were justified in finding that the appellant, with malice, caused the victim's death by using her sister as an innocent agent to accomplish the intended death of the victim. The evidence supports the implied findings that the appellant was the aggressor in the mutual combat between herself and the victim; that her use of a deadly weapon supplied the necessary malice for murder; that, failing to decline any further struggle after the victim acted to protect himself, she was not entitled to justify his killing as in self-defense; and that through her entreaty, she was the effective cause of the discharge of the firearm in her sister's hand. The fact that the sister was acquitted is of no comfort to appellant, because each acted under different circumstances.

The evidence also sustains the finding that appellant used a firearm within the provisions of section 12022.5 of the Penal Code, as it read prior to July 1, 1977.

Appellant and her former boyfriend, Charles Brooks, had two children, aged six and seven, respectively, at the time of the events in question. They had been living separately, but recently she had spent a night with him at his house. The children were apparently in Brooks' custody but were actually kept by a friend of his.

On April 20, 1976, according to the appellant's prior statement to her uncle and subsequent statement to the police, Brooks telephoned appellant and asked her if she wanted to come over to his house to see the children. She drove over to the house where Charles Brooks lived with his brother Henry Brooks about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and when she arrived she asked Brooks where the children were. The appellant told the police that Brooks told her they were upstairs. When, after they had both gone upstairs, appellant discovered the children were not there, she and Brooks began to argue. He told her to leave. A struggle ensued in which, according to her report to the officer, Brooks struck appellant with a hammer. She suffered a cut beneath her left eye. According to Brooks she struck her face against the door jam as he was attempting to pull her out of his room. He denied having invited her over, or having told her the children were there.

Appellant used the telephone at the house to call the police. On his arrival, Officer Churchill observed Brooks striking appellant and knocking her down in the front yard. The officer took Brooks into custody and then went in the house with appellant so the officer could continue his investigation of the incident. While they were in the house Brooks' brother-in-law, Tillman Washington, arrived with his wife and stepson. Brooks asked him to keep the house secure until he or his brother returned. The appellant refused to leave the house and insisted that she had some belongings upstairs that she wanted to get. Washington wanted her to leave and asked the officer to remain until she did so. The officer told her to go and to wait until Brooks was released from custody, and then the police would help her retrieve her belongings if necessary.

Appellant was angry and belligerent. With the officer's permission, she telephoned her sister Jo Ann and asked her to come over and pick her up. When Jo Ann, accompanied by their uncle, arrived she found the appellant bleeding and very upset. Jo Ann tried to calm her sister and get her to leave, but finally it was necessary for her and the uncle to physically escort appellant out of the house. As appellant was leaving she turned to the crowd which had gathered, and looking at Officer Churchill and Washington, who were standing together, shouted, "I'm going to kill both you mother fuckers" or words of similar import.

Appellant got into her uncle's pickup truck and drove off with him, followed by Jo Ann, driving the car in which appellant had driven to Brooks' residence. A short time later both vehicles stopped in the parking lot of a nearby store. Appellant, who had apparently calmed down, told Jo Ann she wanted to return to Brooks' house and get her belongings. Jo Ann tried to persuade her to go to a hospital instead, but was unsuccessful. She tried to calm her sister and told her not to argue with anyone at Brooks'. They returned directly together, according to Jo Ann, although they each gave statements to the police which indicated appellant returned home and secured a weapon.

During the foregoing events several people had assembled at the Brooks' house. In addition to Washington, the victim, his wife and stepson, the next door neighbors and their daughter and nephew were also in and out of the house. These witnesses all observed various aspects of the incidents which marked the defendant's two visits to the Brooks' house. From their testimony, although with some conflicts, the events which transpired may be pieced together as set forth herein.

On arrival at Brooks' house the two sisters approached the front door. Appellant knocked on the front door and entered while her sister waited outside. Once inside appellant asked permission to retrieve her belongings. Washington refused her request, and tried to calm her and convince her to leave. Meanwhile Jo Ann had grown impatient and also asked appellant to leave. Appellant then walked toward the door followed by Washington. Jo Ann heard her say "What you do that for?" As appellant and Washington reached the door, the appellant drew a weapon from her purse. A struggle broke out between them. Washington tried to grab her hands and remove the gun and the struggle continued. Jo Ann approached and viewed the participants struggling over the gun. She did not know to whom the gun belonged or who had started the altercation. Jo Ann did observe that Washington had gained the upper hand, and that although appellant had a hand on the gun it was close to, and pointing at, the appellant's face. She thought Washington was going to kill her sister. Jo Ann produced a gun from her own clothing and yelled, "Drop my sister or I'll shoot!" or "Let my sister go or I'll shoot!" As the struggle continued appellant shouted, "Shoot him! Shoot him!" or "Kill him! Kill him!" Appellant at no time tried to retreat or end the struggle. Washington retained his grasp on the gun. Jo Ann then fired the gun three or four times and Washington died of the resulting gunshot wounds.

Appellant grabbed Jo Ann, who was in a trance-like state, and the two fled the scene in their car. They were spotted by an airborne patrol and were arrested a short time later. The gun Jo Ann threw out of the car was retrieved. An expended cartridge and two rounds of ammunition were also found near the gun.

The appellant did not testify in her own defense. Her sister's testimony supported her own defense that the homicide was justifiable as committed in defense of a third person.

The court instructed the jury concerning the various degrees and forms of homicide, and the principles governing justification by reason of self-defense or defense of another. 1 The jury acquitted Jo Ann but returned a verdict of second degree murder against the defendant.

I

When the facts are examined in the light of principles of law governing aiders and abettors, self-defense, defense of another, commission of a crime through the innocent agency of another, and criminal liability for acts reasonably resulting from the provocation of the use of deadly force, it is clear that any alleged inconsistency in the verdicts does not exist, and that the evidence sustains appellant's conviction of murder.

A

The evidence may have been sufficient to sustain a finding that the appellant and her sister armed themselves and returned to the Brooks' house with the intent and purpose of either securing what appellant sought regardless of what resistance might be encountered, or to inflict vengeance or punishment on Washington for his prior refusal to permit the appellant to reenter the house. (See People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 185, 74 Cal.Rptr. 262 (cert. den. (1969) 395 U.S. 968, 89 S.Ct. 2116, 23 L.Ed.2d 755, and (1972) 406 U.S. 971, 92 S.Ct. 2416, 32 L.Ed.2d 671); People v. Simpson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 553, 571, 275 P.2d 31; People v. Travis (1880)56 Cal. 251, 255; People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 133, 318 P.2d 828; People v. Turner (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 791, 801-802, 195 P.2d 809; People v. Blackwood (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 728, 732, 96 P.2d 982; and People v. Terman (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 345, 347, 40 P.2d 915.) If such were the case there would be some merit in the appellant's contention that the acquittal of her sister, who...

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