People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 08 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 141161.,Calendar No. 3. |
| Citation | 491 Mich. 164,814 N.W.2d 270 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Glenn Terrance WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Tony Tague, Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles F. Justian, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Peter Ellenson for defendant.
Defendant appeals here his conviction of armed robbery. In particular, defendant argues that because he was unsuccessful in feloniously taking or removing any actual property from the intended target of his robbery, there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the charge of armed robbery. We disagree. When the Legislature revised the robbery statute, MCL 750.530, to encompass a “course of conduct” theory of robbery, it specifically included “an attempt to commit the larceny” as sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery itself. We conclude that this amendment effectuated a substantive change in the law governing robbery in Michigan such that a completed larceny is no longer necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery or armed robbery.
On July 13, 2006, defendant entered a gas station, declared that he had a gun, and ordered the attendant to give him all the money in the cash register. After the attendant complied, defendant forced the attendant into a back room and fled the scene with approximately $160 in stolen cash. The next day, defendant entered a tobacco shop, approached the clerk with his hand in his jacket, and stated, “You know what this is, just give me what I want.” The clerk did not give defendant any money or property, and defendant fled from the store without having stolen anything. Defendant was apprehended later that day by the police.
The prosecutor charged defendant with armed robbery 1 of the gas station and, in a separate information, charged defendant alternatively with assault with intent to rob while armed 2 and armed robbery for the events related to the tobacco shop. Defendant elected to plead guilty in both cases. At defendant's plea hearing, the prosecutor advised that he would dismiss the charge of assault with intent to rob while armed in the tobacco shop case in return for defendant's guilty plea to armed robbery.
After advising defendant of his options and constitutional rights, the circuit court established a factual basis for the plea relating to the incident that occurred at the tobacco shop. Under questioning by the prosecutor, defendant admitted that he had entered the tobacco shop with the intent to steal money, had his hand “up under” his coat, and told the clerk, “You know what this is, just give me what I want.” Defendant further admitted that “it was [his] intent, at that time, for [the clerk] to give [him] the money out of the cash register.” The court accepted defendant's guilty plea.3 On February 9, 2007, the court sentenced defendant pursuant to a plea entered in accordance with People v. Cobbs4 to concurrent prison terms of 24 to 40 years for the tobacco shop and gas station robberies.
Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his pleas, contending that an adequatefactual basis did not exist to support either conviction. Pertinent here, defendant argued that there was no evidence that he had taken or removed any property from the tobacco shop and that, absent a completed larceny, he could not be found guilty of armed robbery. The circuit court denied defendant's motions. The court ruled that the language of the armed robbery statute as amended in 2004 allows for a conviction based on an attempted larceny, a basis that the plea discussions substantiated.5 The Court of Appeals granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether a factual basis existed for his conviction of the tobacco store robbery.6
In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed.7 The majority acknowledged that while at common law a robbery required a completed larceny, the crimes of robbery and armed robbery now encompass attempts to commit those offenses following the 2004 statutory amendments. The dissenting judge argued that when the 2004 revisions are viewed through the “lens of common-law definitions,” there is inadequate support for the conclusion that the armed robbery statute would permit a conviction without an accomplished larceny.8
We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal to determine “whether a larceny needs to be completed before a defendant may be convicted of armed robbery.” 9
This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of MCL 750.529 and MCL 750.530 and, in particular, whether the Legislature intended to remove the completed larceny requirement from the crime of robbery when it amended those statutes in 2004. Matters of statutory interpretation raise questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo.10
In this appeal, we are concerned with the statutes pertaining to robbery, MCL 750.530, and armed robbery, MCL 750.529. At common law, the offense of robbery was defined as “the felonious taking of money or goods of value from the person of another or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear.” 11 “To constitute robbery, it [was] essential that there be a ‘taking from the person.’ ” 12 Thus, common law robbery required a completed larceny. Armed robbery required the same showing with the additional element that the robber was armed with a dangerous weapon.13
The crimes of robbery and armed robbery have been codified by Michigan statute since 1838.14 All subsequent iterations of the robbery statutes required a completed larceny, consistent with the common law. Before the 2004 amendments, MCL 750.529, defining armed robbery, provided:
Any person who shall assault another, and shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his person, or in his presence, any money or other property, which may be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony....[[15
In People v. Randolph, this Court considered the scope of this previous version of the robbery statute and, in particular, whether the Legislature had adopted a “transactional approach” to robbery. Under a transactional theory of robbery, 16 In Randolph, this Court rejected the transactional approach as inconsistent with the plain language of the robbery statutes and common law history of robbery. Instead, we concluded that 17 Therefore, because “a larceny is complete when the taking occurs,” 18 any “force, violence or putting in fear must be used before or contemporaneous with the taking” in order to elevate a larceny to a robbery.19
Following this Court's decision in Randolph, the Legislature amended the robbery statutes. MCL 750.529, 2004 P.A. 128, now provides:
A person who engages in conduct proscribed under [MCL 750.530, the robbery statute] and who in the course of engaging in that conduct, possesses a dangerous weapon or an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any person present to reasonably believe the article is a dangerous weapon, or who represents orally or otherwise that he or she is in possession of a dangerous weapon, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term of years. If an aggravated assault or serious injury is inflicted by any person while violating this section, the person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years.
Robbery is defined within MCL 750.530; as amended by 2004 P.A. 128, it states, in relevant part:
(1) A person who, in the course of committing a larceny of any money or other property that may be the subject of larceny, uses force or violence against any person who is present, or who assaults or puts the person in fear, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
(2) As used in this section, “ in the course of committing a larceny” includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny, or during commission of the larceny, or in flight or attempted flight after the commission of the larceny, or in an attempt to retain possession of the property.20
The question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended to remove the element of a completed larceny from the crime of robbery when it amended the statutes in 2004. We hold that the Legislature demonstrated a clear intent to remove the element of a completed larceny, signaling a departure from Michigan's historical requirement and its common law underpinnings. Accordingly, an attempted robbery or attempted armed robbery with an incomplete larceny is now sufficient to sustain a conviction under the robbery or armed robbery statutes, respectively.
Our analysis begins, as it must, with the language of the robbery statutes themselves. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” 21 This Court may best discern that intent by reviewing the words of a statute as they have been used by the Legislature. When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, this Court will enforce that statute as written.22
The Legislature revised the robbery statute at issue here by removing the prior requirement that a...
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