People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 03 December 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 20207
• Citation: People v. Williams, 238 N.W.2d 186, 65 Mich.App. 753 (Mich. App. 1975)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gloria Mae WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. 65 Mich.App. 753, 238 N.W.2d 186
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 186

238 N.W.2d 186

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Gloria Mae WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 20207.

65 Mich.App. 753, 238 N.W.2d 186

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Dec. 3, 1975.

Released for Publication Feb. 17, 1976.

[65 MICHAPP 754]Lieberman & Tukel, P.C. by Irving Tukel, Southfield, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol.Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros.Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, App. Chief Asst. Pros.Atty., Barry J. Siegel, Asst. Pros.Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before J. H. GILLIS, P.J., and BRONSON and T. M. BURNS, JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Presiding Judge.

Defendant, Gloria Mae Williams, was convicted by a jury of control of heroin, M.C.L.A. § 335.153;M.S.A. § 18.1123.¹She was sentenced to a prison term of 32 to 48 months and appeals as of right.We reverse.

At trial, the prosecutor introduced testimony showing that defendant was arrested in the living room of the upstairs flat of a two-flat house she owned.Three tinfoil packets containing heroin were discovered in a jewelry box in her bedroom.[65 MICHAPP 755]Defendant testified in her own behalf, claiming she did not know the heroin was in her jewelry box.She explained, too, that she had once been a heroin addict but was not an addict when arrested.

On appeal, defendant contends that certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal arguments denied her a fair trial.Although we will discuss only one of those remarks, we do not, by so doing, imply approval of the others.²

During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said:

'Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, you have an opportunity to effect the drug traffic in this city.You have a voice.You have a chance to use it.'

Although defense counsel objected to the comment, the trial court overruled the objection.

This comment was highly prejudicial.We believe the rationale of People v. Farrar, 36 Mich.App. 294, 193 N.W.2d 363(1971), controls this case.Farrar, supra, adopted the following American Bar Association[65 MICHAPP 756] standard regarding prosecutorial conduct during argument to the jury:

'The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law.'³

This Court is aware of the seriousness of the drug problem and realizes it touches the lives of many average citizens, generating much fear and dismay.We recognize, too, that jurors share the average citizen's desire to eliminate the narcotics traffic.In such an emotion-laden situation, sensibilities are easily inflamed.Because emotional reaction to social problems should play no role in the evaluation of an individual's guilt or innocence, prosecutors must exercise special care to avoid arousing jurors' emotions concerning such issues.

In the instant case, by arguing that the jurors had an 'opportunity to effect the drug traffic in this city', the prosecutor appealed to the jurors' fears and encouraged them to go outside the evidence and decide the case on the basis of their desire to alleviate the drug problem.This type of prosecutorial argument does not comport with the mandate of Farrar, supra, and it will not be allowed by this Court.Consequently, defendant's conviction must be reversed.⁴

[65 MICHAPP 757]We have considered the remaining issue raised by defendant, and we find no error as to it.

Reversed.

BRONSON, Judge (concurring).

I do not feel that we must decide in this case whether the single objected-to remark by the prosecutor, quoted in the majority opinion, alone requires reversal.The prosecutor indulged in a whole series of comments characterizing defendant as the operator of a 'dope house'.That allegation was not supported by the evidence, and focused the attention of the jury on issues broader than the guilt or innocence of Gloria Mae Williams.The prosecutor's remarks resulted in 'manifest injustice', and require us to reverse the defendant's conviction, People v. Styles, 61 Mich.App. 532, 233 N.W.2d 70(1975).

1This statute was repealed by 1971 P.A. 196;M.C.L.A. § 335.341;M.S.A. § 18.1070(41).

2The prosecutor, in closing argument, may draw reasonable inferences based on the evidence.People v. Giacalone, 52 Mich.App. 428, 430, 217 N.W.2d 444, 445(1974).In the instant case, although no evidence was introduced at trtial indicating that narcotics were sold in defendant's home, the prosecutor argued '(t)his was a dope house'.We noted the prejudicial effect of a similar comment, also unsupported by the evidence, in People v. Page, 41 Mich.App. 99, 199 N.W.2d 669(1972).In addition, in spite of the fact that no evidence was offered regarding the method by which the downstairs tenant paid rent to defendant, the prosecutor asked, 'How do you think the rent was paid?Do you think it was paid in cash; or do you think it was paid in tin foil packs of Heroin?'Furthermore, although no evidence was produced connecting defendant with the heroin discovered in the downstairs flat, the prosecutor argu...