People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 16 May 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 156782
• Citation: 205 Mich.App. 229,517 N.W.2d 315
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darnell Maurice WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 315

517 N.W.2d 315

205 Mich.App. 229

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darnell Maurice WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 156782.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 9, 1993, at Grand Rapids.

Decided May 16, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication June 30, 1994.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Dennis M. Wiley, Pros. Atty., and Elizabeth A. Wild, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

William D. Renner, II, Coldwater, for defendant on appeal.

Before McDONALD, P.J., and MURPHY and TAYLOR, JJ.

TAYLOR, Judge.

Defendant pleaded guilty of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, M.C.L § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), a charge carrying a mandatory one- to twenty-year prison term. ¹ Under subsection 4 of that statute, the sentencing judge was authorized to depart from the mandatory minimum term for substantial and compelling reasons. ² Because defendant is a repeat drug offender, he is subject to the sentence augmentation provision of the controlled substances act, M.C.L. § 333.7413(2); M.S.A. § 14.15(7413)(2), under which he "may be imprisoned for a term no more than twice the term otherwise authorized...." Thus, the sentence enhancement provision allows defendant's statutory mandatory prison term to be raised from one to twenty years to a possible two to forty years. ³ However, the sentencing court sentenced defendant to ten to forty years in prison. ⁴ Defendant appeals this sentence as of right, and we affirm.

The first issue on appeal is whether the guidelines apply to offenders sentenced under the sentence enhancement provision of § 7413(2), i.e., whether a defendant whose sentence was enhanced under the second-or subsequent-offender provision of the controlled substances act is an "habitual offender" for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. We conclude that such an offender is an habitual offender; therefore the guidelines do not apply.

This issue was raised in the trial court when defendant moved for resentencing on the grounds now advanced on appeal. The sentencing judge denied the motion on the ground that the instructions for the second edition of the sentencing guidelines specifically state that the guidelines do not apply to habitual offenders, an undefined catchall phrase he viewed as being equally applicable to an offender "habitualized" under the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., M.C.L. § 769.10-769.12; M.S.A. § 28.1082-28.1084, or under the second- or subsequent-offender provision of the controlled substances act, M.C.L. § 333.7413(2); M.S.A. § 14.15(7413)(2). In addition, the judge pointed out that there is no grid in the sentencing guidelines for drug offenses that shows a statutory maximum of 480 months (forty years), demonstrating that habitual drug offenders were never intended to be sentenced under the guidelines. We agree with the sentencing judge.

The "Basic Information and General Instructions," paragraph B.3, prefacing the guidelines, says:

Even though the Sentencing Guidelines do not apply where an offender is to be sentenced as an habitual offender, the judge must complete the SIR on the underlying offense. This information will aid in the development of guidelines to cover habitual offenders [Emphasis supplied.]

Toward the end of the instructions, the following paragraph is found:

HABITUAL INFORMATION

The Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to Habitual Offender Convictions. In order to develop guidelines for Habitual Offenders, the judge must record, on the SIR, when the offender is convicted as an habitual offender, the level of conviction, and the new statutory maximum. [Emphasis supplied.]

Defendant correctly points out that our Supreme Court has distinguished between sentences imposed under the habitual offender provisions of the penal code and those imposed under the habitual offender provisions of the controlled substances act. People v. Eason, 435 Mich. 228, 458 N.W.2d 17 (1990). See also People v. Scott, 197 Mich.App. 28, 29, n. 1, 494 N.W.2d 765 (1992). However, the distinctions drawn in Eason pertain to procedural due process safeguards. 435 Mich. at 232-233, 458 N.W.2d 17. The differences between the habitual offender statutes, which the Eason Court described as "alternate sentencing provisions," and the provisions of the controlled substances act, described as "penalty-enhancement provisions," are not particularly helpful in deciding the issue presented.

In interpreting the guidelines, we are guided by the rules of statutory construction. People v. Johnson, 202 Mich.App. 281, 291, 508 N.W.2d 509 (1993). The first criterion of statutory interpretation is the specific language used; the meaning plainly expressed is presumed to be the meaning intended. People v. Hawkins, 181 Mich.App. 393, 396, 448 N.W.2d 858 (1989); People v. Miller, 186 Mich.App. 238, 241, 463 N.W.2d 250 (1990), modified 440 Mich. 631, 489 N.W.2d 60 (1992). Unless defined, every word or phrase should be given its plain and ordinary meaning; technical terms are to be given their peculiar meaning. M.C.L. § 8.3a; M.S.A. § 2.212(1); People v. Tracy, 186 Mich.App. 171, 176, 463 N.W.2d 457 (1990).

The instructions for the sentencing guidelines do not define "habitual offenders." Nor, as the sentencing judge astutely recognized, does the word "habitual" or the phrase "habitual offender" appear anywhere in §§ 10-12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, in construing the sentencing guidelines instructions, we give the phrase "habitual offender" its ordinary meaning, i.e., an offender who persists in engaging in criminal activity. This definition fits repeat drug offenders like defendant.

Another rule of statutory construction is that provisions must be read in context so as to produce an harmonious whole. In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich. 242, 251, 439 N.W.2d 246 (1989). The guidelines in their entirety do not accommodate enhanced sentencing, no matter which statutory provision enhancement derives from. There are no grids reflecting the lengthened statutory maximum sentences in any such cases. In keeping with the guidelines instructions, this Court has previously held that the guidelines apply only to the minimum sentence for felonies for which the guidelines manual provides sentencing range grids. People v. Douglas (On Remand), 191 Mich.App. 660, 663, 478 N.W.2d 737 (1991). The Douglas rationale precludes application of the guidelines in this case; the guidelines range...