People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 24 November 1987
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 97391,97754
• Citation: 415 N.W.2d 301,163 Mich.App. 744
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bennie Ray WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bennie Ray WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee. 163 Mich.App. 744, 415 N.W.2d 301
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 301

415 N.W.2d 301

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bennie Ray WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bennie Ray WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 97391, 97754.

163 Mich.App. 744, 415 N.W.2d 301

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 9, 1987.

Decided Oct. 19, 1987.

Released for Publication Nov. 24, 1987.

[163 MICHAPP 746] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Robert E. Weiss, Pros. Atty., Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Div., and Lenore M. Ferber, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

J. Michael Buckley, Flint, for defendant-appellant.

Before KELLY, P.J., and BEASLEY and EDWARDS, ^* JJ.

BEASLEY, Judge.

This case involves two consolidated interlocutory appeals. Defendant has been charged with first-degree felony murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, allegedly committed in the perpetration of an armed robbery. ¹ In Docket No. 97391, the prosecutor appeals from an order by acting [163 MICHAPP 747] Circuit Judge Kenneth M. Siegel suppressing certain statements made by defendant to the police. In Docket No. 97754, defendant appeals from an order made by Circuit Judge Donald R. Freeman denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.

Defendant was arrested on June 25, 1985, in connection with the murder of Walter Pano. At the time of his arrest, he was fifteen years and eleven months old. On motion of the prosecutor and after a waiver hearing, the probate judge entered an order on July 11, 1985, waiving jurisdiction over defendant. Defendant appealed the waiver order to the circuit court where, after oral argument, an order was entered on February 4, 1986, affirming the probate court's waiver of jurisdiction. On February 19, 1986, after preliminary examination, defendant was bound over for trial on the first-degree felony murder charge. After arraignment, trial was tentatively scheduled for May 8, 1986.

On April 2, 1986, defendant moved to suppress certain inculpatory statements he had made to the police on June 25, 1985. A Walker ² hearing was scheduled for May 28, 1986, and, for purposes of the Walker hearing only, the case was reassigned to acting Circuit Judge Kenneth M. Siegel who presided over the Walker hearing. On May 8, 1986, the trial court adjourned the trial until July 29, 1986, to accommodate the Walker hearing. After the Walker hearing began on May 28, 1986, the prosecutor's request for an adjournment was granted, but the testimony of one witness, defendant's mother, was taken because she had come from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and defense counsel wanted to preserve her testimony in case she was [163 MICHAPP 748] not able to return to Flint. The hearing was then rescheduled for June 9, 1986.

In a bench opinion on July 28, 1986, Judge Siegel, who had heard the Walker hearing, suppressed defendant's statements to police on the ground that they were not voluntarily made. On July 29, 1986, the circuit court granted the prosecutor's motion to adjourn based upon her allegation that she intended to seek leave to appeal the suppression ruling made in the Walker hearing. Defense counsel opposed the adjournment motion, stating that defendant was prepared to go to trial. The circuit court granted the adjournment and rescheduled the matter for December 2, 1986.

At a hearing on entry of the proposed suppression order on August 21, 1986, Judge Siegel entered the order and issued a further opinion supplementing his earlier bench opinion. In addition to reaffirming his ruling that defendant's statements were not voluntarily made, Judge Siegel also concluded that the statements had to be suppressed because the police had exploited the delay in bringing defendant before the probate court as a tool to extract the confession. On September 26, 1986, the prosecutor filed a motion for rehearing on the suppression order based in part on the then-available tape recordings of defendant's statements to police.

On December 2, 1986, trial was again delayed because the circuit judge was presiding over another criminal trial. On December 3, 1986, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based upon his claim that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. That motion was heard on December 15, 1986, and was denied and trial was rescheduled for February 25, 1987. On December 19, 1986, the prosecutor filed a claim of appeal with this Court and, on December 26, 1986, the circuit judge entered an [163 MICHAPP 749] order denying defendant's motion for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial. On January 6, 1987, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court from the circuit judge's order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. We granted leave to appeal on February 27, 1987, and, at that time, consolidated the two appeals.

On appeal, the prosecutor claims that the trial court erred in concluding (1) that defendant's statements to police were not voluntarily made and (2) that the police exploited the delay in bringing defendant before the probate court as a tool to extract a confession from him. We disagree. There was no error in the conclusions reached by the judge.

The standard of review for evaluation of a trial court's findings in a Walker hearing are set forth in People v. Lumley: ³

"On appeal from a Walker hearing, we are required to examine the entire record and reach an independent determination of the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.... We will affirm the trial court's ruling unless it is clearly erroneous, such that we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made....

"The voluntariness of a confession must be determined from all of the facts and circumstances, including the duration of detention, the manifest attitude of the police toward the suspect, the physical and mental state of the suspect, and the pressures which may sap or sustain the suspect's powers of resistance and self-control." (Citations omitted.)

Lumley cites People v. Catey, ⁴ where we made it clear that if there are credibility issues, we accord [163 MICHAPP 750] special deference to the trial judge's findings regarding that issue.

In the within case, additional procedural safeguards existed in favor of defendant because he was a juvenile at the time of his questioning by police. These safeguards are contained in M.C.L. Sec. 764.27; M.S.A. Sec. 28.886, which provides:

"Whenever any child under the age of 17 years is arrested with or without a warrant, such child shall be taken immediately before the juvenile division of the probate court of the county wherein the offense is alleged to have been committed and the officer making the arrest shall immediately make and file or cause to be made and filed, a petition against such child as provided by chapter 12A of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 1939, as amended, being sections 712A.1 to 712A.28 of the Compiled Laws of 1948 and the court shall proceed to hear and determine the matter in like manner as provided by said act, as amended." (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, MCR 5.903(E) provides that when a child under the age of seventeen is taken into custody during the hours that the court is open, the police officer must immediately take the child before the juvenile division of the probate court. In addition, MCR 5.903(E) and MCR 5.902(C) provide that when a child under the age of seventeen is taken into custody, the parent, guardian or custodian is to be notified immediately and reasonable steps must be taken to provide for their presence at the child's hearing before the probate court. As a general rule, M.C.L. Sec. 712A.16; M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178 (598.16) provides that a child under the age of seventeen shall not be confined in any police station, prison, jail, lockup or reformatory. In addition, MCR 5.906(B) provides that in order for a child to [163 MICHAPP 751] voluntarily, understandingly waive his right to an attorney, the concurrence of the child's parent, guardian, custodian or guardian ad litem must be obtained.

The effect of failure by police to comply with the procedural safeguards of M.C.L. Sec. 764.27; M.S.A. Sec. 28.886 has not always been automatic suppression of statements made by the accused during the improper delay in bringing him before the probate court. But a line of cases, beginning with People v. Roberts ⁵ in 1966, has appeared to so hold. In People v. Wolff, ⁶ we followed this rule, saying:

"We reverse on the authority of People v. Roberts, 3 Mich App 605 [143 NW2d 182 (1966) ]. The failure to take this minor defendant before the juvenile court immediately, as required by CL 1948, Sec. 764.27 [MSA 28.886], was a violation of defendant's right to due process and vitiated the August 14 confession. The subsequent finding of voluntariness did not cure this defect."

A further strong example was People v. Allen, ⁷ where we said:

"The Juvenile Court Rules of 1969 set out specific procedures to assure that a child is taken promptly before the juvenile court. See JCR 1969, 2.2, 3.1, 4, 6. Furthermore, in People v Wolff, 23 Mich App 550, 552; 179 NW2d 206 (1970), this Court specifically found that the failure to take a minor defendant before the juvenile court immediately, as required by MCL 764.27; MSA 28.886, violated defendant's right to due process and invalidated his confession. See also MCL 712A.14, 712A.16; MSA 27.3178(598.14), 27.3178(598.16)."

[163 MICHAPP 752] On the other hand, in People v. Irby, ⁸ we chose to review the totality of circumstances and refused to find that violation of the statute providing that a juvenile be taken immediately before a juvenile court official required suppression of a confession. A similar case is People v. Jordan, ⁹ where, in upholding suppression of a confession made by a sixteen-year-old, we said:

"We conduct an independent review of the record but will not reverse unless we come to a definite and firm conviction that the court's findings were...